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This thesis develops a multidisciplinarily grounded account of the cultural causes
of environmental problems discussed as a question in philosophical and sociolog-
ical theory of social action. The approach is articulated by an original reading of
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
Part 1 of the thesis critically discusses a prominent view of the cultural causes
found in environmentalism and environmental history with significant popular
appeal. In this view, labelled the ideological approach, the human nature rela-
tionship is characterised essentially by our culture’s alleged disrespectful, manip-
ulative and materialistic attitude to nature that is said to have been internalised
by the modern human being and to fundamentally drive our ecologically conse-
quential activities. An alternative organisatory approach is suggested based on
the view that due to division of labour of culturally and geographically dispersed
masses, as well as the everyday character of activities in terms of which we collec-
tively cause environmental problems in global industrial market society, no gen-
eral ideological source of social action can plausibly be posited. An organisatory
approach to the human environmental burden as a function of the collective per-
formance by masses of a shared organisation of activity on a recursive, everyday
basis is a more realistic account of the intensity of human environmental impact.
Part 2 argues that the ideological approach in environmentalism and beyond
can be seen to imply a form of collectivism also found in many classics of Wittgen-
steinian philosophy and social theory, an important common denominator being
their ontological focus on the mental source of social action in shared conceptual
schemes, normative orientations and the like. By contrast, in the Wittgenstein
reading developed in this thesis, his perspective was non-ontological, viewing so-
cial activity as developing processes not defined by their mental source in shared
conceptions but by their organisation. Social life is viewed as being based on
agreement in form of life, that is, in organisation of human activity.
The thesis is a rare and original attempt to make philosophy relevant in the
discussion of a pressing contemporary problem that also advances Wittgenstein-
scholarship to a novel area.
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Aufrecht, Nils Güttler, Anne Ziemke and Christian Baatz as well as all those
who gave comments at my talks.
I thank the examiners of this thesis, Jane Calvert of the University of Edin-
burgh and Nigel Pleasants of the University of Exeter, for their valuable comments
as well as for reading and evaluating the thesis in its own terms.
I also thank Professor Heiner Ganßmann, Professor Gunter Gebauer and Pro-
fessor Frieder Otto Wolf of Freie Universität Berlin as well as Professor Konrad
Ott and Rafael Ziegler of the University of Greifswald for their comments on my
work. I am also thankful for the comments provided by Fernando Vidal of the
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science Berlin on my ideas.
This research was made financially possible by a grant from the Economic
and Social Research Council (ESRC) for which I am grateful to the ESRC and
the Science Studies Unit of the University of Edinburgh. I am also thankful to
the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin for allowing me to
visit and make use of their excellent facilities and services, a fellowship during
which essential research for many parts of this study was conducted. I also thank
Lesley Balharry of the Edinburgh University International Office for helping with
my stay in Berlin.
Finally, I thank Esther, Elmo and his grandparents Terttu, Jarmo, Therese
and Herbert for their generous support, their faith in me, as well as their patience






2 Ecological Modernisation of the Treadmill of Production 11
3 A Deeper Spiritual Malaise 23
4 The Cosmos of Commodification 77
Part 2 95
5 Losing Everything Philosophically Astonishing 95
6 Knowing the Way About 113
7 Agreement in Form of Life 135
8 Collective Inquisition and a Private Ceremony for Nothing 173







... the mutual penetration of history and philosophy. It was a
grandiose and somehow tragic enterprise ... to solve the
conflict between the relative and the absolute ... to work
uncompromisingly in two spheres at the same time, to
consider the temporal and the eternal simultaneously, and to
apportion to each its actual importance.
— Gerhard Masur on Wilhelm Dilthey1
Human induced environmental change appears to be taking place on the planet
on a scale and speed never seen before. For one, the planet seems to face global
warming and climate change as, in 2007, eleven of the previous twelve years had
been the warmest on record2. A major cause of global warming are certain human
activities, in particular the burning of fossil fuels that alter the composition of
the earth’s atmosphere ultimately leading to temperature changes in it. The
effect of this kind of human activity since the 1750s is said to “greatly exceed”
the effect of natural changes in natural processes3. In addition, and not wholly
unrelated to climate change, the earth’s biocapacity to sustain life is currently
being overshot by thirty percent4. This means that the earth’s natural resources
are used up faster than they are able to regenerate. In the last 35 years the
global biodiversity has declined by nearly thirty percent5 meaning that due to
1Masur 1952: 96.
2IPCC 2007: 103. The next update to this important report by the United Nation’s Inter-





2 Chapter 1. Introduction
human activities species and ecosystems are forever destroyed at a previously
unseen pace. Some other problems accompanying these developments are the
accumulation of waste in the air, water and soil, as well as deforestation and, now
increasingly, water shortages6. Many other more local environmental problems
from acid rain to loss of soil fertility are further examples of human induced rapid
and disruptive changes in the environment.
In the face of the environmental predicament, natural sciences but also human
sciences have turned their attention to various aspects of environmental problems.
In addition to natural scientific knowledge of the causes of environmental prob-
lems, roughly the last sixty years have seen the emergence of human scientific
interest in what in this thesis are referred to as the cultural causes of environ-
mental problems. By this kind of causes are meant, roughly speaking, the social
forms of the organisation of human life as well as certain specifically intellectual
or ideological factors such as human conceptions of nature and our place in it as
driving human action in the environment. This thesis provides an account of the
cultural causes where ‘cultural’ is understood, not ideologically, but in the former
sense as focusing on the forms of organisation of human action.
As will be illustrated in Chapter 2 by a review of two main orientations in con-
temporary environmental sociology, most would agree that the cultural causes of
environmental problems must be intimately and essentially related to the burden
placed upon the environment by global industrial market society. Natural sci-
entific knowledge of environmental problems indeed strongly implicates human
activity associated with global industrial market society, such as the industrial-
scale production of food and goods with associated resource depletion and waste
generation, in human induced environmental change. In a crucial way, then, the
cultural causes of environmental problems have to do with our collective ‘perfor-
mance’, to use sociological jargon, of global industrial market society.
The central claim discussed in this thesis is that there is a significant tendency
in human sciences —as well as in popular culture more broadly, it appears— to
conceive the cultural causes of environmental problems ideologically. That is to
say, as human beings are conceived of as symbolic, cultural beings —roughly,
beings in possession of culturally mediated symbolic representations of the world
around them according to which they direct their actions in it—, it has seemed
in human sciences that the attempt to explain human and social action towards
6WWF 2008: 22.
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the environment will centrally have to involve reference to how human beings
conceptualise nature.
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, environmental history
and environmentalism are significantly characterised by the so-called ideological
approach to the cultural causes of environmental problems. As testified by a
number of classics of environmental history, the typical argument there is that
the scientific revolution gave rise to a new human conception of the environ-
ment as a disenchanted, law-governed entity susceptible to human manipulation
by knowledge of the system of nature. The scientific rationalistic picture of na-
ture, furthermore, naturally joined forces with another ideology, that of a broadly
utilitarian drive towards ever higher levels of human material well-being as the
guiding value of our times, or so environmental historians often argue. Human
exploitation of the natural environment signals lack of respect and is often under-
taken with misplaced technocratic confidence in science and technology to control
risk, the argument goes. Similar views are echoed in environmentalism and be-
yond evident in the rise of anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation activism in the
past decade. The statement of an environmentalist summarises the import of the
ideological approach well: “[t]he environmental crisis is a spiritual crisis which
can only be solved through a deep enquiry into who we are and what it means
to be alive”7. Important here is that in the ideological approach the human rela-
tionship to nature appears as conceptual in character basing upon conceptions,
motivations, values and the like —in short, ideology— that allegedly drive social
action in nature and lie hence also at the root of our environmental problems.
Although my discussion of the cultural causes of environmental problems takes
place in the context of modern society, I believe that the essential points have
relevance also historically in understanding the human relationship to nature. I
shall illustrate this in Chapter 3 by critically discussing the uses of ideology made
in a number of classics of environmental history. I shall, among others, discuss
at length Carolyn Merchant’s account of John Evelyn’s Sylva and contrast her
account with mine based on original historical research.
In Chapter 4 I shall then provide the present positive account of the cultural
causes of environmental problems. I shall argue that, firstly, the performance does
not have a general shared ideological source, for it is characterised by extensive
global division of labour of geographically and culturally dispersed peoples from,
7Spowers 2002: 9.
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say, a designer in Sweden and the manual labourer in Bangladesh to the consumer
in Japan8. Secondly, the performance consists of an immense variety of essentially
very mundane, daily recursive and broadly speaking productive and consumptive
activities and as such cannot be said to have a shared, general ideological source.
I contrast the view of this thesis with the ideological approach arguing that the
latter implements a questionable picture of our collective performance of global
industrial market society and its environmental problems. It is a picture that
over-intellectualises and intellectually homogenises our collective performance of
the social and its problems by seeking to account for our everyday activities in
terms of an underlying shared ideology.
Moreover, the picture offered by the ideological approach is, in my view, not
conducive to comprehending in a deep way our problematic present situation with
regard to environmental problems. It is not the uprooting of an ideology, but the
finding of an alternative more ecologically tenable form of the socio-economic
organisation of everyday life that is the most pressing challenge posed by human
induced environmental change, or so this thesis argues. When for instance in
environmental history one of the central focuses has been on the historical devel-
opments in human ideas about nature, I argue that the emphasis should really
be in the socio-economic organisation of human life in particular ways, in partic-
ular that everyday human life is organised in a particular form on an enduring,
repetitive and mundane basis. It is in this way that the human environmental
disruption is instituted on an enduring and larger scale basis, namely, by some
socio-economic form becoming the norm of organisation of human life steering the
masses to its continual performance and reproduction. The human disruption of
the environment is so disastrously effective precisely because of the large popula-
tion scale and repetitive nature of the everyday human engagement with nature,
an observation essential to any account of the cultural causes of environmental
problems.
The points I make about our collective performance of global industrial mar-
ket society and its environmental problems are not novel as such, but their full
ramifications have rarely been noticed. I believe that the way this thesis identifies
the ideological approach, and critically discusses it as underlying a dominant view
of the human relationship to nature and beyond is challenging, stimulating and
novel. Furthermore, a critique of the ideological approach bears upon, not only a
8Rivoli 2009.
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view of our nature relationship found in environmental history and environmen-
talism more broadly, but also some of our favourite conceptions of the character
of ourselves, our culture and age.
Thus, as I conducted the research for this thesis, it began to seem to me that
there are certain tendencies at work across human sciences that appear to steer
thought towards an ideological approach to human and social action, and hence
also towards an ideological approach to the cultural causes of environmental prob-
lems. To illustrate this, in a distinctly more theoretical discussion commencing
in Part 2, I shall identify the theoretical bearings of the ideological approach in
social theory and philosophy of social action embodied in the so-called paradigm
from sharing. This is often coupled with what I call the view of the essentiality
of the mind to human action. That I in this way expand the discussion to social
theory illustrates a key characteristic of the present thesis: it aims to provide a
broad ranging, interdisciplinary analysis of the cultural causes of environmental
problems exploring its dimensions sociologically, historically and philosophically.
Consequently, the thesis has a related double-character signalled in the structural
division in Parts 1 and 2: it is at once a take on the cultural causes of environ-
mental problems (Part 1) and an effort to sketch a matching theoretical approach
to social or collective action, or performativity (Part 2).
I begin Part 2 with arguing in some detail that a lot of theoretical litera-
ture out there seems to align much more readily with the ideological approach
than the present view, so much so that I began to think that in many ways the
ideological approach really articulates a central human scientific paradigm about
human action, the paradigm from sharing. At its clearest this is visible in the
paradigmatic social theoretical claim that one way or another social action can
only spring from shared mentalities, that is shared and internalised values and
norms (Parsons), ethos or spirit (Weber), mutual knowledge (Giddens), norma-
tively sanctioned shared conceptualisations (Bloor and the Strong Programme),
shared forms of intentionality (Searle), or other such broadly speaking ideolog-
ical factors. In Part 2, after a general description of what I call the paradigm
from sharing and a brief overview of the present organisatory alternative based
on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in Chapter 5, in Chapter 6 I provide con-
siderations to erode the intuitive appeal of the paradigm from sharing and the
ideological approach more generally.
In Chapter 7 I then introduce and employ certain ideas from the later phi-
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losophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein to articulate the present theoretical position,
although some rereading of Wittgenstein will be necessary as in my view many
social theoretical and philosophical readings of him too readily lend to the ide-
ological approach. On a number of occasions in Part 2 I shall return to the
contrast between the present and past uses of Wittgenstein in social theory, the
present reading of him, and in particular the way it is applied in social theory,
being in my view one of the most novel aspects of this thesis. In Chapter 7 I
also relate in detail the Wittgensteinian organisatory approach I have just de-
veloped to the argument of Part 1 about the cultural causes of environmental
problems. In the remaining chapters I focus on further elucidating the nature of
the Wittgensteinian organisatory approach in relation to selected philosophical
and social theoretical literature. First in Chapter 8, I discuss the issue of the
social nature of normativity and meaning as the main aspects in terms of which
the later Wittgenstein would actually appear to be offering an ideological and
not, as I claim, an organisatory approach. Then, in Chapter 9, I shall relate
the present organisatory approach to a number of interesting social theoretical
perspectives, the most central author here perhaps being Karl Marx to whom a
notable body of Wittgensteinian literature has already sought a connection. I
believe the organisatory reading of Wittgenstein can offer a fresh perspective to
the similarities in the views of the two thinkers.
In general, the present Wittgensteinian organisatory approach, as I name it, is
based on the idea that our collective performance of social systems and processes
does not draw from a shared ideology —this over-intellectualises and intellectu-
ally homogenises our collective performance— but is essentially characterised by
us viewing social reality from different perspectives, with differing interests and
knowledge of the social. These differences are a function of division of labour that
characterises our collective performance of the social. More, we perform the so-
cial by repetitive and mundane, complementary activities in a shared organisation
characterised by division of labour. In the performance, our epistemic attitudes to
the social processes within which we operate, and which we collectively perform,
concern the mundane tasks at hand, and hence our relationship to most aspects
of the total social process is non-epistemic. I argue that in Wittgenstein these
ideas find their expression in the phrases ‘agreement in form of life’ and ‘blind
rule-following’ which Wittgenstein characterised non-ontologically, that is, not by
whatever mental ontological source human and social action may have, but by de-
7
scribing the systems of organisation of human life (form of life, language-game) as
developmental processes. The Wittgensteinian methodology I develop can thus
be seen to mirror the organisatory view articulated in Part 1 of our collective
performance of global industrial market society as the root of the cultural causes
of environmental problems.
In closing, I would like to stress again that against what is perhaps the prevail-
ing tendency in academia for research to have an ever more narrow and specialised
focus, the present thesis approaches the issue at hand with an intentionally broad
interdisciplinary sweep. The thesis is an attempt to relate philosophical and so-
ciological theory of social or collective action, or performativity, with the topical
issue of our collective causing of environmental problems. As such the project
represents a rare and highly important intellectual effort of relating what can be
narrow scholarly issues to a pressing contemporary problem. I believe that posing
the question from the cultural causes of environmental problems as a challenge to
a theory of performativity is a novel and stimulating way to create discussion in
philosophy and social theory about environmental problems. Casting the cultural
causes of environmental problems as an issue to a theory of performativity rep-
resents an exiting but rarely if at all taken opportunity for philosophy and social






Ecological Modernisation of the
Treadmill of Production
All of us in the environment movement, in other words
—whether we propose accommodation, radical downsizing or
collapse— are lost. None of us yet has a convincing account of
how humanity can get out of this mess. None of our chosen
solutions break the atomising, planet-wrecking project. I hope
that by laying out the problem I can encourage us to address
it more logically, to abandon magical thinking and to
recognise the contradictions we confront. But even that could
be a tall order.
— George Monbiot, 20111
By way of a review of two broad types of orientation found in environmental
sociology to global industrial market society and its environmental problems, this
chapter frames the terms of the problem from the cultural causes of environmental
problems. Environmental problems are shown to be essentially a by-product
of the industrial-scale production of the human material well-being in global
industrial market society.
The Social Nature of Environmental Problems
Most would agree that there is a close connection between environmental prob-
lems and global industrial market society. First, natural scientific knowledge
1Monbiot 2011c.
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of the physical causes of environmental problems implicates the functioning of
industrial market society as the underlying system within which environmental
problems arise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identi-
fied the burning of fossil fuels as the central factor behind human induced climate
change. Fuels of course are burned to provide energy for industry, transportation
and domestic uses, all key general processes in global industrial market society.2
Again, drawing from a wealth of natural scientific research, The WWF (The
World Wildlife Fund, also known as the World Wide Fund for Nature) relates
human environmental disruption to the size of the human population and “the
resource and waste intensity” at which it produces the goods and services that it
consumes3. These goods and services are produced, distributed, consumed and
disposed of —albeit characterised by great inequalities4— within the system of
global industrial market society.
Second, environmental problems are not only caused but also conceptualised
and addressed in the frame of global industrial market society. Revealing here is
the aforementioned report by the WWF on the ecological condition of the planet
that also contains recommendations how to address environmental problems. We
shall discuss this report in a moment. In a nutshell, commentators embedded in
global industrial market society, such as the WWF, quite understandably tend to
conceive environmental issues as problems because they constitute a threat to the
smooth running of the global economic system and thereby to the social organisa-
tion of human life. Although the argument of this thesis does not depend on the
truth of this claim, despite the view of an environmentalist that an “Environmen-
tal Revolution has become essential for our own survival”5, it is questionable that
environmental issues would at present constitute a direct threat to the existence
of (human) life on earth. The fear is rather the domino effect of environmental
changes putting pressure on how the human being produces the material basis
of her existence and this in turn putting pressure on the political and other in-
stitutions. Disruption of the organisation of human life can lead to disturbances
and conflict in societies and between societies. An environmental problem can
ultimately be, and essentially is, a social problem, as anthropocentric as this char-
acterisation may be. This is not to say that the environmental concern would not
2IPCC 2007. An update to the report is due in 2014.
3WWF 2008: 22-3.
4Held & Kaya 2007.
5Spowers 2002: 7.
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also involve genuine concern for the preservation of the environment as such, as
politicians and other environmental commentators often carefully remember to
add. However, arguably the most political and other resources are moved by the
concern to pre-empt the potential social disruption that environmental problems
may cause to human life.
These points come out nicely in the WWF’s periodically updated Living
Planet Report containing a natural scientific analysis of the nature of environ-
mental problems as well as political and other practical proposals how they could
be combated.6 The WWF report is an interesting representative of the wider
current of environmental concern in the Western world because of both the roots
of the organisation in charity-based environmentalism and its recognised expert
role as an adviser to governments and business.
One of the main messages of the report is that the world’s natural resources
are being used up at a faster pace than they renew: by 2006 the so-called human
Ecological Footprint exceeded the earth’s biocapacity by 25 percent7. The report
also draws attention to the “rapid and continuing loss of biodiversity”, the world
having allegedly faced the extinction of about a third of its vertebrate species since
the 1970s8. The report points out the need to cut carbon emissions (accounting for
48 percent of the Ecological Footprint), and in general, to cut over-consumption
and waste generation, pointing out that otherwise we will face continual loss of
biodiversity, habitat destruction and degeneration that will eventually amount to
a severe threat to human well-being.
Now, many of the solutions identified in the report involve making changes in
the social organisation of human life. Change is sought, for instance, by means of
urban and family planning as well as by development of new business models and
financial markets conducive to more environmentally conscious decision making9.
The significant players are identified to be politicians, engineers and scientists,
businesses and industry. Engineers and scientists are to develop environmentally
friendly technologies and know-how, together with politicians who are to create
favourable political conditions making the former kinds of innovations possible.
6In this section I will mainly make reference to the 2006 edition of the report (WWF 2006).
At the time of writing this, two later reports have become available, the 2008 and 2010 versions
that however contain essentially the same basic points. Some ecological condition indicators
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Yet, while the WWF implicates politics, business and science and technology as
the key players in countering human environmental disruption, it also, although
rather implicitly, draws attention to us and our consumer decisions as performers
of global industrial market society, for this kind of society affords great numbers
of us the comfortable material existence that we lead.
In the background, receiving various degrees of emphasis and articulation in
the report, looms the concern for a number of aspects of human well-being —as
well as the concern for biodiversity and preservation of the natural environment.
The report is thus not wholly anthropocentric in its point of view, yet it is clear
that human well-being takes priority which is reflected in the space given to the
issue over the preservation of biodiversity.
Thus, the report draws attention to the issue of sustaining the global human
population on a sufficient level of material well-being. The objective here is iden-
tified by the report as that of needing “to find ways for the average person to live
well on less than half the current global average footprint”10. One aspect of the
human well-being is thus the concern for a basic material well-being, improve-
ment of which is a particular issue for the world’s poor and recognised by the
report. For another aspect, consider this passage from the WWF report:
Cities, nations, and regions might consider how economic competi-
tiveness will be impacted if economic activity is hampered by infras-
tructure that cannot operate without large resource demands.11
[Protective measures] must be considered in concert with the economic
costs and potential social disruptions associated with [the measures
taken].12
The passage speaks of economic costs and decline in economic competitiveness
potentially resulting from environmental protection. While the connection is not
made explicit, it is clear that social disruption can result from decline in human
socio-economic well-being, meaning roughly speaking, for instance, problems with
access to sources of livelihood, such as availability of employment. Transformation
towards a less ecologically disruptive society is likely to come with associated
socio-economic costs between which a balance needs to be struck in order to





The foregoing illustrates well that it is within the structures and processes of
global industrial market society that environmental problems appear, in terms
of which they are conceptualised as problems, and by the means of which they
can be addressed. We may say that the WWF report is written under particular
socio-political conditions prevailing in global industrial market society. This is
reflected in the fact that such a report is naturally addressed to those who are the
key players in making the requisite changes in the social organisation of human
life, that is, science and technology, politicians and business leaders. On the other
hand, the changes made in the socio-economic organisation have to be such that
the stability of the system prevails and therefore that social stability is preserved,
or so the report argues.
Ecological Modernisation of the Treadmill of Production
The WWF report is a straight-talking analysis of the environmental burden of
global industrial market society and how environmental problems can be ad-
dressed within that frame. In environmental sociology, two broad orientations can
be distinguished, one rather closely paralleling the approach of the WWF, and
another essentially more critical in approach. These are the so-called Ecological
Modernisation Theory as found in the work of the Dutch sociologist Arthur Mol
and the so-called Treadmill of Production Theory as developed by the pioneering
American environmental sociologist Allan Schnaiberg. It will be useful to briefly
review these views here as they on their part expose the role of global industrial
market society as the context of discourse about environmental problems.
The Ecological Modernisation Theory is characterised by Mol as follows:
The basic premise of ecological modernization theory is the centripetal
movement of ecological interests, ideas and considerations in social
practices and institutional developments. This results in ecology-
inspired and environment-induced processes of transformation and re-
form going on in the core practices and central institutions of modern
society.13
Thus, basically, Mol’s is the optimist view that environmental concerns can
make, and are as a matter of fact making, a difference in how global indus-
trial market society organises itself. Mol observes a “growing autonomy of an
13Mol 2002: 93.
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ecological perspective and rationality” and that “[i]n the economic domain, eco-
logical rationality has started to challenge the dominant economic rationality”14.
Most importantly, Mol argues, these changes are institutional and have a semi-
permanent character: “[a]lthough the process of ecology-induced transformation
should not be interpreted as linear and irreversible ... these changes have some
permanency and would be difficult to reverse”15, Mol writes.
The approach championed by Mol can be contrasted with the Treadmill of
Production approach developed by Allan Schnaiberg. Schnaiberg’s influential
and pioneering work in environmental sociology from the 1980s builds around
the notion of conflict between human society as an economic complex and the
environment as a biological complex. Basically, in an effort to sustain itself,
the human being withdraws more resources and adds more pollution to the en-
vironment than it is capable of sustaining16. In industrial market society these
withdrawals and additions are conducted in the frame of national and global econ-
omy. As Schnaiberg sees it there is an economy versus ecology conflict. Impact of
this ranges in severity depending on the volume of the additions and withdrawals,
degree of their permanence, their centrality to the functioning of an ecosystem
and the range of ecosystems impacted17.
Historically, human environmental impact tends to increase with the increase
of productive capacity despite the alleged ‘eco-friendliness’ of ‘the latest technol-
ogy’, or so Schnaiberg claims:
[w]hile some have argued that modern production technology has be-
come more materially efficient per unit production ..., even these gains
have been offset by increased volumes of production and increased by-
products of such new technologies.18
Schnaiberg repeatedly draws attention to examples where environmentally protec-
tive action has perhaps addressed the problem at hand but also created environ-
mental or other problems elsewhere. Schnaiberg’s view is thus rather pessimistic
as compared to Mol’s.
Schnaiberg’s pessimistic line of argument has been pursued more recently,





18Schnaiberg 1980: 28. More recently, John Bellamy Foster (2002: 22) has advanced similar
views.
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ogists Ingolfur Blühdorn and Ian Welsh. Here in a powerful passage worth quoting
in full they articulate what they see as the the core problematic in environmental
problems:
As the reassuring belief in the compatibility and interdependence of
democratic consumer capitalism and ecological sustainability has be-
come hegemonic, different and perhaps counter-intuitive lines of en-
quiry are not particularly popular. They appear disturbing, even
counter-productive. As faith in technological innovation, market in-
struments and managerial perfection is asserted as the most appro-
priate means for achieving sustainability, empirical experience reveals
the limitations of such approaches. ... environmental sociology that
opportunistically refrains from pursuing potentially inconvenient lines
of enquiry and instead confines itself to serving and enabling the pre-
vailing techno-economic hegemony fails in terms of both academic and
eco-political integrity. For these reasons, a new sociological effort to
grasp and address what we are calling the post-ecologist era and its
politics of unsustainability is in fact imperative.19
They argue further that while “[a]n abundance of eco-political measures are
being considered and implemented ... the key principles governing western prac-
tices of production, circulation, exchange and consumption remain immutable”.
These “key principles of consumer capitalism” include the idea of “infinite eco-
nomic growth and wealth accumulation, which ecologists have always branded as
fundamentally unsustainable” but that still “remain fully in place”20. Blühdorn
and Welsh note that this is not because of a lack of time to make changes as
analogous points were made already as early as in the 1980s, in the so-called
Bruntland Report by the then brand new World Commission on Environment
and Development of the United Nations chaired by the Norwegian politician Gro
Harlem Brundtland21.
Blühdorn and Welsh argue that the critical issue is “the question of what is to
be sustained and how”. They continue saying that if what is to be sustained “is
first and foremost the established economic system, or cherished western practices
of individualised, consumption-oriented identity formation, then this is a far cry
from the demand to sustain planetary ecological integrity and the intrinsic value
of nature”.22
19Blühdorn & Welsh 2007: 186.
20Blühdorn & Welsh 2007.
21Blühdorn & Welsh 2007: Footnote 1.
22Blühdorn & Welsh 2007: 189.
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Blühdorn and Welsh implicate some environmental sociologists themselves in
making it seem like a fundamental socio-economic change is not required. In par-
ticular, they implicate the above considered Ecological Modernisation approach
saying that “[t]he paradigm of ecological modernisation ... offered reassurance,
disempowered radical ecologist movements and helped to pacify eco-political con-
flicts whilst bolstering the argument that radical system change is not actually re-
quired as environmental goals can be realised through the modification of existing
structures”.23 In a process known in the literature as the death of environmen-
talism24, strands of sociology, but of environmentalism too, have allegedly gone
with the prevailing economic realities and have thereby lost a crucial element of
their identity, namely, that of aiming for long-term solutions to environmental
problems, which Blühdorn and Welsh argue is simply not possible within global
industrial market society.
We see then that the two approaches set out from rather different starting
points in their analyses of the relationship of society to environment. In the words
of Mol and Spaargaren, “the ecological modernization perspective analyzes how
environmental interests and considerations are starting to make a difference with
respect to the organization of our modern society” whereas the Treadmill of Pro-
duction theories “focus on continuity in the way capitalist economies ... persist
in setting the scene for failures in environmental reforms”25. These characterisa-
tions imply a key difference in the premises of the investigation. The Ecological
Modernisation theory appears, as it were, as a view from inside global industrial
market society looking at how society could transform its practices such that it
can continue to exist as global industrial market society. In a passage revealing
the trade-off’s between different priorities Mol and Spaargaren write that “[i]n
principle, ecological modernization theorists may very well come to the conclu-
sion that green capitalism is possible from an environmental point of view but
that the social consequences would be so dramatic that it is very unlikely and
undesirable to move into this trajectory”26.
The Treadmill of Production approach, by contrast, is less sympathetic to
global industrial market society viewing it, as it were, from the outside. They
argue for the importance of transforming global industrial market society in the
23Blühdorn & Welsh 2007: 194
24Shellenberger & Nordhaus 2004.
25Mol & Spaargaren 2002: 36.
26Mol & Spaargaren 2002: 41.
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name of ecological concerns, if necessary beyond recognition. The Ecological
Modernisation theorists, by contrast, envision a process of “transformation of
core social institutions of modernity —be it not beyond recognition”27, as Mol
and Sonnenfeld put it. Tellingly, Mol and Spaargaren argue that the Tread-
mill of Production theories tend to produce meagre and utopian proposals as to
how society should be ecologically transformed. This could be because in the
Treadmill of Production approach the required transformation often appears as
so comprehensive that it is hard to give exact guidelines how it could be achieved.
It is not of present interest to take sides in the disputes of these two camps.
Rather, the above review illustrates the centrality of global industrial market
society to discourse about environmental problems. Two dichotomies emerge in
terms of which environmental discourse tends to orientate itself in the context
of global industrial market society. First, there is the view from the institutions
of politics, business, science and technology as the instruments by the means
of which ecological change can be sought in society versus the view of these
institutions, and the larger frame of socio-economic organisation of human life
they imply, as central impediments to an effective ecological transformation of
human life. There is, second, the emphasis on the dependence of human well-
being on the orderly functioning of the system of global industrial market society
versus the view from the need to overthrow the system and socio-economically
re-organise human life.
Society, Environment and Ideology
In the epigraph to this chapter began, the British environmentalist George Mon-
biot writes about the challenge of addressing the “contradictions we confront”.
These contradictions boil down to the problem that, social inequalities notwith-
standing, in the current situation human well-being is intimately bound with the
relative stability and continuity of an environmentally costly socio-economic form
of organisation of human life, that is, global industrial market society. I believe
most parties to the debate recognise this dilemma in one way or other, but there
is still space to differ over whether a description of societal dynamics can tell the
whole story.
The environmental sociological positions reviewed above do not centrally re-
volve around the issue of ideology, that is human perceptions and ideas about
27Mol & Sonnenfeld 2000: 5.
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nature that environmental history and environmentalism more broadly highlight
as at the root of environmentally consequential forms of human conduct. In the
passages quoted above Bühdorn and Welsh did speak of “faith in technological
innovation, market instruments and managerial perfection” and “consumption-
oriented identity formation”, all ideological themes we shall encounter again in
Chapter 3 in the review of the ideological approach in environmental history and
environmentalism. However, most central to the environmental sociologies dis-
cussed above seems to me to be that they view global industrial market society
structurally or functionally as the context within which environmental problems
occur and by the means of which they are addressed.
It may thus perhaps seem like in sociology it is more generally held that the
question from the effect of human ideas about nature on ecologically consequential
activities would not be the right one to ask. The view is reinforced by the obser-
vation made by the modern classic of environmental sociology Ulrich Beck from
what he terms the “causal autonomy” of global industrial market economy. This
denotes “the momentum of a social development founded on markets, technology,
private ownership, capital investment, class contradictions, bureaucracy, and so
forth” that “consists of human action, but becomes independent of the latter”,
Beck argues. The realisation of causal autonomy is the “culmination of the idea
with which sociology emerged from incipient nineteenth-century industrialism”,
he continues. Everyone in sociology, says Beck, from Weber to Marx, Habermas,
Adorno and Foucault “agree, on very different grounds and with contrary evalu-
ations, that the developed industrial system must be seen as an inexorable social
force, which has become independent”.28 It would thus seem that sociologists
had always thought that the causally autonomous system of global industrial
market economy has no need for an explanation drawing from human ideas and
ideologies.
However, as will be argued in Part 2, Chapter 5 in particular, in a range of
important social theoretical works human sociality and social action are said to
spring ultimately from shared ideology, a shared value or norm basis, world-view,
ethos, mutual knowledge, conceptualisations, presuppositions or the like. These
social theoretical views go together well with the environmental historical and
environmentalist perception of the root of our environmental problems residing
in a shared mentality characterised by profit orientation and an ethos of reliance
28Beck 1995: 74.
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on science and technology as engines of more human material well-being. In other
words, although as far as I am aware the theoretical bearings of the ideological
approach have not been systematically articulated, the environmental historical
and environmentalist argument from the role of certain culturally acquired ide-
ologies at the root of our ecologically consequential conduct can be seen to draw
essentially, although implicitly, from some form of collectivist/constructivist so-
cial theory.
The social theoretical side of the present challenge to the ideological approach
will be discussed in Part 2. In the remaining chapters of the present Part 1, I
will provide a detailed critical discussion of the ideological approach in environ-
mental history and environmentalism in the following Chapter 3 and thereafter,
in Chapter 4, set out a different, a materialistic or organisatory view, of the cul-
tural causes of environmental problems. The two orientations of environmental
sociological discourse sketched in the present chapter can be used to articulate
its core problematics. In my view, the virtue of the view of the Ecological Mod-
ernisation camp is the recognition of the deep dependence of human well-being
—inherent inequalities notwithstanding— on the functioning of global industrial
market society, something which I shall flesh out in more detail in Chapter 4.
On the other hand, the Treadmill of Production camp’s scepticism seems pro-
found: the system may be beyond the possibility of an ecological repair, or at
least the process of repair will see dramatic changes and possibly conflict take
place in the organisation of human life. This puts us in the throes of a grave
dilemma noted by Monbiot in the epigraph to this chapter: either we face what
seems like an eventual environmental collapse or we attempt to repair the system
which however seems essentially unrepairable without massive disruption to the
organisation of human life and thereby to human well-being. At present, there
does not seem to be a solution to this dilemma, nor real concerted global will to
acknowledge and address it.
At any rate, the dilemma provides the background against which the present
account of the cultural causes of environmental problems is put forward. First, I
reject the ideological approach to the cultural causes of environmental problems
on the grounds that the system is essentially too complex, globally so, as well as
performed recursively on mundane day to day basis by the mass of geographically
and culturally dispersed peoples, to be reduced to any common ideological drivers.
Thus, second, only an organisatory view can account for the disastrous efficiency
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and persistence with which global industrial market society consumes the planet’s
resources transforming, polluting as well as destroying ecosystems and species. If
the environmental problematicity of global industrial market society would derive
from some common ideological drivers, we would at least have a distinct target
for reforms. Unfortunately, these are not the drivers. The gravest challenge is
to tell how, in a post-reform world, do we organise human life on this planet
to provide for some kind of human material well-being for all without incurring
significant environmental burden as well as how do we begin to move towards
such a change.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed two major environmental sociological orientations to envi-
ronmental problems and global industrial market society: the Ecological Moderni-
sation and Treadmill of Production theories. The two orientations both allocate
a central role to global industrial market society in human induced environmental
change. Albeit coming from different directions, they both picture the effective
causes and the solution to lie in society as a particular kind of a structure, sys-
tem or organisation of human activity. In the following two chapters I shall argue
that this invites an organisatory rather than ideological approach to the cultural
causes of environmental problems. Before developing the organisatory approach
in detail in Chapter 4, I shall first critically discuss the alternative, the ideological
approach.
Chapter 3
A Deeper Spiritual Malaise
God blessed them and said to them, “Be fruitful and multiply!
Fill the earth and subdue it! Rule over the fish of the sea and
the birds of the air and every creature that moves on the
ground.”
— “the Dominion Mandate”, Genesis 1:28
Gesellschaft, an aggregate by convention and law of nature, is
to be understood as a multitude of natural and artificial
individuals, the wills, and spheres of whom are in many
relations with and to one another, and remain nevertheless
independent of one another and devoid of mutual
relationships. This gives us the general description of
“bourgeois society” or “exchange Gesellschaft”.
— Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft
In this chapter I take up a detailed critical discussion of the so-called ideological
approach as found in many work of environmental history and environmentalism
more broadly to the cultural causes of environmental problems. I shall highlight
a number of forms that the ideological approach has taken in classic environ-
mental history and critically explicate the picture of social action implied in the
ideological approach.
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Central Ideological Themes
The beginnings of environmental history have been traced at the turn of the
20th century and developments in disciplines such as archaeology, ecology and
geography that stimulated thought about the environment, forces acting in it and
their effect on human habitations1. In the United States, the first historical works
resembling what later came to be referred to as environmental history appeared in
the early 20th century2. In Europe, works with environmental historical character
had also been produced already before the First World War, in particular in
France by the so-called Annales historians, whose work was influential in emerging
American environmental history3.
The emergence of environmental history as a discipline is intimately tied with
the emergence of the broader environmentalist movement and environmentalist
ideology in the second half of the 20th century. In the United States, “[t]he
environmentalist movement of the 1960s and after”, writes the environmental
historian Alfred W. Crosby, “was the engine that drove environmental history”4.
According to Caroline Ford, in Europe too the emergence of environmental history
took place “in the context of the rise of ecological issues in the 1970s and 1980s”
associated “with the “green” political activism of those years”5. In the 1970s,
environmental history took an important step towards institutionalisation with
the founding of its first Society in the United States6.
Since its beginnings, the ideological approach has been a central part of en-
vironmental history and environmentalism. By the 1960s, among others in the
works of Clarence Glacken7 and Lynn Townsend White Jr.8, environmental his-
tory had established a firm and paradigmatic interest in natural philosophical,
religious and other ideas about nature and how these give rise to and legitimise
certain forms of human conduct in the natural environment. Glacken’s book, for
instance, is an impressive historical overview of natural philosophical ideas about
nature. Townsend White identifies the Christian theological conception of nature








8Townsend White Jr. 1967.
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One commentator on the history of environmental history and environmental-
ism wrote that the writings of Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson9 and other pioneering
American environmentalists expressed an essentially moral point viewing “things
as diverse as vanishing wilderness and the alienation of modern society as symp-
toms of a deeper, spiritual malaise —our failure to live in right relationship with
the world around us” 10. It was and is a key strength of environmentalism that it
puts forward a utopia about human harmony with nature serving thereby perhaps
some fundamental human spiritual needs and offering a prized ideal to strive for.
In a later classic of environmental history from the 1980s, Carolyn Merchant’s
The Death of Nature11, one of the central themes is the emergence of the so-called
mechanical world-view as characterising the human conception of nature with
implications in human conduct in nature. A very similar view is expressed in the
classic environmental historian Donald Worster’s discussion of the imperial view
of nature12. Central to these works is the idea that in order to understand human
impact on the natural environment we must study the ideas that shape and drive
human engagement with nature where these ideas are understood among others to
be natural philosophical, religious, moral, aesthetic or other human conceptions
about how the world is or should be.
In many ways this ideological approach continues to form a central aspect of
the environmental historical methodology. Thus, Worster says that “[e]nvironmental
historians have done some of their best work on this level of cultural analy-
sis, studying the perceptions and values people have held about the nonhuman
world”13. Also, another heavy-weight of environmental history J. Donald Hughes’
relatively recent book introducing environmental history identifies “the history
of human thought about the environment and the ways in which patterns of hu-
man attitudes have motivated actions that affect the environment”14 as one of
the three main themes of the discipline. Also indicative of the prominent role
of the ideological approach in environmental history is the fact that despite the
central role Worster attributes to ideologies some have seen “potentially excessive
materialism” in Worster’s methodological views15.





14Hughes 2006: 3 ff.
15Cronon 1990: 1124. Cronon’s discussion refers to Worster 1988.
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I should note that there are in environmental history of course also works
that do not attribute any overriding role to ideology. David Blackbourn, for
instance, provides an excellent set of case studies of a number of early modern
and modern German environmental engineering projects discussing the role of
key individuals but also of wider societal developments in the background to
these projects. Particularly admirable is that Blackbourn also highlights the
perspective of the ordinary people who worked in these projects, colonised the
engineered areas afterwards or acted in other mundane roles.16 The ideological
approach does thus not constitute an all-dominating but still a very influential
aspect of environmental history.
While some of the above mentioned classics of environmental history stem
from decades ago, more contemporary examples can be found in modern envi-
ronmentalist thought. Thus, recently, writing on the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil
catastrophe and British Petroleum, the oil and gas company whose rig was in-
volved in the disaster, Naomi Klein makes explicit reference to Merchant’s The
Death of Nature and follows her line of argument saying that the
crisis is about many things — corruption, deregulation, the addiction
to fossil fuels. But underneath it all, it’s about this: our culture’s
excruciatingly dangerous claim to have such complete understanding
and command over nature that we can radically manipulate and re-
engineer it with minimal risk to the natural systems that sustain us.17
Klein argues further that indigenous peoples have myths “about gods and
spirits living in the natural world” and that “the practice serves a practical pur-
pose”: these myths are “another way of expressing humility in the face of forces
we do not fully comprehend”. Most importantly, such ideologies can allegedly
have a significant effect on human conduct: “[w]hen something is sacred, it de-
mands that we proceed with caution. Even awe.” By contrast for us in modern
industrial market societies the ideology has changed, Klein argues: we do not
respect the earth. The suggestion seems to be that environmental disasters are
the result. The key ideological themes that Klein here highlights are thus the
ideas of modern technocratic lack of respect of nature and misplaced confidence
in science and technology to control risk.
That Klein explicitly draws from Merchant indicates the prominent role still
played by her classic work in environmental history and environmentalism more
16Blackbourn 2007. Others include Sieferle 2001 and Brakensiek 1994, 1991.
17Klein 2010.
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broadly. Also, as we shall see below not only are Donald Worster’s views on
the role of ideology in the human relationship to nature crucially similar to Mer-
chant’s, but Worster’s take on methodology in environmental history from the
late 1980s18 remains a leading discussion of the theme19.
There are, alongside Klein, other contemporary examples of the ideological
approach in environmentalism. The American environmentalist Bill McKibben
argued recently that Adam Smith’s economics introduced the idea of “dogged
pursuit of maximum economic production” on the core ideas of “individuals pur-
suing their own interests” and of “increasing efficiency ... [as] the key to increasing
wealth”. In McKibbens’s view, “Smith’s ideas still dominate our politics, our out-
look, even our personalities”20. Similarly, the British environmental author and
journalist Jeremy Seabrook argued that “[t]he morality of economic growth and
expansion has invaded the psyche, the inner sites where people struggle with how
to be a good person; and now reigns as the ultimate revelation of what it means
to be human”21. The general ideological themes arising here are the materialistic
and utilitarian value orientation allegedly typical to modernity and the claim that
such values would be broadly internalised by the modern human being.
In David Orr we find a peculiar mixture of many of the previously mentioned
themes. He spoke of ‘biophobia’ and gave the film maker Woody Allen as an
example case: “Allen is known to take extraordinary precautions to limit bodily
and mental contact with rural flora and fauna”, Orr says22. Biophobia is “the
culturally acquired urge to affiliate with technology, human artifacts, and solely
with human interests regarding the natural world”, Orr suggests, adding that
biophobics also include those “who regard nature ‘objectively’ as nothing more
than ‘resource’ to be used any way the favored among the present generation
see fit”23. Although not really by choice, more primitive societies of the past
were biophilic respecting and living in harmony with nature, Orr argues. Their
“ecologic innocence”, Orr explains, was not really chosen but rather dictated by
the circumstances, for they lacked the means to radically alter the natural world.
18Worster 1988.
19Methodological questions have not engaged environmental historians a great deal. In ad-
dition to Worster 1988, other works on methodology in environmental history that I know of
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The moderns, on the other hand, “must choose between biophobia and biophilia
because science and technology have given us the power to destroy so completely
as well as the knowledge to understand the consequences of doing so”24. The
fundamental issue is, Orr says, about “how we regard the natural world and our
role in it”25. Our manner of thinking “so thoroughly ingrained in us that we
can scarcely conceive of any other manner of thinking”26 is characterised by lack
of respect towards nature. Reflecting the paradigmatic environmental historical
story, according to Orr this transformation in thinking was brought about by the
view, expressed among others by Descartes and Bacon, that the human being
is capable of controlling nature by the exercise of reason and utilising it for
human benefit. This way of thinking naturally joined forces with “the ideology of
perpetual economic growth, now the central mission of governments everywhere”,
Orr concludes27.
Thus, historically and contemporarily, environmental history and environmen-
talism more broadly are characteristically ideological in approach. Let us now
look at some of the above covered central themes in more detail.
World-views in Environmental History
The describing of a world-view as characterising the human relationship to nature
is a major theme in environmental history as we have it for example in the works of
Carolyn Merchant and Donald Worster. In The Death of Nature, Merchant spends
a great deal of time providing an interesting and what seems like a comprehensive
overview of various human ideologies about nature from magical to the emerging
natural scientific views28. One ideology discussed by Merchant is the so-called
organic world-view, an ancient now almost extinct view of a symbiotic, non-
manipulative existence of the human being on the earth. This world-view is
essentially connected with the ancient imagery of ‘nature as a nurturing mother’29,
Merchant writes. For a contrasting world-view, Merchant reviews Francis Bacon’s





28Given this emphasis of the work on human ideas about nature, it is all the more puzzling
why, in a paper some seven years later, Merchant articulated a very different methodology
where ideas merely ‘legitimate’ actual human activities in nature (Merchant 1987). However,
we shall not pursue this tension further here.
29Merchant 1987: xx.
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secrets’30. Merchant goes on to argue that with Bacon and the beginnings of
modern natural sciences emerged the so-called mechanical world-view bound for
manipulating and taking advantage of nature for human utilitarian ends.
A very similar set of world-views is identified in Donald Worster’s Nature’s
Economy31. This work too reviews the ideas of a number of central thinkers about
the human relationship to nature in the West. Worster distinguishes between two
world-views, one branded arcadian and the other imperial. The arcadian world-
view emphasises human interdependence with the natural environment promoting
equality of the species and preservation of nature’s own dynamics. This is effec-
tively Merchant’s organic world-view.
The imperial view, in turn, is basically that which Merchant calls the me-
chanical world-view. The imperial view is characterised by the human desire for
“the domination of the earth —often promoted in the name of a purely secular
welfare” which is, Worster argues, “one of modern man’s most important ends”32
—another sweeping ideological attribution that one often finds in environmental
history but that is not argued for.
Following Townsend White, for Worster the roots of this kind of imperialism
are in the Christian view of nature. “[O]f all the major religions of the world”,
Worster says of Christianity, “it has been the most insistently anti-natural”33.
There is, for instance, the Christian image of the human being as the Good Shep-
herd, “the defender of the flock against the hostile forces of nature”34, Worster
writes. Also, Worster adds, Christianity “severed man from nature emotionally”
by the overthrow of pagan animism which, characteristic of the arcadian view,
emphasised the human communion with “the inner, vital spirit of the natural
world”35. In addition, Christianity cast the world as having been divinely cre-
ated out of chaos “by a rational mind and made to obey a strict set of laws”36
contributing to the birth of the modern scientific world-view, Worster argues.
And as in Merchant, the imperial view is to be found, among others, in Francis
Bacon’s ideas: “Bacon promised to the world a manmade paradise, to be rendered
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astonishingly fertile by science and human management”37, Worster argues.
In the above overview we encounter a number of articulations of the nature
of the said world-views. In The Death of Nature Merchant draws from mytholo-
gies and figures of speech (‘nurturing mother’) on the one hand, and natural
philosophical texts such as those of Francis Bacon on the other, in mapping the
changes in the human conception of nature. Elsewhere she justifies her approach
saying that “[s]cientific, philosophical, and literary texts are sources of the ideas
and images used by controlling elites, whereas rituals, festivals, songs, and myths
provide clues to the consciousness of ordinary people”38.
Worster in turn talks about the idea of interconnections in ecosystems as un-
derlying the arcadian world-view, which would seem to be an essentially modern
natural scientific conception articulated well after the thinkers in the connection
of whom Worster uses these terms such as the early naturalist and priest Gilbert
White (1720–1793)39. Worster also talks about the role of Christianity as spread-
ing anti-natural sentiments although the precise channel of influence from such
ideas to people’s everyday conduct is not discussed by Worster.
Apart from passing mentions, I have not encountered rigorous discussions by
environmental historians of the mechanisms in which ideologies influence actual
human activities although this is in many ways a crucial step in the environ-
mental historical argument40. It seems fair to say that environmental history
and environmentalism are marked by something like what James W. Sire called
“worldview thinking” focused on the detection of “a set of basic concepts ... a
fundamental orientation of the heart ... commitment to and understanding of the
“really real” ... grasped as story, not just as abstract propositions”, as Sire char-
acterises it41. In my view, the two also face a similar general problem. My general
argument in this thesis builds upon the intuition that positing a close connec-
tion between world-views and everyday human activity is problematic, although
I do not deny that world-view analyses can be made of philosophical and other
such literatures. It is one thing to detect a world-view in a philosophical work
but quite another to attribute a world-view to a mass of people as a significant
determinant of their everyday activities. My view is that explaining human and
37Worster 1994: 30.
38Merchant 1987: 272.
39Worster 1994: Chapter 1.
40Barnabas Dickson (2000) makes the same observation. Dickson also attempts to reconstruct
the philosophical position of some environmentalists based on the implicit clues they give.
41Sire 2004: 13.
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social action by an ideology, world-view or some such set of ideas, conceptions or
the like over-intellectualises and ideologically homogenises everyday human and
social action.
In this thesis I support this view in a number of ways. In the sections below
I shall provide examples of how environmental historians have overblown and
thus failed to account for the link between a world-view and everyday conduct.
In Chapter 4 I shall highlight the powerful role in human and social action of
certain systemic or organisatory mechanisms of the social organisation of human
life. Shortly, in a brief discussion of Max Weber’s spirit of capitalism as a world-
view, and more comprehensively in Part 2, I shall engage with a number of
sociological and philosophical works critically discussing their uses of something
like a world-view in explanation of human action, both individual and social.
The Ruling Values of Our Time
Above we identified two major ideological ingredients in the environmental his-
torical analysis at the root of the modern human relationship to nature. These
were the so-called mechanical and broadly utilitarian world-views. In this section
I want to focus on the latter world-view characterised by Worster as the ethos
for ever more material well-being. I shall ask the question, how much are the
hardening, rationalisation and materialisation of values for example towards the
environment part of ‘the modern psyche’?
In a passage that we have already quoted Worster argues that for us “[t]he
characteristics of the modern economic system are familiar to the point of be-
coming ‘second nature’ ” and that “[w]e are well aware that ours is an intricate
corporate society”42. I believe that here Worster radically over-intellectualises
the mass of human beings as to our ‘collective grasp’ of the structures and pro-
cesses shaping our societal existence. The same goes for Worster’s claim that
“efficiency and productivity as human goals” are “undoubtedly the ruling values
of our time”43. It is doubtful that these describe our values in any penetrative
sense. Equally doubtful is it that “[w]ith few exceptions, anything that does not
meet their test [of efficiency and productivity as human goals] or that challenges
their supremacy has little chance of being taken seriously by the public or its lead-
42Worster 1994: 293.
43Worster 1994: 293.
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ers”44. It is important not to let Worster’s claims pass, for if they are accepted
at their face value we are well on our way to a distorting ideological account of
human action.
Environmental historians, to be sure, are not in that bad company with their
ideological approach, in particular the claim from the utilitarian values as the
ruling values of our times. I shall offer a lengthier quasi intellectual history of the
ideological approach at the start of Part 2, but I note here the striking similarity
of the utilitarian world-view with what Max Weber wrote in his classic study on
the Spirit of Capitalism. In Weber’s words, a central feature of this spirit is that
Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the
ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer sub-
ordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material
needs.45
This impulse draws essentially, Weber writes, from “the idea of a calling and
the devotion to labour in the calling ... one of the most characteristic elements of
our capitalistic culture”46. When we couple this idea of blind devotion to mam-
mon with Weber’s claim that historically it was first necessary to overcome “inner
resistance”, the power of tradition to stifle “the ability and disposition of men
to adopt certain types of practical rational conduct”47, we have two important
ingredients of the environmentalist argument, modern materialism in its contrast
with a softer mentality of the times long gone by.
Consider also a problem with Weber’s view. He observed that the core of
Western capitalism resides in the development of “a very different form of cap-
italism which has appeared nowhere else: the rational capitalistic organization
of (formally) free labour”48. What Weber, however, went on to do next did not
focus on the structural features of the capitalistic organisation of labour that
for example Marx was very much interested in, namely the phenomena of wage
labour and division of labour together with the effects of these organisatory fea-
tures on the quality of human life. Instead, Weber put forward a questionable
ideological argument based on the idea that capitalistic organisation of labour







Thus, in Weber’s example, the tool of capitalistic organisation of labour that
allowed the employer “to secure the greatest possible amount of work from his
men is the device of piece rates”49. Yet, claimed Weber, this was often thwarted
by the “traditionalism” of the worker who often did “not ‘by nature’ wish to earn
more and more money, but simply to live as he is accustomed to live and to earn
as much as is necessary for that purpose”, Weber claimed50. Another example
Weber gives builds upon the claim that this “type of backward traditional form
of labour is today very often exemplified by women workers, especially unmarried
ones”, who are “almost entirely unable and unwilling to give up methods of work
inherited or once learned in favour of more efficient ones”, he wrote51.
Now, the second of these arguments we would now declare immediately as
prejudiced and sexist, but how about the first? Does it tap onto a key historical
shift in mentality? I am not in the position to judge this —and who is? Who can
claim, and on what evidence, that in the birth of the capitalistic order significant
masses of people all went and adopted a different mentality? The structural
features of the capitalistic organisation of labour are easy to observe but the
same does not go for the alleged mentalities with which people operated in these
systems. This is a major implausibility in Weber’s ideological argument that we
shall see below also bothers the arguments of two classic environmental historians
(see the sections Worster on Varmints and Cronon on Boosters below), namely
the sweeping claims made about shared mentalities on questionable grounds.
Before we consider the question of the ruling values of our times from an-
other perspective, I want to point out that no utilitarian motive or creed towards
more and more material well-being needs to be posited to explain the growth
orientation, growth dependence, of modern society. Given the present form of
the socio-economic organisation of human life in global industrial market econ-
omy, growth is simply a precondition of societal stability. As discussed above,
Weber identified the spirit of capitalism, the alleged Protestant ethos for blind
accumulation of wealth, as the key differentiator in the developmental paths of
the Orient and the Occident, but it would seem to be a mistake to assume that
such an ethos is still today needed to power the system. One reason for why
the economy needs continuous growth even without an ideology of growth is that
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standard of living of the expanding population for otherwise the added popula-
tion would be unemployed. There is also the associated pressure upon politicians
to keep the populace happy where continuous economic growth certainly helps as
it often means more jobs, more tax revenue and thus the possibility of providing
better services. Also, in a situation where no new investments were made in the
national economy, there would be no new housing developments, no new roads
built, no new cars built. There would still be the maintenance of existing goods
and infrastructure to take care of, but this would still mean dramatic scaling
back in the economic activity as we have it with associated unemployment and
unhappiness. Thus even without the ideology of blind creed for more material
well-being there is enough incentive for economic growth.52
I note in passing that even if the spirit of capitalism was a significant driver of
action, it is another question are such actions in the end successful in producing
wealth, that is whether such an ideology has a practical effect. In fact, there
is some evidence to the contrary. On the basis of a statistical analysis of the
performance over eight years of a group of investment advisers in a firm, the
psychologist and 2002 economics Nobel prize winner Daniel Kahneman concluded
that there was no consistency to their performance. Whatever successes the
advisers had had seemed in the light of relevant statistics to be down to pure luck.
In the complex world of investment, even educated recommendations appear to
produce no consistent results.53
Let us now, however, return to the issue the ruling values of our times and
whether a hardening of values has occurred. I cannot here seek to ground these
claims empirically, but my experience is that by and large people still lead ‘morally
healthy’ lives with friends and family, make commitments, have respect, recognise
ends other than purely material ends, and so on. I simply do not see these
relations having been watered down by utilitarian considerations or that they
display ‘efficiency and productivity as human goals’. I cannot here attempt a
systematic investigation of moral attitudes, and I am sceptical that opinion polls
can shed essential light here. I shall instead draw attention to an argument made
by a number of philosophers that turn the matters around in an interesting way:
in modernity it is not people’s morality but the philosophers’ concept of morality
that has suffered an inflation they argue. Some similar blindness to actual human




life seems to me to underlie Worster’s views on the ruling values of our time.
In his After Virtue, the Scottish philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre traces an
historical developmental line in moral philosophy over the course of its history.
MacIntyre observes that philosophers such as Immanuel Kant held a view that
MacIntyre refers to as rational ethics according to which “reason instructs us
both as to what our true end is and as to how to reach it”54. However, already
in David Hume a new mechanistic conception of reason is to be found, a con-
ception according to which “reason is calculative; it can assess truths of fact
and mathematical relations but nothing more”55, MacIntyre writes. That is, in
contrast to Kant, reason as conceived in Hume is able to assess the means but
not the ends worth pursuing. To save the day, Hume posited the existence of
the sentiment of humanity giving moral judgements an air of universality and of
being directed towards something like universal human good. However, Hume’s
humanity is significantly weaker than the rationalist conception in which reason
was taken to dictate the means and the ends. In Hume we have the beginnings
of a historical shift in moral thought, MacIntyre argues. Later theories, such as
one called emotivism espoused by the American philosopher Charles Stevenson
(1908–1979), fashionable for a while in the first half of the 20th century, proposed
that all moral judgements are mere expressions of emotive preferences. Quite fit-
tingly, emotivism has sometimes been referred to as the boo-hurrah theory of
morality.
Commenting on emotivism, the American philosopher Cora Diamond writes:
“it is as if Stevenson were writing philosophy after having forgotten all he knew
of what moral thought and moral discussion were like, as if he had lost the very
notion of morality”. Diamond continues saying of Stevenson that “it is not that
he has lost it so much as that he cannot or will not acknowledge or recognize what
he knows”56. In other words, Diamond is saying that moral philosophers have
in their professional lives become estranged from what they probably very well
know in their private lives. The reason is certain philosophical preconceptions,
arguably deriving from Hume’s distinctions between values and facts and is and
ought, that have seen philosophers forget what they in everyday life know about
morality espousing instead an impoverished professional concept of morality.




36 Chapter 3. A Deeper Spiritual Malaise
Max Weber, regarding efficiency and productivity as the ruling values of our time
belong to the same category? Could it be that industrialisation, bureaucratisation
and commercialisation of modern society have made us think that the mentality
of the human being too has changed to reflect these societal structural changes?
This is what Worster but also certain classics of sociology seem to be telling
us. The break-up of the old rural ways of life and the emergence of industri-
alism and urbanism with the associated socio-economic changes informed, and
were indeed recorded in, the classic works such as Ferdinand Tönnies’ Commu-
nity and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) and Emile Durkheim’s The
Division of Labor in Society57. These early sociologists saw it that there were
particular human attitudes and even parts of the human psychological machinery
at work here: Durkheim spoke of organic and mechanical solidarity and Tönnies
of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as well as particular forms of human will, We-
senwille and Kürwille.
For these authors European life was becoming more rational, spurred by var-
ious scientific and technological advances which was naturally reflected in their
sociology. Strikingly, these developments in society were often conceived as hav-
ing ideological roots: modern mentality is rational, scientific and capitalist as
for instance in Max Weber’s thesis from the spirit of capitalism. Durkheim and
Tönnies worried about the divisive, alienating effect of intensifying division of
labour upon social cohesion, shared values and perceptions. This worry was the
context of Durkheim’s ideas of organic and mechanical solidarity. As the so-
ciety around them became more and more saturated with science, technology
and bureaucracy, it was perhaps natural for sociologists to think that people’s
mentalities also gained a qualitatively new character.
The environmental historical argument from the mechanical, imperial world-
view seems to be in agreement with the general tendency of the sociological tra-
dition to conceive modernity ideologically. Commercialisation, bureaucratisation
and industrialisation are of course undeniable structural changes that have taken
place in many societies in the last couple of hundred years. I suggest, however,
that the ways of thinking that these developments would seem to favour, namely
certain rationalisation and associated hardening of values, do not necessarily have
to be seen to reflect the attitudes of the mass of ordinary people.
In fact, it could be argued that in a significant sense people have responded to
57Tönnies 1957; Durkheim 1984.
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modern society, not by adopting a harder rationalist mentality, but by becoming
in general confused in the changed circumstances. I cannot seek to ground this
claim here at any length, but I shall briefly mention one example. Terms such as
‘rootlessness’ and ‘alienation’ or ‘estrangement’ are now commonly used notions
describing the human experience of global industrial market society. Rootlessness
describes the situation of individuals who for better job opportunities have re-
located usually to urban centres with family, friends, acquaintances and a wider
social network elsewhere. Alienation or estrangement describes the relocated
individual’s, but also of those left behind in the emptying country side, disinte-
gration from social life due to the severing of social links and leaving behind of a
significant part of one’s social network.
I suggest that analogous to how the human being has had problems with
adjusting to life in global industrial market society, so too by similar mechanisms
she has drifted apart from nature. This drifting is not a result of hardening of
values or anything like that, at least in the case of social estrangement the old
values are indeed very much present. Rather, the setting in which people live
their lives has changed and no longer allows the kind of social relationships and
social life to which they were accustomed.
Similarly, in the process of human estrangement from nature we have drifted
away from nature among others by relocating and now living life in an urban
setting away from significant ‘natural spots’. In such settings there is little op-
portunity and indeed social use for activities involving ‘the great outdoors’ or
even superficial knowledge of plants and animals. In the predominantly human
created environments in which we tend to spend our time we have no need for
knowledge of nature but rather, we develop knowledge and skills pertaining to,
for example, electric gadgetry. In a similar way people have become estranged to
certain forms of physical exercise, not by developing a mentality against physical
exercise, but by way of a change in our lives’ activities from, say, chopping fire
wood to sitting at the computer. For the mass the shift away from nature has
not been triggered or sanctioned by a changed mentality or values but by the
gradual shift in the activities of human everyday life.
We do not thus need to argue that global industrial market society’s mores
are our second nature, or that our values have hardened, to explain the changed
relationship of the human being to nature. The shift has been much more subtle
having to do with the gradual reorganisation of human life away from the natural
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environment. Arguably, we could say that the process started with the human
practice of agriculture, but certainly the emergence of global industrial market so-
ciety with the implied large scale alteration of the environment, urbanisation and
the changed character of typical human everyday activities greatly accelerated
and widened the scope of the process.
Often it is of course the mentality, not of ordinary people, but that of crucial
elites that has got the most serious stick in environmentalist argumentation. Here
the ideological approach can be said to enjoy some significant popular appeal with
corporate economically motivated ruthlessness, corruption, lobbying and the like
often being in the focus of media and other attention58. I do not wish to claim
that in many cases elites and individuals could not be charged for moral and other
types of failure here. Such ‘individualisation of responsibility’ as it is known in the
literature, however, can also lead to demonisation of individuals as well as analytic
failures such as when we, in the words of an environmental sociologist, “desig-
nate particular discrete actions as bad and/or irresponsible without addressing
the pervasive and systemically embedded nature of the causes”59. Arguably, as
the American environmentalist John Bellamy Foster put it, “it is not people (as
individuals and in aggregate) that are enemies of the environment but the histor-
ically specific economic and social order in which we live”60. This is to say, as I
shall argue in more detail in Chapter 4, the intensity of the human environmental
burden is not the doing of elites and individuals, but of vast masses of people
performing a ‘historically specific economic and social order’ on a recurring and
everyday basis. There is, finally, also an air of the discredited History of Great
Men approach to the idea of the individualisation of responsibility, an issue that
I shall discuss more below in the context of Donald Worster’s use of crucial elites
in a environmental historical case study of his.
Functional World-views
We have in this chapter reviewed a set of environmental-historical notions in terms
of which the modern human relationship to nature is often articulated. Another
image continuing to engage the environmentalist and environmental historical
imagination is the idea of an organic, symbiotic existence of the human being
58See e.g. Greenpeace 2011; Reay 2006.
59Butler 2010: 188. For more on this debate, see e.g. Maniates 2002 and Kent 2009.
60Bellamy Foster 2002: 49.
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with nature. We saw Naomi Klein make the argument that modern society has
effectively lost the kind of touch with nature that some more primitive societies
still allegedly had. The view, as we saw, draws from the idea of the arcadian or
organic world-view discussed by Merchant and Worster.
An ideal case of such organic adaptation seems to be discussed in the classic
anthropological case study by Roy Rappaport titled Pigs for the Ancestors61,
also highlighted as such by Worster62. In this study, Rappaport focused on a
relatively small tribal community of 200 members in New Guinea and argued
that their beliefs, rituals and practices formed a system of life particularly well
adapted to the environment in which they lived.
Consider, however, a commentary given on this approach. The modern classic
anthropologist Conrad Kottak seizes on the point that, where Rappaport’s sub-
jects may have occupied a small geographical area and lived within one ecosys-
tem, many people today move from one area to another, do not participate in
one ecosystem only or do not employ only one set of “cultural adaptive means”63
in dealing with their environments. Kottak observes that the idea of a so-called
“cognized model” —that is, a given culture’s “interpretations of the world, the
set of rules and expectations, orienting principles, concepts, meanings, and val-
ues that are significant to an individual culture bearer and that account for why
he or she does things”— requires modification. Kottak continues saying that
“[c]ontemporary people still have cognized models, but anthropologists must in-
creasingly wonder where such models originate, how they are transmitted, and
the extent to which they are unique and shared”64. According to Kottak, this
rethinking of ‘cognized models’ corresponds with a general shift in methodol-
ogy in anthropology “from research focusing on a single community or “culture”,
perceived as more or less isolated and unique, to recognizing pervasive linkages
and concomitant flows of people, technology, images, and information, and to ac-
knowledging the impact of differential power and status in the postmodern world
on local entities”65.
Now, environmental historians may claim that they study past cultures that
are not splintered and where, therefore, ‘cognized models’ with effective explana-
61Rappaport 1968.
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tory value can still be identified. To some extent this may be true, yet it is clear
that we have to go relatively far back in time66 or make regional differentiations
if we want to write the environmental history of local, largely self-contained com-
munities untouched by global industrial market economy. At the time of the
alleged emergence of Merchant’s so-called mechanical world-view and Worster’s
imperial view of nature the ‘globalising process’ had at any rate already begun.
Kottak’s observations constitute one reason for thinking that modernity re-
quires a different conceptualisation of the human relationship to nature than
can be afforded by the contrasting notions of organic-arcadian and imperial-
mechanical-utilitarian world-views, or indeed the notion of world-view in the first
place. In modern society the human relationship to nature is essentially more
complex, and I argue indirect, than can be articulated ideologically.
A Note on Marx(ism) in Environmental History
Before moving on to illustrating by examples from certain classics of environ-
mental history the effects of the ideological approach on the actual writing of
environmental history, I want to discuss briefly the role of Marx(ism) in environ-
mental history, not least because we shall later, in Chapter 9, make our own use of
him. The issue in this section is the self-conception of environmental history and
environmentalism as having their roots in certain Marxian ideas. The question
we shall address is how could environmental history be said to be ideological in
approach if it has its roots in Marxian historical materialism?
Let us begin to answer this question by noting that the ideological approach,
that I have cast as dominating environmental history and environmentalism more
broadly, and the present challenge to it, could be conceptualised as representing
two differing readings of Marx. The two poles are, on the one hand, Marx’s cri-
tique of the profit motive of capitalism and associated exploitation of the worker
seized upon in environmentalism and, on the other hand, Marx’s materialist con-
ception of history summed up in the famous line from the 1859 preface to A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy : “[i]t is not the consciousness
of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines
their consciousness”. These two strands in Marx can be seen to pull in two
66According to the historian of capitalism Immanuel Wallerstein, the origins of the capitalist
system are “in late-fifteenth-century Europe” (Wallerstein 1983: 19).
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distinctly opposite directions67.
Marx’s critique of the capitalist system and the profit motive prevalent in it
forms one of the central tenets of critical environmental thought. It seems like
an easy and sound step to argue from the profit motive in capitalism to the more
or less total disregard of the system of nature and its preservation. Seen in this
way, Marx would appear to support the ideological approach in that the capi-
talist profit motive appears as driving human action, among others towards the
environment. Among classic environmental historians, at least Carolyn Merchant
and William Cronon68 explicitly give Marx as one of their influences. It is not
surprising that Marx should have been of influence in the discipline given the
activist roots of environmental history.
To be sure, environmental historians have also criticised Marx. Some of Marx’s
ideas have been seen as inimical to the appreciation of the role of nature in human
history. Thus, William Cronon has argued that
Marx’s emphasis on the class relations whereby one human group
extracts surplus from another is less than satisfactory in environmen-
tal terms, since it marginalizes the very processes [i.e. the environ-
ment] that environmental historians wish to place at the centre of
their work.69
Marx is arguably rather utilitarian towards the environment. Marx argued that
industrial production is realisable other than in the frame of a capitalist system.
This forms the key to the humanistic utopian objective of his theorising: that
an industrial society with all the material well-being that it is capable of offering
could be had without any of the morally questionable effects of the capitalist
form of ownership. In other words, Marx’s ideal society, although it would not be
capitalist, would be an industrial society. Yet, as highlighted in the work of John
Bellamy Foster, Marx also noted and criticised the detrimental environmental
effect of intensive, large-scale industrial as well as agricultural production70.
At any rate, environmental historians have taken from Marx a certain distaste
of the broadly utilitarian ethos of capitalism linking it, as we saw, with the human
perception of nature as a system suitable for human manipulation and exploita-
67Theda Skocpol (1979: 15) makes this same observation about the dual export of Marx’s
influence.
68Merchant 1987; Cronon 1991.
69Cronon 1990: 1125.
70Bellamy Foster 1999 and Bellamy Foster 2000.
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tion. This is probably the primary sense in which environmental history, and
environmentalism more broadly, can be said to have taken in Marxian influence.
Environmental historians also often conceptualise themselves as materialists,
although, I would argue this has been in a sense quite remote from Marx. They
have been materialists in the sense of emphasising nature, its regenerative and
other processes, as the material stage of human existence often having a significant
impact on the historical development of human societies. According to Worster71,
this is one genuinely new perspective or emphasis introduced to the study of the
past by environmental history. Few would maintain that this is Marx’s kind of
materialism. Marx’s materialism refers to the material organisation of how the
human being produces the material basis of her existence, that is by certain means
of production according to the stage of economic development that the society is
in.
However, environmental historians have been materialists also close to the
sense of Marx’s historical materialism emphasising the “changes, tensions, and
contradictions that develop between a society’s mode of production and its ecol-
ogy” leading to “major transformations in human relations with non-human na-
ture”, as Carolyn Merchant put it72. This is a Marxian dialectical point to the
extent that it speaks of contradictions in the mode of production, albeit ecological
contradictions, leading to societal transformations. Marx did not conceptualise
the contradiction in ecological terms between ‘a society’s mode of production and
its ecology’, as Merchant sees it. For Marx, the contradiction had to do with a
number of things. One was the commodification of labour, that is, that in indus-
trial market society the worker is alienated from the fruits of her labour due to
labour being reduced to mere abstract means of exchange via pay to other com-
modities (see the first sense of ‘market’ on p. 78 below). Another contradiction
was that eventually the capitalist form of socio-economic organisation, due to a
conflict in the capitalist’s interest to hoard more profits and productive interest
of stimulating economic activity through circulation of money, begins to fetter
further development in productivity leading to an era of social revolution.
The point of the foregoing is that it is not obvious that the Marxian influences
in environmental history are essentially Marxian points. At any rate, as pointed




to have evoked particular attention among environmental historians and that is
inimical to their ideological paradigm: Marx did not think of ideologies, but cer-
tain material factors, as driving human action. Consider here again the words of
the famous passage from the 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy : “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their exis-
tence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness”. By ‘social
existence’ Marx meant human existence in the frame of a particular social organ-
isation of production. In Marx’s sense of materialism, the word always refers to
the processes by way of which the human being collectively produces the material
basis of her existence. In Part 2, Chapter 9, I shall pursue this theme in Marx
and illustrate its close relation to the present Wittgensteinian alternative to the
so-called ideological approach to the cultural causes of environmental problems.
I shall thus conclude this section merely by pointing out that the environmental
historical and environmentalist use of Marx as a critic of the capitalist ethos is
not the only way to read him.
Worster on Varmints
Let us now finally consider a number of particular examples of the ideologi-
cal approach in action in environmental history. A case in point is a chapter
in the American environmental historian Donald Worster’s Nature’s Economy
discussing the early 20th century case of government control of certain vermin
populations in Western United States. Worster’s argument makes significant but
in my view simplistic and over-intellectualised use of the ideological aspects of
the human relationship to nature. Note thus that the purpose here is not to
discredit the factual details of Worster’s scholarship which is, as far as I can see,
solid. Furthermore, Worster’s writings tell of a genuine passion for the environ-
ment that must be respected. Rather, I shall attempt to highlight the overblown
nature of the ideological claims made by Worster on what is in my view a rather
slim factual basis.
The larger issue upon which Worster focuses in that part of the book is the
transition in early 20th century American ecology from the “[p]rogressive ideol-
ogy of utilitarianism” to “a preservation policy based on ecology”, as he puts
it73. For the present purposes, what exactly was going on in this alleged transi-
tion in values from an explicitly anthropocentric view emphasising human utility
73Worster 1994: 256.
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over preservation of untouched nature to something genuinely concerned with
preserving the wilderness is of little direct interest. I will instead provide a close
reading of Worster’s story of the governmental vermin control programme dis-
cussing critically the ideological nature of the account.
Worster’s story takes us back to the early 20th century United States and
discusses the issue of vermin control in areas where the agricultural and other
activities of the white settlers were encountering problems in the form of vermin.
Of present interest in Worster’s story are his frequent attributions of ideological
motives to the actors he discusses. Immediately upon its founding, the American
Bureau of the Biological Survey (BBS), founded in 1905, “began to concentrate
its energies even more on aspects of science with obvious economic value”74, for
instance, on supervised killings of wolves and coyotes in the National Forest and
Parks, Worster writes. Through varmint control, it was thought, it would be
easier for agriculture to operate in these areas. There were “pressures on govern-
ment from well-heeled livestock associations, especially those of western sheep-
men, many of whom reacted to wolves and coyotes with an almost metaphysical
hatred”75. These associations played an important role in pressing for funds to
flow into the government vermin control programs. Worster continues saying
that these sheepmen and their associations “wanted —needed, from their point
of view— to see the West made over into an artificial ecological order, forever
free from predators: an idyllic pasture for thousands of bleating flocks”76.
Now, while Worster does not provide passages from pamphlets or speeches to
support the claim that there was ‘an almost metaphysical hatred’ among these
men towards wolves and coyotes, or that they wanted an ‘artificial ecological
order’, it is of course not wholly implausible that such men, whose livelihoods
and whose companies’ stock performance seemed to depend on vermin control,
felt passionately about the issue. I presume, however, that while we do not know
what individual sheepmen felt and thought about in terms of ideology, it is safe to
assume that these men and their associations had a certain pragmatic interest in
pressing for vermin control. The meaning of pragmatic interests in the sheepmen’s
lives is easily understood, but what could such terms as ‘metaphysical hatred’ and
‘artificial ecological order’ have meant to the average sheepman? Should we think





any rate, the use of these terms nicely maintains the thrust and aura of Worster’s
ideological argument without an immediately obvious or documented basis in the
lives and thinking of the actors that he talks about.
A moment later in the text, Worster observes that “[i]n the history of pro-
gressive agriculture, wild creatures had never counted for much” for “they failed
to conform to the farmer’s productive purposes and so were seen as useless when
not seen as a threat”77. It should be noted first that the term ‘progressive’ is until
that point used by Worster to denote the explicitly utilitarian motive behind pol-
icy recommendations, and not as a farmer’s ideology as it seems to be cast here,
so there is an implicit switch of context there from motivations of policy makers
to the motivations of the farmers. Be that as it may, the phrases ‘progressive
agriculture’ and ‘farmer’s productive purposes’ may for some connote a broadly
utilitarian ethos on the farmers part. The passage, however, can also be read
as providing a plausible description of the sheepmen’s pragmatic thinking about
vermin: it did not necessarily contain an almost metaphysical hatred or some
vision of managed environment, but merely a simple pragmatic view about im-
proving, or even just securing, their livelihoods in the face of the perceived threat
from vermin. Yet, typical of a number of ideological arguments in environmental
history, the implicit ideological aura of the argument is maintained through the
use of powerful expressions such as ‘almost metaphysical hatred’ whose meaning,
however, is often not grounded in the pragmatics of the lives of those who figure
in key roles in the story.
This leads us to another issue of interest which is the extent to which Worster
discusses the societal context in which an ideology may have gained practical
currency. As is evident in the above quoted passages, the bulk of the text does
contain some mentions of the wider economic context in which the government
pursued its vermin control programmes. The context, however, is not pursued
systematically and the mentions remain brief and superficial —again quite fit-
tingly for an ideological approach. This is significant because it allows Worster
to cast certain arguably ideologically motivated crucial elites as the prime moving
force of human environmental impact disregarding the point of view that these
elites could not have functioned without the existence of a wider institutional
backdrop conducive to their actions.
Consider, for instance, Worster’s claim that the extermination programmes
77Worster 1994: 268.
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were less “the result of the livestock groups’ economic needs and political lever-
age” than “the attitude toward the land and wildlife espoused by Progressive
conservation leaders”78. One of them discussed by Worster was Gifford Pinchot
(1865–1946), the Chief Forrester of Theodore Roosevelt’s administration (in office
from 1901 until 1909). Here Worster does draw material from Pinchot’s autobiog-
raphy that seems to justify Worster’s conclusion that there was “no doubt about
his [Pinchot’s] utilitarian bias toward nature”79. Pinchot argued for “a program
of long-range, careful management that would put resource development on a
thoroughly rational and efficient base” with the goal of “the greatest economic
benefit for all citizens”80.
However, we should now ask, how come was Pinchot able to have his opinions
heard? What was the context in which his views were able to gain wider currency?
Again, there is not much towards answering this question to be found in Worster
apart from the brief clue that “[g]ame management on the public lands began
in earnest during the [Theodore] Roosevelt administration”81 which suggest that
the wider political situation in the United States and Roosevelt’s ambitions might
explain why men such as Pinchot rose to prominence.
Although Worster would most likely vigorously object to this characterisation,
there is I think more than a passing similarity to the fallen-out-of-favour so-
called History of Great Men approach in the way Worster highlights the roles of
crucial elites and individuals for instance in the case of Pinchot and the vermin
programme. The classic British historian Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881) expressed
the History of Great Men approach saying:
Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this
world, is at bottom the History of Great Men who have worked here.
They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, pat-
terns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of
men contrived to do or to attain.82
To put Carlyle’s point in other words, we find in him, as well as I think
in Worster, the idea of crucial elites and individuals as somehow dominating
the course of historical developments. Thus, there is in Carlyle a clear similarity







ignoring the societal context in which Pinchot rose to the role he had and in which
he was able to have the impact he had.
Carlyle’s History of Great Men approach was famously attacked by the early
British sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820–1903). Spencer wrote:
the origin of the great man is natural; and immediately this is recog-
nized he must be classed with all other phenomena in the society that
gave him birth, as a product of its antecedents. Along with the whole
generation of which he forms a minute part —along with its institu-
tions, language, knowledge, manners, and its multitudinous arts and
appliances, he is a resultant of an enormous aggregate of forces that
have been co-operating for ages.83
Spencer is of course famous for having had a biological evolutionary conception
of the methodology of social sciences casting “the study of Sociology as the study
of Evolution in its most complex form”84, as Spencer put it. It should be clear that
the present thesis does not advocate this. Yet, if we understand the ‘antecedents’
of crucial elites and individuals, not biologically, but socially as the social context
in which they operate we begin to have a more balanced view of the role of the
crucial elites and individuals such as Pinchot. By contrast, a contrary approach
we find for instance in the American sociologist Theda Skocpol’s States and Social
Revolutions on the ‘cultural causes’ of a number of great revolutions85. In a
later paper, she summed up the argument of the book saying that “no single
acting group, whether a class or an ideological vanguard, deliberately shapes
the complex and multiply determined conflicts that bring about revolutionary
crises and outcomes ... as if some grand intentionality governs revolutionary
processes”86.
It is not my task to provide the background missing in Worster’s story —I
shall attempt something similar below in the case of John Evelyn’s Sylva where
I contrast my version with Carolyn Merchant’s ideological story. For the present
objective of discussing the nature of the ideological approach in environmental
history it suffices to note that the general background against which apparently
ideologically motivated men, such as Pinchot, rose to prominence is missing.
Furthermore, were it not missing it would, I think, have added an essentially
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In sum, the point I wish to make here against the role of arguably ideologically
motivated elites and individuals in driving human environmental impact is that
their views would have come to nothing without the existence of a backdrop of
social organisation of human life that was receptive to their ideas or otherwise
allowed their ideas to be heard and have an impact. Let me emphasise that
I do not wish to deny that crucial elites and individuals might have ideological
convictions that genuinely affect their course of action. Moreover, the approach to
social action I develop in Part 2 also admits that individuals are thinking beings
and can be ideologically motivated. I do hold, however, that the ideologically
minded individuals should always be seen in the social context in which they
operate, and I think Worster’s story of Pinchot and governmental vermin control
is a case in point where the societal backdrop is not analysed, giving rise to a
skewed, almost exclusively ideological, reading of the case.
Cronon on Boosters
The next example of an ideological approach in environmental history stems from
William Cronon’s classic Nature’s Metropolis87. It discusses the history of the
founding and rise of Chicago from the 1830s onwards as the chief transporation
link of the natural resources of the Great West, the vast frontier spreading west-
ward of the city. Cronon’s story too contains a significant but implicit ideological
component.
Cronon introduces the book with an interesting discussion of the angle from
which he approaches the issue: “if we wish to understand the ecological con-
sequences of our own lives”, Cronon argues, “we must reconstruct the linkages
between the commodities of our economy and the resources of our ecosystem”88.
The angle, as it is described here, is rather ‘materialistic’ and in the rest of the
book Cronon indeed provides an intriguing description of the various aspect of
the socio-economic organisation of the conquest of the Great Western resources.
This part of the work is in my mind excellent and exemplary of perceptive envi-
ronmental history.
In the first chapter, however, the book sets off with the familiar ideological ap-
proach to the human conceptions driving the city’s founding as it was connected




length the various 19th century theories pertaining to urban growth, colonisation
of the Western prairies as well as the arguments and the vision of certain ‘boost-
ers’, businessmen promoting Chicago and other sometimes still non-existent, but
speculatively charted, locations of potential future great metropolises. One key
element, according to Cronon, was the idea of Chicago, or some other great future
city, as leading the rise of the United States to a great empire. There were visions
of American cities comparable to the great cities of Antiquity89. The vision of
the empire was essentially connected with economic greatness promised by the
resources of the Great West, Cronon argues.
Now, as individuals the boosters may indeed have entertained such visions but
it is questionable to what extent, and with what practical significance, was the
vision shared by the masses making Chicago and the conquest of the Great West
happen. Strikingly, Cronon indeed makes the claim that the vision of the empire
was “the vision that inspired those who flooded into Chicago during the 1830s
hoping to make it the focus of a far more extensive metropolitan economy”90. A
moment later he reiterates the claim saying that “[f]or many, if not most, Amer-
icans, “the discovery, cultivation, and capitalization” of land meant bringing it
into the marketplace and attaching it to the metropolis”91. In a striking contrast
to the quality of the rest of Cronon’s story, the above ideological claims are not
discussed further and not backed up by any documented or other evidence.
One has to wonder, could this kind of an ethos on its own, or even as a
significant component, explain the American annexation of the Great West? Is
it really plausible to attribute such an ethos to all those ordinary men, women
and children who ‘flooded in to Chicago in the 1830s’? Did ‘many, if not most,
Americans’ really think this? These are bold claims. I suspect that it was really
some multitude of other much more pragmatic motivations and mundane every-
day considerations that drove the colonisation of the Great West, in particular
the activities of the mass of ordinary people who farmed, operated the rail-roads
and the grain silos of the Great West and Chicago. Certainly a lot more argu-
mentation is needed to make Cronon’s claims plausible, and this Cronon simply
does not provide. Still, the way Cronon frames his story in the first chapter leaves
the feeling that the vision of the empire, and certain related human conceptions
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West.
Merchant on John Evelyn’s Sylva
I close this chapter with a final, substantially lengthier critical discussion of the
use of ideology in environmental history. Carolyn Merchant’s account of John
Evelyn’s Sylva, a classic of English forestry from the 17th century, casts the
work as a prime example of the mechanical world-view coupled with a broadly
utilitarian ethos in action. In the following three sections I shall provide my own
contrasting historical account of the circumstances of production and reception
of Evelyn’s Sylva.
John Evelyn’s Sylva was first published in 1664. The book went through four
editions in Evelyn’s life-time, each one expanded in various ways. The fourth
edition runs to almost 600 pages and is a comprehensive collection of forestry
techniques pertaining to various types of trees, also including exotic trees. Al-
though the authorship of Sylva is credited to John Evelyn alone, it was at least to
some extent a collaborative work of a number of other fellows of the early Royal
Society of London. The literary style of the work is attributable to Evelyn.92. It
was a popular work already in its time93 and displayed Evelyn’s fame and skill
as a gardening enthusiast.
In Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature the work is discussed as an histor-
ical example of the mechanical world-view and the utilitarian ethos in action. In
environmental history the case of Sylva has not received detailed attention apart
from Merchant’s discussion of it where it is appropriated as a case in point of the
mechanical world-view and the utilitarian ethos, crucial themes in the environ-
mental historical and environmentalist conception of the human relationship to
nature. There is thus distinct argumentative value in looking at the case of Sylva
again.
Let us begin with a brief overview of Merchant’s argument. She casts Sylva
as standing at a threshold of change in human relationship to nature as a repre-
sentative of a newly emerging aggressively manipulative attitude to nature. Eve-
lyn’s “interest in conservation of timber”, Merchant writes, “represented a new
92Hunter 1981: 93. On the collaborative origins of what was to become Sylva, see Hartley




managerial approach to nature”94. This “[m]anagerial conservation”, Merchant
continues, “was an adaptation of the rationalizing tendencies inherent in mecha-
nism applied to the natural environment”95. The managerial approach allegedly
embodied in Sylva is related by Merchant to “a rudimentary form of a utilitar-
ian ethic” first championed in Evelyn’s time by a host of natural philosophers
and appearing quite a bit later in “the progressive conservation movement in the
United States in the early 1900s” as well as “the new reductionist ecology of the
1950s”96. The ideology of managerial ethos towards nature, allegedly in opera-
tion across centuries, is associated by Merchant with the attempts to “maximize
energy production, economic yields, and environmental quality through ecosys-
tem modeling [sic], manipulation, and prediction of outcomes”97. In Evelyn it
allegedly found its expression in the view that “[i]f exploitation [of forests] were
allowed to continue unabated, nature would decay, and human progress would be
curtailed”98.
Now, there are a number of aspects to Evelyn and Sylva that may lead us to
associate the two with the managerial-mechanical and utilitarian ideology about
nature. In the following sections I shall discuss three issues. There is, first, the
persistent statement about Sylva, that is often repeated but the exact meaning
of which is rarely carefully discussed, namely that the book was a reply to a
request for help by the English navy regarding replenishing the nation’s stock of
naval timber. It may thus at first seem plausible to associate Evelyn and Sylva
with the military strategic and economic forestry interests of the English state
and therefore with the so-called utilitarian ethos. Yet, as we shall see, Sylva’s
link with the navy’s request has been greatly exaggerated and it is of a complex
pragmatic rather than of an ideological nature.
Second, that Sylva was a comprehensive collection of tree planting and main-
tenance techniques may foster the impression that it put forward a mechanical,
managerial attitude towards nature. Moreover, the book became a best-seller
and it is nowadays considered a classic of forestry and so it would seem that
94Merchant 1980: 238.
95Merchant 1980: 238.
96Merchant 1980: 238. Although I shall not pursue this argument here, history of ideas
conceived as tracing the development of an idea across significant stretches of time, as we see
it for example here in Merchant, has been challenged as insensitive to the significance of the
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it was influential in spreading the ideology of human domination of the natural
environment. Yet, we do not find any signs of influence of Evelyn upon plant-
ings in English state forests and, moreover, the economic and military strategic
issue pertaining to timber had been in the agenda well before and without the
influence of Evelyn99. Finally, third, Evelyn’s own interests in gardening could
be described as being to a significant extent spiritual and aesthetic in nature, not
managerial or economically orientated, and Evelyn’s advisory work for country
gentlemen with regard to planting trees in their estates would seem to have been
practically exclusively of an aesthetic nature.
Sylva and the Navy
We shall begin with an examination of the question of the navy’s paper to the
Royal Society in relation to Evelyn’s Sylva. It is said that the navy put a request
to the Society to examine what could be done about the impending naval timber
shortage in the nation. This crucial statement is often made in the literature
with varying choice of words and implied meaning. For example, sometimes it is
said that the navy “commissioned” Sylva, or that Sylva was a “response to an
appeal from the Navy for the Society to encourage the preservation and planting
of oaks” and other times merely that the navy “inspired” the research that went
into Sylva100. We shall see that the precise relationship between the request
by the navy and Evelyn’s response, as well as the nature of the request itself,
is complicated, and has never been properly explicated; in fact, relatively little
appears to be known of the relevant circumstances101.
First, however, let us briefly discuss the situation in 17th century England
regarding the navy and its timber needs. In setting out the issue one has to be
careful to make at least some rough distinctions between different kinds of wood
and other materials needed in the 17th century to build a naval ship as well as
the sources of these materials. Thus, for example oak, native to the British Isles,
was used to build the body of the ship due to it being rot resistant, whereas the
99It should be noted that I obviously cannot attempt to consider here in detail the influence
of Sylva over the centuries that it has been available. For one, the book appears to have enjoyed
revived interest upon its republication in 1812 (see Nisbet’s introduction to Sylva, Evelyn 1908:
Vol. I, lxviii). I shall focus on the period leading up to and shortly after Sylva’s publication.
100Chambers 1988: 29, Hartley 2010: 1, Hunter 1981: 104.
101The most detailed account is offered in Lynch 2001: 37 ff.. See also de la Bédoyère 1995:
173-180 and de Beer 1960: 234. Hartley 2010 reprints one crucial document to the story, the
navy’s paper to the Society.
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durable but flexible Baltic conifers were considered to be the best quality mast
wood102. In addition, there was the need for instance for tar obtained sometimes
from as far north as Finland103. However, a lot of the discussion of planting trees
in England to secure the availability of naval timber concerns oak.
The historical context of the naval timber issue was the following. In the 17th
century, there were a series of conflicts between the English and the Dutch referred
to as the Dutch Wars. One crucial element of these conflicts was to challenge the
Dutch dominance in international trade in which by that time Europeans were
active on most continents of the world: the Americas, Asia as well as in Europe104.
These conflicts were to a significant extent naval, involving the building and
maintenance of fleets of wooden vessels. In particular, suitably long yet flexible
timber for masts was difficult to acquire and Norway, but also many other parts of
Northern Europe and the Baltic, were for the British the source of mast wood105.
In terms of such strategically crucial goods England was thus at least partly
dependent on foreign powers. The situation was made worse by the fact that
the Dutch were in control of the trade to the Baltic and Scandinavian countries.
Even if the English were sometimes in charge of the trade, the route to the Baltic
through the narrow straits between Norway, Sweden and continental Europe could
easily be blocked. At least to some extent England was thus at the mercy of
foreign powers both in terms of the source of some crucial raw materials as well as
their distribution. In addition to military means, this dependence was combated
legally by the English: the introduction of the Navigation Ordinance of 1651,
and a number of Navigation Acts in the 1660s attempted to arrange matters of
transport in terms more favourable to the English.106
Thus, writes the historian John Nisbet, as “[a] great advance in the price of
timber took place soon after the Restoration the commissioners of the navy at that
time, alarmed by the prospect of a want of timber for the dockyards, represented
the situation to the Royal Society, and requested them to suggest a remedy. This
was given to them in the shape of John Evelyn’s Silva”107. Similar passages
102Williams 2003: 193 and 196.
103Williams 2003: 200.
104For a relatively recent review of historical work regarding the causes of the wars, see Israel
1997.
105Kent 1955.
106Williams 2003: 169 ff.
107Nisbet 1906: 452. In the first three editions the name is spelled Sylva and in the fourth
edition as Silva. Recent literature prefers the original spelling, Sylva.
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stressing the intimate connection between Sylva and the navy are common in
the literature. Such accounts, however, face one crucial set of questions: why did
Evelyn and the Society respond to a practical enquiry about how to secure timber
access from the navy by compiling a manual on forestry techniques? Would not
a paper proposing some particular, concrete policies together with the relevant
forestry techniques to realise them have been more appropriate? This remarkable
discrepancy between what was a rather pragmatic request by the navy and the
manual-like character of Sylva, that nevertheless allegedly was Evelyn and the
Society’s response to the navy’s request, has as far as I can discover passed
unnoticed in the secondary literature.
The connection between the navy’s request and Sylva can be studied in the
minutes of the Society’s meetings over the period in which Sylva came to be108.
The story begins on 17 September 1662 when “[a] paper about the improvements
and planting of timber” was read at the Society’s meeting. It was brought in by
Sir Robert Moray109 and the paper was “from the commissioners of his majesty’s
navy”110. The paper still exists, the text of which has recently been published,
and Beryl Hartley has been able to establish that it was handwritten by one of
the commissioners of the navy, Peter Pett111. In fact, in the very same meeting in
which Moray read the paper from the commissioners of the navy, “commissioner
Pett” among a number of others “were put to the scrutiny, and elected” as fellows
of the Society112.
Now, the paper itself, although often referred to as a request for help from
the navy to the Society, is rather a set of propositions, not a set of questions,
nor a request for anything from the Society. The five propositions it contains are
addressed to “his most sacred Majesty” that he would institute certain reforms
to secure the protection and future availability of naval timber. Why is the paper
then so often referred to as an appeal for advice from the Society and Sylva as
108These minutes are reprinted in Birch 1968. Birch’s book is a chronicle, a day to day record
of the work undertaken by the Society, presenting the results of an enormous task of copying
that he as the Society’s secretary (1752-65) was nicely placed to execute (see xi-xiii of the
introduction to Birch 1968 by A. Rubert Hall).
109Moray was a founding member of the Society and said to have been “the chief intermediary
between the Society and the King and other highly placed persons” (Martin 1960: 246). Al-
though serving the state in high positions, Moray does not appear to have had any particular
role in the affairs of the navy, so perhaps he was in this case a mere messenger between the
navy and the Society.
110Birch 1968: 111.
111Hartley 2010: Footnote 3, Appendix I.
112Birch 1968: 111.
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the reply? This is stated for instance in the very cover of Sylva itself. Due to
the lack of documented evidence, one possibility is that perhaps Pett and the
commissioners had the paper read to the Society in order to have their comments
to it as well as to obtain further similar propositions to be presented to the king
later. This is supported by the fact that, as we shall soon see, similar propositions
were then indeed provided by a number of the Society’s fellows, for sure by John
Winthorp and probably by John Evelyn. Importantly, however, as will become
apparent soon, these propositions are not to be thought of as Sylva the book.
The next step in the story is that four fellows of the Society had the navy’s
paper ‘referred to their consideration’. These were “Mr. Evelyn, Dr. Goddard,
Dr. Merret and Mr. Winthorp”113. Then, on 1 October 1662 it was recorded
that “Mr. Evelyn was desired to peruse the papers regarding the propagating
of timber, brought in by Dr. Goddard, Dr. Merret, and Mr. Winthorp, and to
add what he had of his own, digesting the sum of all into one paper against the
next meeting”114. Evelyn presumably had not been able to produce the summary
paper by the next meeting on 8 October as it is not mentioned in the records,
but then on 15 October 1662 “Mr. Evelyn read his paper, in which he had put
together the several suggestions offered by others in distinct papers, by way of
answer to the queries of the commissioners of the navy”115. The Society must
have liked what they heard for “he [Evelyn] was desired to print the paper read
by him”116.
Importantly for the present argument, the summary paper presented by Eve-
lyn on 15 October 1662, and desired to be printed by the Society, was considered
inadequate as a reply to the navy. This is testified by the fact that, in the same
meeting, “Dr. Goddard, Dr. Merret, Mr. Evelyn and Dr. Wilkins, were appointed
a committee, to make an extract out of Mr. Evelyn’s papers, and the others, &tc.
in order to return a brief and methodical answer to the queries of the commis-
sioners of the navy”117. What was wrong with the summary paper as a reply to
the navy the record does not explicitly say, but we may speculate that it did not
113Birch 1968: 111. Jonathan Goddard was the professor of physics at the Gresham College,
Christopher Merret a physician and John Winthorp the governor of the colony of Connecticut




117Birch 1968: 117. As we see, the make-up of the committee has now changed. The new
addition John Wilkins was at the time the secretary of the society (as detailed on the list of
the Society’s fellows in Birch 1968: xxxiii ff.).
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directly address the concerns of the navy but was perhaps too long or even just
a collection of tree planting techniques in the style of Sylva.
While it was a whole committee that was set upon the task of providing the
‘brief and methodical’ version of the paper it seems to have been Evelyn who
worked on it as at the next meeting on 22 October 1662 only Evelyn’s name is
mentioned in a request for results118. On 5 November it is recorded that Evelyn
had “conferred with commissioner [Peter] Pett concerning the account, which
he was to bring in”, which Evelyn however had apparently not yet brought in,
“of the best methods of planting and propagating timber-trees”119. Interestingly,
the record says that Evelyn was hastened to make changes to the part “which
concerns the way of preparing acorns for planting”120, the significance of which
we shall consider below.
Evelyn’s diary entry for 5 November adds a detail about the meeting: “[t]he
Council of the Royal Society met to amend the Statutes, and dined together;
afterward meeting at Gresham College, where was a discourse suggested by me,
concerning planting his Majesty’s Forest of Dean with oak, now so much ex-
hausted of the choicest ship timber in the world”121. This passage gives the most
direct link we have suggesting that Evelyn played a role in initiating or encour-
aging state plantings. I shall consider the passage in more detail below in the
section on Evelyn’s role in the Forest of Dean.
After the mention on 22 October there are no more references in Birch’s record
to the issue and we are left in the dark as to what happened with the Society’s
reply to the navy. Of the many papers mentioned above —the navy’s paper
brought in by Moray, the contributions of the four fellows set to work upon the
navy’s paper, Evelyn’s summary of them, and the final brief and methodical reply




121Evelyn 1901: Vol. I 365.
122Darley appears to have further information as to the content of some of these papers but
her sources are not recorded and Darley’s claims conflict with Birch’s records. Darley writes
that “[o]ther fellows provided material for Sylva, notably Christopher Merret’s observations on
France and Germany, ... and Dr Jonathan Goddard on the physiology of trees” (Darley 2006:
181). Now, Birch’s record does mention that on 24 September 1662 Goddard “brought in ...
his thoughts concerning the planting of timber in England” this being “upon the proposition
offered to the consideration of the society by the commissioners of his majesty’s navy” (Birch
1968: 112). This, then, presumably was Goddard’s contribution but it is not on ‘the physiology
of trees’ as Darley says. Likewise, in the meeting on 1 October Merret is recorded to have
read “his paper concerning the planting and preserving of timber; together with his collection
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the navy’s paper123, the content of which has already been summarised, and Mr.
Winthorp’s contribution124.
How much the character of Winthorp’s contribution corresponds with the
character of the other missing papers we cannot say. Winthorp’s contribution, in
contrast to the bulk of Sylva containing technicalities of tree planting, certainly
is of the pragmatic kind that would have been of interest to the navy whether
they would in the end have considered its proposals practicable or not. Most
interestingly it is written in the same form as Pett’s or the commissioners’ paper,
namely, as a proposition ‘to his majesty’ to institute certain reforms to secure the
supply of naval timber. Thus, Winthorp’s contribution wonders “whether it may
not be fit to propose to his majesty, or his honourable commissioners of the navy,
the conveniency of building ships in some of the northern parts of America”125.
This is followed by nine arguments why this would be of advantage concerning
for instance the easy and cheap availability there of all the resources needed to
build ships, and the ready ships could then sail to England loaded with spare
materials, Winthorp adds.
The few clues we have to the nature of Evelyn’s contribution are the above
quoted passage in his diary and the minutes of the Society’s meeting, both from 5
November 1662. The minutes imply that Evelyn’s proposal to the navy contained
technical details about preparing acorns for planting which makes sense in the
light of his above quoted diary remark where he says that he proposed the Forest
of Dean to be planted with oak. As speculated above, judging by its content,
the first six pages or so of the concluding chapter of Sylva (first edition) could
well have been contained in Evelyn’s contribution. This section indeed contains
a mention of the Forest of Dean, sowing acorns and a number of other practical
considerations that may have been of interest to the navy but little in terms of
technical detail pertaining to planting trees. We shall return to the content of
this section below as we discuss Evelyn’s influence regarding plantations in the
Forest of Dean.
In this connection the historian Gillian Darley writes that in Sylva “Evelyn
suggested that an orderly programme of timber management and conservation
of those statuses, that have been formerly made by the parliament of England concerning the
same” (Birch 1968: 114). This then probably is Merret’s response to the navy’s paper but
again it does not concern France and Germany as Darley has it.
123Reprinted in Hartley 2010.
124Printed in Birch 1968: 112-3.
125Birch 1968: 112.
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would put the economy to rights and ensure that the national defences, those
‘wooden walls’ that consumed such prodigious quantities of timber, were secure
against imminent threat”126. Yet, this kind of suggestion hardly describes the
bulk of the content of Sylva which is essentially a kind of instruction manual, not
an ‘orderly programme’. Darley’s remarks, though unreferenced, may refer to
what are the most programmatic and pragmatic passages of Sylva found in the
beginning of the concluding chapter127. We shall return to consider the content of
this interesting section shortly. For now, the point needs to be stressed that, while
it contains pragmatic materials of the sort that would probably have interested
the navy, the relevant part of the closing section of Sylva is very short (some six
pages of the total 120 pages of the first edition), cannot really be described as an
orderly programme, and in terms of the nature of its content differs greatly from
the bulk of Sylva.
Moreover, in a letter by Evelyn to William Wotton dated 12 September 1703128
he writes that materials “for the improvement of planting and gardening..., my
Sylva and what else I published on that subject” were collected as part of the
Society’s History of Trades programme129. The History of Trades was a project
inspired by Francis Bacon’s vision of the systematic collection of practical tech-
niques to be used for human benefit that was begun in the 1650s by the members
of what was to become the Royal Society, among them Evelyn. Indeed, the im-
portance of the promotion of tree planting among the Society’s activities has
recently been argued for by Hartley130. It seems thus that the collection of mate-
rials later to appear in Sylva was begun already in the 1650s, that is, well before
the navy’s paper to the Society.
In sum, then, despite the declaration in the very cover of Sylva, it is clear that
the book was not the Society’s reply to the navy. A detailed study into why Sylva
was nevertheless branded as such is beyond the present scope. I speculate that it
was a marketing tactic by the Society to associate itself with the state. The early
Society is known to have struggled with funds and craved for an official recogni-
126Darley 2006: 182.
127See The Paraenesis and Conclusion 112 ff. of the first edition, 157 ff. of the fourth edition.
In the fourth edition the chapter is titled The paraenesis and conclusion, containing some
encouragements and proposals for the planting and improvement of his Majesty forests, and
other amcemties for shade, and ornament and in it it is some forty pages longer than in the
first edition.
128The letter is reprinted in Evelyn 1854: 390 ff.
129Evelyn 1854: 392.
130Hartley 2010. See also Levy Peck 2005: 312 ff. and Houghton Jr. 1941.
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tion of its operations131, so it is understandable that the Society would seize the
opportunity to associate one of its publications with the work of the navy and the
needs of the state. In Merchant’s story, by contrast, Evelyn and Sylva appear as
the ideological champions of a newly emerging, aggressively manipulative attitude
to nature intimately connected with the technocratic machinery of the English
state. There is reason, however, to see the association of the Society with the
navy as a much more pragmatic and a much less substantial affair. Moreover, as
will come more apparent in the following sections, the orientation towards man-
aging forests as sources of raw materials and wealth —orientations that Merchant
casts as emerging with Evelyn and Sylva— were already very much in the agenda
as pragmatic economic and military-strategic questions that by no means needed
Evelyn as their protagonist.
Sylva and the Forest of Dean
What of Evelyn’s proposal to plant oak in the Forest of Dean as he recorded
in his diary (on 5 November 1662, quoted above)? Could Evelyn have played a
role in drawing the navy’s attention to that possibility? In the absence of further
evidence this is unlikely. As we shall see, the dire situation with regards to timber
at the Forest of Dean was well-known having been subject to much discussion in
the parliament throughout the 17th century.
In the main, the English navy obtained its timber from three royal forests: the
Forest of Dean, the New Forest and the Alice Holt forest (in addition to which,
“though unreliable, private parks and estates could make up deficiencies from
time to time”)132. Let us begin with a brief overview of the circumstances in the
Forest of Dean in the period leading up to the 1660s.
In overall terms, during the reigns of James I (1567-1625) and Charles I (1625-
1649) of England, it has been said that “the Forest of Dean was managed for
short-term monetary benefit with little care for preserving the future value of its
woodlands”133. By Evelyn’s time, it had already for some time served as a source
of the navy’s timber: “[t]he first evidence found of the use of Dean’s oak for the
royal navy was in 1617”134. First plantings in the forest were initiated by John
131Hunter 1981: 36 ff.
132Williams 2003: 193-6.
133Baggs & Jurica 1996.
134Baggs & Jurica 1996.
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Wade, the chief administrator in the Forest of Dean from 1653 until 1660135. In a
display of disregard for the forest in the quest for monetary benefits, in the early
17th century, “James I declared much of what was presumed to be established
freehold in the Forest’s parishes to be illegal assarts” making the newly illegalised
inhabitants pay for their lands136. Later on, a different approach was applied, as
“[b]y 1638 Charles I’s government had decided that the best means of capitalizing
on the Forest was to disafforest and sell the bulk of the royal demesne”137. Both
of these actions resulted in riots and destruction in the enclosures by the unhappy
commoners who had lost access to common lands. It was not until the 1630s that
“the government became more purposeful in its attempts to preserve timber for
the navy’s use” which, however, due to free access to the forest was in practice
not very efficient138.
Further destruction in the forest followed in the disorderly years of the Civil
War as “[f]or most of the Civil War the administration of the Forest was disrupted
as royalists under Sir John Winter [the older spelling is Wintour] contested control
[of the area] with the parliamentary garrison of Gloucester”139. Already since the
1620s, Winter had been in charge of his family estates in the forest, managing in
particular an ironworks140. In the 1630s he was fined for offences relating to felling
materials for fuel in his ironworks141 only in 1640 to be sold a significant portion
of the forest by Charles I who “through Wintour ... could at once obtain a highly
attractive revenue and leave local difficulties to someone on the spot”142. This
led at once to vast enclosure and felling operations by Winter that were bitterly
opposed by the locals143 probably for the simple reason that the enclosures now
denied them access to what had been common lands upon which their livelihoods
depended. This is a pattern that was to be repeated again and again in the future
and Winter too was to figure in a central, and in a rather destructive, role in what
went on in the forest in the next decades. However, during the Commonwealth of
England, the royalist Winter “fought for the King’s cause and his own, but when
135Hart 1966: 150.
136Baggs & Jurica 1996.
137Baggs & Jurica 1996.
138Baggs & Jurica 1996.






his resistance ended in about 1644 he lost most of his property”144.
The Restoration in 1660 had brought in a new attempt to put the forest
under effective control and thus “[a]t the Restoration the government ordered a
commission of inquiry, which, reporting in 1662, advised it to resume as much
as possible of the alienated lands and follow a determined policy of inclosing the
Forest as a nursery for ship timber”145. The inquiry into the Forest of Dean
had thus reached a conclusion some months before the navy’s paper was read at
the Society’s meeting: the Society heard the paper on 17 September 1662 (as
quoted above) but on 12 April 1662 a commission led by Marquis of Worcester
had already reported on the state of the Forest of Dean146. Therefore, the navy’s
paper to the Society probably did not relate to the commission’s report as their
report was issued earlier than the paper by the navy to the Society. In any
case, the commission’s study of the conditions in the Forest of Dean had been
conducted independently in February 1662147.
However, malpractice in the Forest of Dean continued as one Sir John Winter
reclaimed his right to the forest. Winter “had a new grant of all the timber trees
surviving on almost the whole demesne and the use of the ironworks” there148.
As mentioned above, in the 1640s Winter, an ardent royalist, had resisted the
Commonwealth among others by arms attacking the Parliamentary forces in and
around the Forest of Dean. No wonder then that “[t]he return of Charles at
once restored Sir John Winter to liberty, and to the benefits of the Patent which
the late King had granted him”, upon which he began to act immediately “by
repairing his enclosures, in spite of determined opposition from the neighbouring
inhabitants”149 from whom the access to land they depended upon was once again
being denied.
Part of the new agreement of 1662 was that Winter provide the navy with
timber150. However, already in 13 April 1663 another committee, that had been
144Hart 1966: 131.
145Baggs & Jurica 1996.
146Hart 1966: 157.
147Hart 1966: 155.
148Baggs & Jurica 1996.
149Nicholls 1858: 38.
150Samuel Pepys had been involved in setting up this agreement between Winter and the king,
as Pepys records in his diary on 20 June 1662: “Drew up the agreement between the King and
Sir John Winter ... about the Forrest of Deane; and having done it, he come himself, (I did not
know him to be the Queene’s Secretary before, but observed him to be a man of fine parts);
and we read it, and both liked it well. That done, I turned to the Forrest of Deane, in Speede’s
Mapps, and there he showed me how it lies; and the Sea-bayly, with the great charge of carrying
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formed to investigate complaints coming from the Forest of Dean, reported “that
Wintour ‘had 500 cutters of wood employed in Dean, and all the timber would
be destroyed if care should not be speedily taken to prevent it’ ” upon which the
House of Commons ordered the felling to stop. This, however, appears to have had
no effect upon Winter’s operations in the forest.151 In December 1667, a survey
found that about seven to eight tons of timber supposed to be delivered by Winter
for the navy were unaccounted for while “of 30133 trees sold to him there remained
only about 200”152. Where all these trees went “remains a mystery”153. Finally,
in 1668, after a number of Parliamentary hearings and “after more opposition
and irregularities in his delivery of the navy’s timber, he [Winter] surrendered all
his rights and was discharged of the obligation to supply the timber”154. He was
simply discharged of his obligation despite “his debt to the King for 8921 tons of
shiptimber”155 still outstanding.
The year 1668, when Winter’s activities in the Forest of Dean were put to a
final end, saw the parliament pass The Dean Forest Reafforestation Act. This act
was at last one that was “ostensibly acceptable to most interests”, much however
“would depend on the energy and integrity of the officials” to put the Act to an
effective realisation156.
Not only does the year of the passing of the Act (1668) make it possible that
the Society’s response to the navy should have borne fruit, albeit six years after
the navy’s paper was read in the Society’s meeting, but also, in 1671, none other
than “Samuel Pepys and colleagues from the Navy Office visited the Forest”157
suggesting that the navy, and perhaps by implication the Society and Evelyn,
had had its hands on the project.
However, such a link is tenuous to establish in a rigorous way and in any case,
as we have seen, the official concern with the Forest of Dean well predated Evelyn’s
it to Lydny, and many other things worth my knowing; and I do perceive that I am very short
in my business by not knowing many times the geographical part of my business.” Later on,
on 14 August 1662, perhaps in a display of Winter’s gratitude to Pepys and the commissioners,
Pepys records: “Commissioner Pett and I being invited, went by Sir John Winter’s coach sent
for us, to the Miter, in Fanchurch-street, to a venison-pasty; where I found him a very worthy




154Baggs & Jurica 1996.
155Hart 1966: 168.
156Hart 1966: 169.
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recommendation to plant oak there. True, Pepys was a fellow of the Society, but
not yet in 1662 having become one in 1665158. Pepys was incidentally also a good
friend of Evelyn’s although apparently the two became so only sometime towards
the end of the 1660’s, a difference in social rank having until then kept a distance
between Pepys, the son of a tailor as well as twelve years junior to Evelyn, the
gardening enthusiast from a wealthy and learned background159. It is therefore
unlikely that Pepys was at that time Evelyn’s or the Society’s channel of influence
upon the navy.
Also, the role of Pepys and other commissioners of the navy in the Forest
of Dean appears to have been merely to inspect whether there were suitable
timber materials for the use of the navy, and not for example to issue orders
to plant trees. For this purpose, “Pepys, with Lord Brounker and J. Tippetts,
surveyed the Forest for three days in July 1671”160. The actual management and
the introduction of plantings at the Forest of Dean appears to have been in the
hands of a group of officials there: John May, the supervisor of the forest, Daniel
Furzer, a master shipwright, who since 1656 had been the supervisor of various
naval timber projects in the forest161, the surveyor-general of woods Thomas
Agar, the constable-warden Marquis of Worcester together with his deputy Sir
Baynham Throckmorton, as well as Sir Charles Harbord and his son William162.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate about Evelyn’s effect in the connec-
tion of the 1668 Act and the changes it brought in the Forest of Dean. For this
purpose, let us return to the remarks made by Evelyn in the concluding chapter
of Sylva (Chapter VIII) we mentioned briefly above and compare the recommen-
dations there to what took place in the Forest of Dean as a result of the 1668
Act.
As noted above, the concluding chapter of Sylva could well have been of in-
terest to the commissioners of the navy because of the pragmatic nature of the
first six pages or so of the chapter. These pages may even have been Evelyn’s
reaction to the navy’s paper that later found their way into Sylva. There, again
in the form of a proposal to ‘his majesty’ as in Winthorp’s and the commission-
ers’ papers, Evelyn writes “that there is not a cheaper, easier or more prompt
158See the list of fellows in Birch 1968: xxxiii.
159de la Bédoyère 2005: 11.
160Hart 1966: 172.
161Hart 1966: e.g. 144, 145, 158 and in particular 170.
162Hart 1966: 169.
64 Chapter 3. A Deeper Spiritual Malaise
expedient to advance ship-timber, than to solicit, that in all his Majesty’s forests,
woods and parks, the spreading oak, &c. (which we have formerly described) be
cherish’d, by plowing and sowing barley, rye, &c. ...”163. The best way to achieve
this is to enclose common forest, as Evelyn says is “advis’d by such as are every
way judicious, and of long experience in those parts”164. However, Evelyn notes
that “it is to be considered, that the people, viz. foresters, and borderers, are
not generally so civil and reasonable, as might be wished”165 but tend to object
to enclosures. It is therefore desirable that “in such places, his Majesty must
assert his power, with a firm and high resolution to reduce these men to their due
obedience, and to a necessity of submitting to their own and the publick utility
...”166. These were not particularly original suggestions as the troubles in the
forest as well as its role as a source of navy timber were well known. We have
also seen that the enclosure of common land had been one key source, not the
solution, of the troubles in the forest.
Evelyn appears to have recognised the need to provide these ‘uncivil and
unreasonable men’ something in return for the enclosed common lands, otherwise
there would be no stopping the violations of the enclosures. Thus, Evelyn suggests
getting “the bordures [borders, the edges of the forest] well tenanted, by long
terms, and easie rents, and this will invite and encourage takers; whilst the middle,
most secure, and interior parts would be a Royal portion”167. The reasoning
evidently is that the enclosed part would remain untouched if the surrounding
forest offered attractive enough land upon which to subsist. Yet, for the landless
folk subsisting on the forest the idea of having now to pay for access to land
that had formerly been common would have seemed outrageous and, in any case,
presumably not everyone could become a tenant. What changes took place in
the tenancies around the forest I have not been able to find out, but the 1668
Act ordered the implementation of a model of the following kind: “11,000 a. of
the demesne should be inclosed, to be progressively laid open and replaced by
other inclosures as the new growth of timber reached sufficient size to be safe
from browsing animals”168. We see then that Evelyn’s proposed model does not
immediately coincide with the model actually instituted at the Forest of Dean.
163Evelyn 1908: Vol. II, 158.
164Evelyn 1908: Vol. II 158.
165Evelyn 1908: Vol. II, 158.
166Evelyn 1908: Vol. II, 158.
167Evelyn 1908: Vol. II 159.
168Baggs & Jurica 1996.
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Evelyn also suggested an administrative model reliant on private enterprise
to manage the enclosed areas: “[l]et his Majesty therefore admit of any willing
adventurers in this vast circle for such enclosures in the precinct”, the anticipated
effect being “that multitudes [of parties with interest in the forest] being thus
engaged, the consideration might procure and facilitate a full discovery of latter
encroachments, and fortifie the recovery by favourable rents, improvements and
reversions by copy-hold ...”169. If Evelyn’s advice was ever heard, it was not
in this respect taken up, for as a matter of fact the management of the forest
was executed by “the administration [which] relied mainly on salaried and easily
replaceable officers”170. In any case, in dividing up the forest the rights of the
landowning families of the area had to be taken into consideration and in practice
many landowners of the area were appointed to posts in the forest administration,
and sometimes the positions remained in the family line for generations171.
In some other respects Evelyn’s recommendations seem to match with what
was instituted at the Forest of Dean. Thus, the overall strategy of the reformed
administration was “mainly to encourage natural regeneration of oak and beech
and preserve what healthy trees survived, though some acorns were sown”172,
sowing of which Evelyn also had thought a good idea (as quoted above)173. In
Sylva Evelyn also wrote that “to advance the Royal forests to this height of
perfection, I should again urge the removal of some of our most mischievously
plac’d iron-mills” and acquire the materials from abroad, in particular, from New-
England174. And indeed the administration’s “determination to pursue a policy
of preservation was shown by the dismantling of the ironworks in 1674 ...”175.
Yet, again Evelyn’s points are not particularly original but familiar from decades
of troubles in the forest.
In sum, then, it is possible to find both convergence as well as divergence
169Evelyn 1908: Vol. II, 158.
170Baggs & Jurica 1996.
171Baggs & Jurica 1996.
172Baggs & Jurica 1996.
173Quoting first Evelyn’s diary from 5 November 1662 where he mentions having suggested
the planting of the Forest of Dean with acorns, Hart continues saying that “Evelyn may or
may not have known that Furzer had collected 100 bushels of acorns in Dean by 20 October
... and hoped to collect another 60 bushels” of which Furzer noted that “they begin to sprout
and grow very much already” (Hart 1966: 158). Hart’s account, the most detailed account of
the history of the Forest of Dean, does not contribute Evelyn or the Royal Society any explicit
role in what went on in the Forest of Dean.
174Evelyn 1908: Vol. II, 163.
175Baggs & Jurica 1996.
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between what Evelyn proposed in Sylva and what was instituted in the Forest of
Dean in the 1660s and 1670s. What was the matter of fact connection between
the two, we do not know for sure. If there was a connection, it was most likely un-
official consisting of private conversations between Evelyn and other strategically
placed gentlemen serving the English state. On the other hand, the problems in
the forest and what could be done about them were well known even without
Evelyn’s encouragements to preserve and plant. Thus the main thrust of the
present argument is supported: Evelyn and Sylva cannot be considered a novel
ideological driving force towards rationalised maximum exploitation of the forest
as Merchant appears to suggest.
Sylva and Landowners
Let us now turn to more civilian forestry matters and inspect Evelyn’s influence
there. Sylva sold well and was popular among the higher ranks of the English
country side, but because of its style it was more difficult for the lower ranks.
Thus, while “a market undoubtedly existed among yeomen farmers and practi-
tioners of mechanical arts for handbooks describing techniques and disseminating
theoretical skills like arithmetic”, Evelyn’s style in Sylva often appeared as too
“aloof” for such an audience176. The success of Sylva seems to have partly de-
pended on “its refinement that ensured its success among the dilettante gentry,
who were flattered by its pretensions”177. The more common folk were put off by
Sylva’s “literary embellishments and difficult vocabulary”178, even when a later
edition contained a glossary of difficult terms.179 It has been suggested that it
may have been, at least after the success of Sylva, a deliberate tactic on part of
the Royal Society to promote its work through the upper class: “[t]he Society
might even have been well advised to concentrate on relatively elitist subjects”
and use “a network of prominent landowners to spread innovation”180.
Thus, in the beginning of Sylva we find a preface titled To the Reader where
Evelyn encourages private planting of timber trees saying
[i]t is what all Persons who are Owners of Land may contribute to, and




179On the refined style of Sylva, see also de la Bédoyère 1995: 178 ff.
180Hunter 1981: 101.
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able Ambition of imitating their Illustrious Ancestors, and of worthily
serving their Generation.181
Later Evelyn himself proclaimed that the book had had just that effect: it had
encouraged the planting of “many millions of useful timber-trees throughout this
nation” concluded “(without immodesty) from the many letters of acknowledge-
ment received from gentlemen of the first quality, and others altogether strangers
to me”182. One of these may have been Joseph Glanville, at the time the rector
of the Abbey Church in Bath in southwestern England and member of the Royal
Society along with Evelyn. In his own words, Glanville had distributed the book
in his locality and in 1671 wrote to Evelyn saying that the local gentlemen who
had received a copy “have to my knowledge been incited by it [Sylva] to plant
some Thousands’ of trees”183.
The historian John Nisbet tells us that Evelyn’s work had influenced both
private persons and the English state to plant trees: “[a]part from the planting
done in the royal woods and forests, details of Evelyn’s diary shew that he was
frequently called upon to give advice with regard to laying out private planta-
tions”184. Evelyn himself proclaimed that Sylva had greatly inspired planting
in England, and some have claimed that it had in particular inspired planting
of naval timber: “[i]t is not too much to say that Evelyn’s book on forestry
contributed to the ‘wooden walls’ of Nelson’s navy”185.
However, as we saw, there is little direct evidence suggesting Evelyn’s influence
upon what went on in the Forest of Dean. Also, Evelyn’s diary, while it does
mention that Evelyn advised persons on gardening matters, it does not, as far
as I can discover, contain passages about the alleged advice he gave to private
persons regarding setting up tree plantations. The advice seems rather to have
concerned the arrangement of gardens from an aesthetic point of view. Thus,
consider this passage in the entry for 16 October 1671:
Here my Lord [Arlington]186 was pleased to advise with me about
181Evelyn 1908: Vol. I, Ixxviii.
182This passage stems from Evelyn’s a 1690 letter to Lady Sunderland (reprinted in Evelyn
1854: 317 ff.). A similar passage is to be found in the book’s dedication to the king in which
Evelyn writes: “I need not Aquaint Your Majesty, how many Millions of Timber-Trees (be-
side infinite others) have been Propagated and Planted throughout Your Dominions, at the
Instigation, and by the sole Direction of this Work” (Evelyn 1908: Vol. I lxv).
183Quoted in Hunter 1981: 93.
184Nisbet’s Introduction to Sylva, Evelyn 1908: Vol. I, lxviii.
185Bowle 1981: 115.
186Henry Bennet, 1st Earl of Arlington, secretary of state under Charles II.
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ordering his plantations of firs, elms, limes, etc., up his park, and in
all other places and avenues. I persuaded him to bring his park so
near as to comprehend his house within it; which he resolved upon, it
being now near a mile to it.187
Another passage from 25 September 1672 also suggests Evelyn having given
landscaping advice to Lord John Berkeley188:
the fore-court is noble, so are the stables; and, above all, the gardens,
which are incomparable by reason of the inequality of the ground,
and a pretty piscina. The holly hedges on the terrace I advised the
planting of.189
Indeed, it is likely, given the fashion of the times for landowners to display their
social standing by the construction of parkland for hunting and other recreational
as well as aesthetic purposes, that the advice given by Evelyn was indeed mostly
of that quality.
In the 17th century, English country gentlemen had a related social reason to
improve their estates by tree planting. “Ever since medieval times”, the historian
Michael Williams writes, “the forests had been the hunting grounds of royalty,
and large areas of the country were preserved for the recreational use of the
few”190. Later on, the possession of such land where recreational activities could
be conducted was a status symbol: “the owners displayed their wealth and power
by refashioning the landscape, mainly through planting trees”191. In addition,
Williams continues, “[i]n the urban sphere the cult of walking and promenading
as a social exercise gathered momentum after the Restoration of Charles II in
1660” and the place to do that was “along formally laid out tree-lined walks
and avenues”192. Indeed, Williams adds jokingly, “[w]hereas the Romans had
taken off their clothes [and bathed] in order to meet socially, the English donned
their best clothes and planted a great number of trees to do the same”193. In
the country side, a kind of a competition between landowners ensued, Williams
argues, as “[l]andowners vied with each other in the complexity and extent of their
187Evelyn 1901: Vol. II, 73.
188John Berkeley, first Baron Berkeley of Stratton, member of the Privy Council and a civil
servant.






plantings”194. In these circumstances, Evelyn’s gardening know-how and vision,
and his prominence as a gardener, would have seemed attractive to a gentleman
wanting to redesign his estate.
That gardening was for Evelyn an important aesthetic and spiritual exercise
is clear. Evelyn’s works on gardening tend to invest the subject with a spiritual,
poetic quality and he develops an almost metaphysical account of the philosophy
of gardening195. Evelyn is said to have introduced to the English language the
word ‘avenue’ to mean a drive with trees planted in straight lines on the sides,
although such drives had existed well before Evelyn196. Furthermore, Evelyn is
said to have championed “one of the major shifts in the eighteenth-century land-
scape”, that from “the contained traditional Dutch garden to large open estates
whose chief effects were dependent upon trees”197. His test ground for ideas was
his estate Sayes Court (in today’s London) in which “he had transformed the gar-
den of the old-fashioned manor house, realizing French and Italian ideas” and that
contained such specialties as “a fountain, an aviary ... [a] transparent beehive”
and other fine examples of gardening vision and skill198. This evidence suggests
that Evelyn’s approach to matters of gardening and silviculture was always at
least partly, if not significantly, aesthetic.
In addition to aesthetic and social reasons, private landowners could have
been moved to planting by a significant but rather long-term promise of profit.
According to the historian Sarah Couch, plantings undertaken in Evelyn’s time
“were not solely expressions of the current taste in gardening but were inextri-
cably connected with the social and economic preoccupations of the time”199.
Couch adds that “[l]arge scale planting was being encouraged to restore the de-
pleted stocks of timber following the Civil War” which she also sees as the “the
primary motive behind the publication of Sylva” although the “ornamental value”
of avenues was a factor too200. At any rate, “[i]t is clear”, she says, “that the
value of the eventual timber was a consideration if only as an insurance for the
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to over 200 years required for a tree such as an oak to reach the suitable size.
The impression that there was profit to be made in the timber business is
further strengthened when we note the central role of timber in the 17th century
life. As pointed out by the historian Lindsey Sharp, “[u]ntil the late eighteenth
century, timber was one of the most basic requirements of human existence”
and “[t]hus the importance of any widespread threat to timber supplies, whether
local or national, becomes self-evident in the light of this seventeenth-century
dependence on wood as the all-purpose material”202. There was thus a natural
market for timber even before and without Evelyn’s encouragement to plant more
and it would be surprising that it should have taken Evelyn’s encouragement to
plant trees given that timber was already very much on the agenda anyway.
According to Sharp, the early 17th century witnessed a surge in technical guide
materials for farmers and landed gentlemen203, and it would have been interesting
to read Sharp’s speculations as to why this was the case. One may speculate that
the interest in agricultural improvements may have received impetus from the
gradual growth of population after the ravages of plague in the 14th century and
the pressure as well as commercial opportunities this constituted. Thus, according
to the historian William H. Te Brake, the 17th century witnessed a second wave
timber shortage in many localities of England. The first had been brought to an
end by the plague in the 14th century, and it took until the 17th century that the
human population had again reached levels that began to put serious pressure
on timber resources. According to Te Brake, the times of timber crises saw the
price of timber rise dramatically (several hundred percent) and had people return
to the burning of sea-coal for fuel, shipped from up North in Newcastle, despite
its smell and other disadvantages204 (about which one John Evelyn also wrote in
1661 a pamphlet titled Fumifugium, or, The inconveniencie of the aer and smoak
of London dissipated together with some remedies humbly proposed by J.E. esq.
to His Sacred Majestie, and to the Parliament now assembled). In the literature,
early accounts do speak of a more or less unqualified timber crisis205, but a recent
statement of the extent of the timber crisis is more cautious and tends to conclude
that the crises were most likely local and of indirect national significance only
when occurring in centres of national life such as London. In an age pre-dating
202Sharp 1975: . 51.
203Sharp 1975: . 52.
204Te Brake 1975: 356 ff. The price rise is confirmed in Williams 2003: 169 ff.
205See e.g. Nisbet’s introduction to Sylva (Evelyn 1908: Vol. I).
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the railway and other efficient modes of transport, the transportation of timber
from its source was always the critical issue, for the journey through a difficult
landscape could sometimes increase the price of timber manyfold. Perhaps there
was thus not a shortage of timber as such, but it seemed at times painfully costly
or otherwise difficult to obtain suitable materials.206 In addition, the sense of a
crisis could have been evoked by the military strategic issue of access to naval
timber discussed above.
In these circumstances timber may well have seemed a commercially attractive
option to the country gentleman even without him having read Evelyn’s book. To
a later edition of Sylva Evelyn indeed added a section discussing the commercial
advantage of timber allowing Evelyn to “demonstrate through clear calculations
that it was as advantageous financially, as it was aesthetically, for the contem-
porary landowner to plant trees”207. This section borrowed the figures from a
recent agricultural guide book by John Smith titled England’s Improvement Re-
viv’d (published in 1673). It is also clear from Smith and Evelyn’s discussion
that the time-scale upon which returns could be expected was rather lengthy: as
Evelyn writes, the first felling could take place about eight or nine years after
planting but the greatest profit would be derived after as long as seventy to over
two hundred years of growth208 effectively making planting trees an investment
for the well-being of future generations.
Michael Williams also confirms the economic motivation to plant timber. He
argues that “while its [Sylva’s] publication certainly raised awareness of the de-
sirability of tree planting, there is reason to believe that the trend had begun
earlier”. At any rate, according to Williams, “[t]he reasons for planting were
primarily economic”, for “it paid well to grow large trees, if one could wait the
fifty or more years it took them to mature”209.
In addition to aesthetic, social and economic reasons, the historian G. D.
Holmes argues that “Evelyn’s enterprise was influential in inspiring landowners
to plant trees for patriotic reasons”210. The nature of these patriotic reasons is not
elaborated further by Holmes but two likely significations can be distinguished
in the literature: planting to provide timber for the maintenance of the navy and
206Williams 2003: 169 ff.
207Sharp 1975: 66.
208Evelyn 1908: Vol. II, 195 ff.
209Williams 2003: 206.
210Holmes 1975: 72.
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planting to symbolically indicate loyalty to the restored monarchy in distinction
to forest destruction of the Commonwealth times. Nisbet, however, counters the
claim from neglect saying that the Forest of Dean “would probably have been
totally destroyed then but for the vigour and vigilance of Cromwell’s adminis-
tration as regards both the prevention of waste and abuses in this forest, and
the general preservation of timber throughout England”211. The Commonwealth
era seems to have been taxing on forests as, according to the historian Miles
Hadfield, in England in general a destructive dynamic was at work in which the
Commonwealth “sold great areas of the forests on the Royalist’s lands that they
had sequestrated to raise funds” and the Royalists on the other hand “sold timber
to pay their fines”212. At any rate, if there was a patriotic motive from loyalty to
the restored monarch, it is ironic, as we saw above, that the destruction at the
Forest of Dean would appear to be significantly due to the self-interested actions
of the last monarchs before the Interregnum as well as what appears to have been
self-interested actions by John Winter sanctioned by the restored monarch. In
any case, whether or not a patriotic motive inspired landowners to plant trees
and whether or not Evelyn’s recommendations played a role, the English naval
timber “came mainly from the royal forests”213 and the role of private estates
was subsidiary: “though unreliable” timber from private estates “could make up
deficiencies from time to time”214.
Finally, there were age old reasons for landowners to be interested in tree
planting having to do with practicalities of running an estate. Thus, private
landowners were concerned with “not only to produce income from the sale of
timber, but also to enhance the landscape, provide cover for foxes and game,
[and] shelter for exposed houses and fields”215. These were, of course, ancient
preoccupations. Also, the historian George Peterken argues that while “[m]any
people believe that tree planting and therefore afforestation started with the
publication of Silva by John Evelyn ... some planting and sowing are known from









Evelyn, Sylva and Ideology
To return to Merchant’s account of Evelyn’s Sylva, the points raised above cast
doubts on the claim that the work should be closely associated with the emergence
of a mechanical-utilitarian ideology. As argued above, Evelyn’s own interests and
approach to gardening were significantly aesthetic and so was the advisory work
he conducted for his chief audience, country gentlemen. Also, as we saw, making
a close connection between Sylva and the request of the navy is not true to the
facts. Sylva was, already in terms of its style, a work of an aesthetically minded
gardening enthusiast and not in any primary sense a tract towards championing
the orderly management of nature for human benefit. In any case, the issue of the
English naval timber situation, that the work has been (too intimately) associated
with, were not publicised by Evelyn but had rather been in the agenda already
well before Evelyn. Whatever ideologies Evelyn may have championed, there
was sufficient pragmatic interest around for there to be concern for example with
the naval timber issue. Evelyn did not play a crucial role in introducing these
utilitarian concerns for the well-being of the English people, they were already
there. It was demonstrated, to the extent that the available information allows,
that Evelyn, despite the proposal towards planting trees in the Forest of Dean,
did not have any central role in bringing about such activities in the said forest.
Let it be clear that I do not wish to deny that Evelyn could not be cast as an
ideologically minded individual for instance in terms of his loyalty to the King
and the work Evelyn did for the English state. After the Restoration Evelyn
frequented the court and met numerous gentlemen in various governmental posi-
tions —including working for the navy as one of the commissioners for the sick,
wounded and prisoners of war, although only since October 1664, after Sylva’s
publication217— so that private conversations and exchange of ideas were per-
fectly possible.
However, in my mind, much more crucial in terms of understanding the re-
lationship to nature of Evelyn’s times is to construct ourselves a picture of the
organisation of human activities in the frame of which they engaged in ecologi-
cally consequential actions regardless of what the numerous differently situated
individuals we have encountered above may have thought and understood about
the larger picture. One aspect of crucial interest here is the interest of the En-
217Darley 2006: 193.
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glish state in a steady supply of naval timber. In terms of its economics, England
was a society increasingly engaged in foreign trade and imperialistic activities in
the colonies which gave a plenty of pragmatic, economic and military strategic,
reasons to pursue particular courses of action. A lot of what went on for example
in the Forest of Dean had to do with the military-strategic importance of timber.
Note, however, that also a single man, Sir John Winter, as well as an anony-
mous mass of forest dwellers played their role in the story contributing in their
various ways to the developments. Thus, in addition to the role of the organi-
sation of human life, the story told above can be seen to highlight the diverse
perspectives that different actors hold to their social settings, which implies dif-
ferent interests concerns, motivations and knowledge of the social reality in which
they operated. In the story we encountered, among others, John Evelyn and the
fellow’s of the Society keen to promote and secure the financial preconditions of
their pursuit of science. We encountered the navy officials with their particular
work related interests. We encountered the characters of John Winter and the
commoners with their own perspectives making also a difference to the proceed-
ings in the Forest of Dean. In short, a whole host of motivations from ideological
to pragmatic come to play in understanding the individuals’ actions in given
historical circumstances, and I certainly do not claim to have done more than
scratched the surface of this diversity. It is just not plausible to try to reduce
these to some shared ideology or to identify some ideology as the most central
motivation. Given perspectival diversity, it is the shared organisation of action
including its internal tensions, rather than shared ideology, that accounts for the
concerted larger scale human engagement with nature. In the following chapters
I shall reiterate and clarify this key claim of the present thesis in a variety of
contexts.
Conclusion
In this chapter we identified and critically discussed a set of central ideological
themes as well as looked at a number of particular examples in which the so-called
ideological approach appears in a number of classics of environmental history. Due
to the elusive nature of ideologies allegedly powering human and social action,
the arguments provided above have also had to be suggestive in character. I have
focused on pointing out implausibilities in ideological arguments as well as given
alternative ways of glossing various phenomena for which ideological explanations
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have been offered.
While the foregoing argumentation may have a certain negative or destruc-
tive overall character, also certain hints of a positive view of the cultural causes
of environmental problems have emerged. The central themes here are what
I refer to as the over-intellectualisation and intellectual homogenisation of hu-
man and social action easily occurring when we try to understand them as pow-
ered by a world-view or other such ideology. Thus, I claimed that it is one
thing to attribute a high-flying ideology to a philosopher but quite another to
attribute it to a mass of ordinary people engaged in quite mundane, everyday
activities. Example cases of over-intellectualisation I discussed above included
Donald Worster’s metaphysically minded sheepmen, the masses colonising the
Great West in William Cronon’s story and materialism as the ruling value of
our times. The case of John Evelyn’s Sylva, on the other hand, was shown to
involve a whole array of differently placed actors with quite particular or local
and differing knowledges, motivations and interests —differences that Merchant’s
ideological story effectively overlooks in search of an underlying ideology driving
the proceedings. The positive account contained in this draws from the idea that
in the face of individual differences in perspective to social reality it is therefore
more plausible to focus on the organisation rather than the ideological source of
human and social action. I shall develop this idea in the following chapter with a
particular focus on our collective performance of global industrial market society
and its environmental problems seeing it as a performance of a shared organisa-
tion of human life. Thereafter, in Part 2 of this thesis, I provide an extensive
social theoretical or philosophical discussion of the same core idea.

Chapter 4
The Cosmos of Commodification
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly
established, it is but a very small part of a man’s wants which
the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the far
greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the
produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own
consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s
labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by
exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the
society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial
society.
— Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations
Green narratives have collapsed precisely because they were
unable to withstand the steely quantification demanded by an
attempt to get to grips with problems like climate change.
— George Monbiot, 20111
Chapter 2 identified global industrial market society and the dependence of hu-
man well-being on its functioning as the key context of environmental sociological
discourse about environmental problems. In Chapter 3 the so-called ideological
approach to the cultural causes of environmental problems was shown to be un-
able to account for the organisatory quality of our collective performance of global
industrial market society and its environmental problems. This chapter sets out
1Monbiot 2011d.
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the present positive account of the cultural causes of environmental problems.
We shall take a closer look at certain key characteristics of the system of global
industrial market society and consider their implications to the question from our
collective performance of the system. Instead of ideological sharing, this chap-
ter views the role of a certain division, namely division of labour, as the central
characteristic of our societal existence and hence of our collective performance of
the social. The points I shall make about global industrial market society are not
novel as such, but the way this chapter relates them to the question of our collec-
tive performance of social systems and processes —in short, of performativity—
and raises them as problems for the ideological approach is challenging, stimu-
lating and I believe novel.
Global Industrial Market Society
The notion of global industrial market society denotes a complex form of the
socio-economic organisation of human life. The three terms contained in the
phrase —global, industrial and market— describe different aspects of the system.
To begin with, the notion of market society can be seen to refer to two aspects
of human socio-economic organisation. Firstly, it relates to the phenomenon of
wage labour in that when work is compensated (usually) monetarily labour be-
comes a kind of a commodity exchanged via pay for other goods and services.
This phenomenon of the commodification of labour was of central importance to
Marx. In a market society there exists thus a kind of a market in which workers
sell their labour power. Historians of capitalism such as Immanuel Wallerstein,
of whose ideas more below, speak in this connection of the gradual historical
“commodification of everything” as ever more areas of human productive activ-
ity become commodified, that is, that producers are wage labourers as well as
that commodities thus produced are sold and bought in the market. This first
sense of market society is important for the present purposes, for it allows us
to grasp the dependence of actors on the functional stability of market society:
workers’ well-being depends on continual employment and reception of a wage
with which we purchase the material basis of our existence, a complex process to
which a stable, functioning economy is virtually a precondition. In the second
related sense market society is one where goods and services are sold in what
is now an increasingly global market. The complex global links of production
and consumption via the market, and their role in fostering human material well-
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being characterised by significant inequalities, can be unknown to the actors in
the system.
The notion of market society is closely related to the notion of industrial
society. For one, industrial production, characterised by its comparative intensity
and efficiency through the use of machinery and other technology, really only
makes economic sense when there is a market consisting of wage labourers capable
and interested in ejecting their wages ‘back into the economy’ by purchasing and
consuming the industrially produced goods. It should be noted that capitalism is
not synonymous with industrial market society although historically the two may
perhaps be closely linked. The word ‘capitalism’ denotes a form of ownership of
the capital employed in the production process, namely, that to a varying extent
the means of production are in private ownership. In conceptual terms there is
no contradiction in the idea that an industrial society would be a socialist or
communist society —this is in fact a crucial feature of the Marxian utopia that
a society can be industrial without being capitalist.
Let us emphasise that the industrial market society is a global phenomenon.
For this purpose it may be better to speak of the industrial market economy as
the word ‘society’ connotes a distinct unit like a nation state or country while
the global industrial market economy is something that essentially transgresses
national boundaries. In this thesis, the term ‘industrial market society’ is to
be understood in the wider sense. The above described dynamic of industrial
production and consumption is today an essentially global phenomenon where
geographically remote and ideologically diverse areas are in interaction via eco-
nomic links. Global economic interconnections are highlighted, for instance, by
the fact that while in the period from 1990 to 2009 the United Kingdom reduced
its total greenhouse gas emissions by some third2, yet allegedly more than the
reduced amount of emissions simply ‘moved abroad’ with more and more UK con-
sumed goods being produced elsewhere3. Some commentators indeed speak of the
world-economy or world economic system, most notably Immanuel Wallerstein,
whose work we shall review shortly.
2Department of Energy and Climate Change 2011: Table 2.
3Davis & Caldeira 2010. The point is made in Monbiot 2011a.
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Population, Production, Consumption and Division of Labour
A striking fact about global industrial market society surely is the population
scale at which it is performed. The last two hundred years have seen a dramatic
acceleration of the growth in human population. Between 1750 and 1900 the
human population more than doubled, from 791 million to 1.7 billion, but this
is still dwarfed by the most recent developments: in the 20th century the world
population went up from the 1.7 billion to over 6 billion.4
The growth has been most dramatic in the last 100 years, but arguably the
groundwork for making such numbers possible was made in the preceding cen-
turies —just as the costs of these developments will be paid in the future. Popu-
lation growth due to natural factors (e.g. ‘good years’) is obviously too limited in
scope to account for the dramatic population increase, hence the causes of growth
have been looked for in human induced factors. For the present argument, what
is important is not to find the cause but to obtain a view of the wider social
mechanisms that give rise to and maintain the population.
It is sometimes said that until about 1800 the world was held within the so-
called Malthusian limits5. The term ‘Malthusian limit’, or sometimes ‘Malthusian
check’, derives from the classic population theory of Thomas Malthus in his An
Essay on the Principles of Population6. According to Malthus, the ultimate
factor regulating population growth or decline is the availability of the means of
subsistence. The basic logic that keeps the human population in check is that, if
growing uncontrollably, the demands of the human population eventually outstrip
the capacity of the environment to support human life. The population is then
automatically checked by the ensuing outbreaks of famine, disease and war, but
also other more intellectual, cultural or societal factors such as voluntary birth
control, Malthus argued.
Indicating that we may be reaching the Malthusian limit, the aforementioned
Ecological Footprint of the WWF, an index measuring the human impact on
the environment, tells us that sometime in the 1980s the human consumption of
natural resources began to exceed the earth’s biocapacity, that is, its capacity to
provide resources taking into account regeneration from human impact7. Unless
4United Nations Population Division 1999.
5Clark 2007.
6Malthus 1826.
7See WWF 2006 and 2008.
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corrective action is taken, the world would eventually seem to have to feel the
impact of various kinds of Malthusian checks reducing human population due to
lack of sustenance, or so the WWF’s index gives us a reason to assume.
At any rate, historically, after 1800 the Malthusian limits were seemingly bro-
ken, or rather expanded: the human population just kept growing and growing,
the Malthusian check apparently not taking effect. From the Malthusian point of
view this must be because while the human population increased for some reason
it did not outstrip the capacity of the environment to support life. Hence the
population did not become subject to population decreasing effects. It seems that
now the earth just is capable of supporting more human beings than before.
An increase in the human efficiency to exploit the environment is one key
phrase in understanding these developments. On a basic level, we are more effi-
cient at producing food. This is due to improved know-how and technology per-
taining to various aspects of agricultural processes as well as to the fact that more
and more of the earth’s surface is in productive use. On the other hand, there is
a favourable balance in the death and birth rates: annually more people are born
than pass away. This is probably due to things like better health through better
hygiene and medicine which leads among other things to longer life expectancy.
Also important are reductions in mortality, in particular in developing countries
of the African and Asian continents: the 1999 United Nations report on world
population argued that “[t]he rapid growth of the world population started in
1950, with reductions in mortality in the less developed regions”8.
It should always be kept in mind that these changes display massive global
inequalities in what comes to the improvement of material conditions so much so
that in 1800 on average the material living standards on the planet have been
estimated not to have been better than they were in the darkest stone age9.
Growth in population and improvements in material well-being for some disguise
inequalities, poverty and a reduction of standards of living for others.
A lot of economic historical literature tends to focus on working out the decid-
ing factors bringing about the spectacular economic rise of the West as powered
by science, technology and ideology10. However, without wishing to discredit
8United Nations Population Division 1999: 4.
9Clark 2007: 1.
10See e.g. Walt Rostow’s classic work on the preconditions of the European early-modern eco-
nomic ‘take-off’ (Rostow 1975), and more recent work by Jack Goldstone (2004 and 2008). One
of the trend-setters here certainly must have been Max Weber’s argument from the Protestant
ethic and the spirit of Capitalism as explaining the divergent developmental paths taken by the
82 Chapter 4. The Cosmos of Commodification
this literature, for the present purposes it is important not to lose sight of the
social institutional background against which for instance medical advances and
the human population growth obtain. While for example improvements in health
through modern scientific medical knowledge are extremely important in explain-
ing human population growth, it is equally important to see that discoveries come
to nothing unless there exists a complex system of social institutions within which
technological and medical advances are made, turned into products, distributed,
purchased and consumed. Also, the historical increase in the efficiency in food
production does undoubtedly owe a great deal to certain technological discoveries.
However a given piece of technology can begin to make a difference in societies
only as soon as the practical questions of the commercialisation of technology,
production and distribution, are addressed. This claim is supported historically
for example by the case of artificial fertilisers that began to make practical dif-
ference some half a century after their invention as the industry and markets had
developed sufficiently to address the question from commercialisation of fertiliser
production and distribution.
Drawing attention to the complex systems of extraction, production, distri-
bution, sale and consumption underlying human life in global industrial market
society is effectively to draw attention to one of its absolutely key characteristics,
namely, division of labour. The concept is obviously well-known and not hugely
controversial. A central logic behind division of labour is, as Adam Smith put it
in the epigraph to this chapter, that a very small part of our wants are satisfied
by the products of our own labour. Rather, in the system of division of labour,
the labour I expend, say, in academic research brings me a wage with which
I shall be able to purchase products and services towards satisfying my wants.
Division of labour thus goes hand in hand with the notion of wage labour and
money economy which characterise modern society, in Smith’s words, as a com-
mercial society, or as a market society as I have referred to it above. The basic
and core processes of global industrial market society —extraction, production,
distribution, sale and consumption— are all immense complex, social processes
shot through with global division of labour and, importantly, made possible by a
complex infrastructure of a vast array of social institutions.
The system is vast and intricate, an “immense cosmos” in Max Weber’s
Orient and the Occident (Weber 1930).
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words11, but some handle on this complexity can be gathered from the 2009
report of The World Economic Forum (WEF) titled the Global Competitiveness
Report12 analysing the nature and factors contributing to national economic com-
petitiveness. Whatever blind spots and bias towards free-trade13 such a report
may have, it is nevertheless in many respects a telling guide to the global economic
system.
The report identifies “12 pillars of economic competitiveness” representing a
range of factors identified in a number of attempts by economists to analyse the
nature of economic systems.
This attempt has ranged from Adam Smith’s focus on specialization
and the division of labour to neoclassical economists’ emphasis on in-
vestment in physical capital and infrastructure and, more recently, to
interest in other mechanisms such as education and training, techno-
logical progress (whether created within the country or adopted from
abroad), macroeconomic stability, good governance, the rule of law,
transparent and well-functioning institutions, firm sophistication, de-
mand conditions, market size, and many others.14
In a nutshell, the output of whatever products and services an economy pro-
duces is a function of a number of systemic or organisatory properties of the
economic system, properties such as existing systems of education and training
of workforce, the legal system that allows the making of contracts, monetary
transactions, distribution of goods together with its infrastructures, and many
many other such things. “The central point” about these factors, the report
continues, “is that they are not mutually exclusive” but work together in a func-
tioning economy.15 Thinking about the vast number of very ordinary activities
and roles that are covered even in such a summary description, one begins to get
a handle on the truly mind-boggling vastness of the system of division of labour
in which we collective perform global industrial market society. In other words,
when we note that the various pillars of a functioning economy are performed by
11Weber 1930: 54.
12WEF 2009.
13The report states, for one, that “competitiveness is hindered by distortionary or burdensome
taxes and by restrictive and discriminatory rules on foreign direct investment (FDI) — limiting
foreign ownership — as well as on international trade” (WEF 2009: 5). This claim we know to
be contestable, to say the least. For one, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that economic flourishing
of one party in the world-system often results from semi-monopolistic conditions favouring the
flourishing party. The dynamics of this are explained e.g. in Wallerstein 1983.
14WEF 2009: Preface.
15WEF 2009: Preface.
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countless recursive, day to day activities by ordinary people, we observe that a
functioning economy is based on an extensive division of labour within a shared
organisation.
Today, unprecedented numbers of people collectively perform this vast sys-
tem and a particularly problematic aspect of all this is that, due to division
of labour, the well-being of unprecedented numbers of people, all inequalities
notwithstanding, depends upon the functioning of global industrial market soci-
ety. In a moment I shall discuss an important consequence of this, namely the
structural nature of the environmental burden of global industrial market society.
Here I want to highlight the point that the intensity of the human impact upon
the environment is essentially a function of the performance of global industrial
market society on a large population scale which I think must be conceived as
an organisatory, not an ideological, phenomenon. In other words, a key task for
any view on the cultural causes of environmental problems is to account for the
intensity at which we consume the natural environment which I argue can only
by done by an organisatory approach.
Structural Environmental Burden
The other side of the complexity of division of labour is the immense difficulty of
dismantling the system for instance in order to combat environmental problems.
A number of contemporary attempts to work out a working model for a scaled
back economic system exist16. Consider the vision provided in one such a report,
the New Economic Foundation’s (NEF) The Great Transition. The NEF recog-
nises that one of the greatest challenges of transforming global industrial market
society to an ecologically more sustainable direction is to scale back economic
activity in such a way that it does not leave large numbers of people standing
on nothing in terms of source of livelihood. In other words, it is clear that the
unprecedented volume of production and consumption taking place in the frame
of global industrial market society needs to be scaled back but without causing
a collapse in the economic system in the context of which people provide for
themselves. The challenge is enormous as the NEF observes that “headline indi-
cators such as GDP will have to fall by as much as a third” in order for humanity
16See e.g. Daly 1996, Jackson 2009 and NEF 2010a. The economist Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen (1906–1994) is commonly recognised as a pioneer of ecologically orientated economic
theory.
85
to halt the ecological destruction of the planet. As one of the means, the NEF
proposes a large scale return to local production17 necessitating a mass learn-
ing of agricultural, craft and other techniques18. Local production and a degree
of self-sufficiency would scale back global economic interaction, production and
consumption but keep people employed and nourished, or so the NEF suggests.
Needless to say, steps towards this direction will be very hard to take considering
that action needs to be taken by globally concerted agreement.
The pressing need to scale back economic activity coupled with the immense
difficulty of doing so constitutes the hard structural core of environmental prob-
lems. Even if the scaling back could be achieved —which is tough given the
current level of human population, which is a population of an industrial world-
economy, not a local organic economy— we still face what the British environ-
mentalist George Monbiot noted is “a remarkable but seldom-noticed problem:
that most of those who advocate an off-grid, land-based economy have made
no provision for manufactures”. Monbiot was not “talking about the pointless
rubbish in the FT’s How to Spend It supplement”, but about providing “the
energy required to make bricks, glass, metal tools and utensils, textiles ... ce-
ramics and soap: commodities which almost everyone sees as the barest possible
requirements”19.
Numbers provided by Gutowski et al bring the point about structural unsus-
tainability into a stark relief. In their study of the environmental impacts of a
range of life styles in the United States they were able to
identify a floor, below which environmental impacts for people living
in the United States do not drop. For example, none of the life styles
studied here ever resulted in an energy requirement below 120 GJ
[gigajoule] (in 1997). This includes the life style of a five year old
child, a homeless person and a Buddhist monk.20
Crucially, they point out that the figure of 120 GJ “is almost double the
17“The Great Localisation” (NEF 2010a: 56 ff).
18“The Great Reskilling” (NEF 2010a: 67 ff).
19Monbiot 2011c. A similar point was made by another British environmentalist Paul
Kingsnorth: “The greens are in a corner. If you believe that climate change will wreck the
Earth and that the only way to prevent that from happening is to ‘reduce emissions’ in a fan-
tastically short time period, then you are in a very perilous place. It’s not that this argument is
necessarily wrong — it probably isn’t, though the lack of certainty is always worth highlighting.
But it is so obviously impossible to do what it is claimed Must Be Done to stop it that futility
or despair can end up being the only places to turn.” (Kingsnorth 2011).
20Gutowski et al. 2008: 2. I thank Monica Aufrecht for bringing this study to my attention.
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global average energy use in that year (64 GJ)”21. Thus, even a consumptively
and thus environmentally fairly low intensity life style, as we imagine that of a
monk to be, is of an alarmingly environmentally consequential nature when lived
in the frame of a developed society. Why? Because life in a developed society
is supported by a complex infrastructure of social institutions that already in
themselves collectively make up an environmentally burdensome whole. The cal-
culations of Gutowski et al took into account a range of environmental impact
areas from housing to transportation as well as subsidies particular to some life
style, such as those from “educational services, Medicare, Medicaid” and “in-
surance companies”. Many of these provide very basic services and constitute
very basic features of our environments —such as basic transportation and san-
itation infrastructures, health care and education— that we demand a right to
and consider part of good life. They also mean that a society providing them
automatically puts an inevitable, and significant, burden upon the environment
simply by providing certain basic services to its members. The burden results
essentially from the fact that infrastructure and services do not exist in a vacuum
but rely upon the aforementioned pillars of economic productivity which involve
a large number of actors, artefacts and so on in the recursive, daily performance
of the system.
The general form of argument advanced above can I think justifiably be re-
ferred to as Marxian in so far as a central general aspect of Marx’s critical philos-
ophy was to trace the structural effects of the organisation of human life on the
character and quality of human life. Thus, for instance the Marxian writer Con-
rad Lodziak advanced an argument of the same structural form drawing from the
effects of division of labour on the character of human life. Lodziak wrote that in
a society of advanced division of labour “most people do not have direct access
to all the means necessary for their own survival”, and concluded that “[s]urvival
needs, for the vast majority, can be addressed only by the purchase of the rele-
vant goods”22. In this sense quite a specific form of consumption by monetary
purchases of globally industrially manufactured goods is effectively compulsory
and imposed by the form of organisation of production.
In another argument of the same form, Lodziak claimed that “[b]eing em-
ployed structures our range of action by structuring our ‘free time’ ”23. As “to be




employed is a priority for the vast majority for the simple reason that it provides
survival money”, this means that free time —and activities such as child-rearing
and family time— must take place in the “fragmented time” between, after or
on holiday from employment with whatever energy resources and fitness are left
after employment24. Lodziak thus concluded that “the [temporal and monetary]
scope for expensive forms of unnecessary consumption is far more limited than the
images of ‘affluent society’ suggest”25. The general Marxian thrust of Lodziak’s
arguments resides in the insistence that to understand modern consumption we
need to understand “the material power of the capitalist system to organise effec-
tively the means through which we are to satisfy our basic needs, however these
might be interpreted”26.
The immense scale of the structural problem illustrated above is very discon-
certing. In my view an ideological approach to the cultural causes of environ-
mental problems cannot even begin to consider this precisely because of its focus
on ideologies as opposed to the systemic, structural or organisatory root of these
problems.
The Cultural Causes of Environmental Problems
Let us now turn to making explicit the significance of the foregoing to our under-
standing of our collective performance of global industrial market society and its
environmental problems. To make this argument, I shall first turn to an impor-
tant aspect of the historical emergence of the system of global industrial market
economy. A good guide here is the work of the economic historian Immanuel
Wallerstein on world-systems.
A world-system, according to Wallerstein, is first of all “an economic, not a
political entity” being “larger than any juridically-defined political unit”. In a
world-system the “basic linkage between the parts of the system is economic”27.
In a world-system, in other words, there is not one ruler, parliament or other
one instance, who politically rule over the whole of the system, rather political
empires are mere units in the whole system. Wallerstein adds that “it was a mark
of political wisdom to realize this”, namely, that within the world-economy one
may “thrive, produce, and expand without the emergence of a unified political




88 Chapter 4. The Cosmos of Commodification
structure”28. One may thrive —given certain favourable ‘semi-monopolistic’ con-
ditions, as Wallerstein often emphasises— by being favourably placed to utilise
the global system of production, exchange and consumption.
This can be used to pose the first challenge to an ideological account of the
human performance of global industrial market economy: the component parts of
this interacting, interdependent system have the most diverse histories, cultural
traditions and political systems. This observation puts great strain on any attempt
to find a common ideological denominator characterising the modern human rela-
tionship to nature. I have already alluded to this point above in Chapter 3 where
we saw the anthropologist Conrad Kottak argue that culturally shared “cognized
models” may not be the right tool for conceptualising the human relationship to
her surroundings in a globalised, ideologically fragmented yet interconnected and
interacting world. The point was also alluded to earlier in this chapter where we
noted the essentially global character of industrial market society and division of
labour within it.
Turn now to a second challenge to the ideological approach that can also be
articulated by way of a historical point arising from Immanuel Wallerstein’s work.
Although global trade has existed since time immemorial, Wallerstein argues, it
had been conducted mainly in terms of “luxuries, not in bulk goods”29. It was
only “within the framework of modern world-economy that long-distance trade
could convert itself in part into bulk trade which would, in turn, feed the process
of expanded production”30.
Now, this development from trade in luxuries to trade in bulk is in many
ways significant, for one because by coming to trade in bulk, the world-economy
began to include within its growing sphere the mass of ordinary people who could
not afford luxury goods but could afford the cheaper bulk goods. Expanded
production, furthermore, drew in people in large numbers not only as consumers
but as producers, that is, as workers and thus their livelihoods —their well-
being with warts and all— became coupled with the newly expanded upon area
of economic activity. There are plenty of other examples of similar historical
expansions of the productive-consumptive loops. Eric Hobsbawm wrote that
“the products most likely to be mass produced were those which could be used
by very large numbers of small producers such as farmers and needle-women (the




sewing-machine), in offices (the typewriter), consumer goods such as watches,
but above all the small arms and ammunition of war”31. A more recent example
still of a luxury item becoming a bulk good is the emergence of cheap holidaying
and the associated mass tourism that in a number of countries now contribute
an important share of the national economic activity32.
Our second objection to the ideological approach is thus that, as the mass of
ordinary people were drawn to play a role in the world-economic system, whatever
shared ideological basis there may have been for human action was immediately
diluted. For what kind of a grasp did, say, the average 18th century European
cottager-turned-proto-industrial-worker have of the system she had just become
a part of? To begin with, these people were mostly illiterate to read and grasp
whatever economic texts may have been around. And what did it mean to them
to speak of some high-flying utopias of material welfare for all? Marxists, for
one, have been keen to argue that the (proto-)industrial workers did not really
have an option but to toil as they could and they would in any case certainly
not have chosen the lot they had, if they had had an option. Thus, if there was
an ideology behind the emergence and everyday functioning of global industrial
market society it was not one of a majority of the ‘performers’ of the system33.
Also, the coupling of a newly established area of economic activity with the
livelihoods and well-being of people yields a surprising point of view on our col-
lective performance of global industrial market society. Consider again mass
holidaying. Mass holidaying would seem to be the very embodiment of mate-
rialistic vanity, a prime example of a so-called ‘post-necessity value’, something
without which we would well survive. Yet, dismantle this form of economic activ-
ity for instance for environmental reasons and you have a gaping hole in national
economies and a host of associated problems such as unemployment. The impor-
tant point regarding our collective performance of mass holidaying thus is: there
is a significant sense in which we do not perform mass tourism only because of
vanity, that is because of an ideology, but to a significant extent because of its
role in the everyday socio-economic organisation of human life. In other words,
to emphasise the consumer side of holidaying as a vain exercise in post-necessity
values ignores the other side of our collective performance of holidaying, namely
the side of the producer(s) of the holiday.
31Hobsbawm 1975: 60-1.
32Inglis 2000.
33See the epigraph to Chapter 7.
90 Chapter 4. The Cosmos of Commodification
This takes us to the third point against the ideological approach. As our col-
lective performance of global industrial market society consists of these countless
very mundane, everyday activities and interactions with and around artefacts,
commodities, infrastructure and services, it cannot be said to have an effective
ideological source. In a phrase, mundane everydayness is not performed out of
a world-view, perception, ideology or the like. We have seen that to account for
the cultural causes of environmental problems one must account for the recursive
performance of global industrial market society by the masses of globally inter-
connected peoples in essentially very mundane broadly speaking productive and
consumptive activities. This the ideological approach cannot do, for activities in
mundane everydayness simply do not have a general ideological driver.
I shall have a great deal more to say about this so-called everydayness aspect
of our collective performance of social systems and processes in the social the-
oretical side of the present argument in Part 2. I believe that the idea can be
found in the Wittgensteinian idea of our blind or non-epistemic relationship to
social reality. The point with everydayness has also already been talked about
above in Chapter 3 under a slightly different guise. There I suggested that the
conceptual, motivational and intentional contents ‘in the heads’ of the various
actors we encountered in the particular historical examples we considered —
Worster’s sheepmen, Cronon’s colonisers and the various parties in the case of
John Evelyn and Sylva— be best conceived as local, situated and contextual in
character exhibiting individual differences. I accused the ideological approach of
over-intellectualising and intellectually homogenising us in the attempt to find a
shared, ideological driver of our diverse activities. It is better, I argued, to con-
ceive the various actors as sharing, not a mentality, but a form of organisation of
their activities.
One can also express the point about everydayness advanced here by saying
that the human relationship to nature is indirect and mediated by the form of
organisation of human activity. This is to say, the human relationship to nature
is not ‘present’ in the actors’ mentalities as we operate in our everyday lives —
instead, a whole array of different, local, situated and contextualised contents
probably are. The human relationship to nature, if there is such a thing, is a
property of the organisation of human activity, not a common ideological de-
nominator allegedly shared by all or most actors. By contrast, the ideological
approach would have to claim the opposite: it would seem to have to say that
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our nature relationship is direct, ‘present’ in and a property of all of us, for it is
characterised essentially by our shared mentality.
As the fourth objection to the ideological approach, I raise the issue of arbi-
trariness that the ideological approach casts as one central feature of the form
that our societal existence and hence also our nature relationship happens to take.
For the environmentalist view is very much characterised by its constructivist
character in that the human relationship to nature is conceived as an ultimately
arbitrary ideologically powered fancy to exploit nature for material gains. That
is, in so far as environmentalism casts a certain collective mentality as the root
of our ecological problems, it implies that if we only would think differently we
would have taken, if not the sole, then at least a very decisive step towards a
more ecological society. This view is, furthermore, echoed in social theory in that
according to social theoretical collectivist constructivism the striking character-
istic of social reality is its self-referentiality, that is, how it appears to be given
rise to by a collective decision to adhere to a set of meanings, symbolism —not
whatever purposes, point or function it can be seen to serve— and hence the
arbitrariness, contingency. As one commentator pointed out, in a different con-
text but also in criticism of constructivism, “[w]hen the consumption of food, for
example, is treated solely as a symbolic activity, the main purpose of consuming
food does not figure in its explanation”34. I shall return to the social theoretical
side of this issue in Part 2. At any rate, in the argument of the present thesis, the
form of organisation of human life, and thereby our nature relationship, is by no
means arbitrary. That is to say, as I have argued above, global industrial market
society serves the important function of providing for our material well-being, all
inequalities notwithstanding. And precisely there lies the challenge of addressing
environmental problems, namely, in coming up with and transferring to an alter-
native, less environmentally costly, form of socio-economic organisation of human
life that at the same time serves the function of providing for human material
well-being on an adequate level.
Conclusion
The argument advanced in this chapter was that the essential character of the
human induced environmental disruption resides in the form of organisation of
human activity and it therefore being adopted and acted out on a larger popula-
34Lodziak 2002: 15.
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tion scale on a recursive, day to day basis. The key is to be able to account for
the intensity of the human impact on the environment. This is most realistically
seen as a function of the form of organisation of masses of people on a recursive,
everyday basis.
In an effort to characterise the system of global industrial market society, the
chapter provided an interdisciplinary look at certain key features of the system.
Fairly basic observations about the global, industrial and market societal char-
acter of the socio-economic form of organisation of human life were made. The
twelve pillars of competitiveness highlighted the complexity and embeddedness
of a functioning economy in the very mundane and repetitive everyday activities
of the masses. Historical work of Immanuel Wallerstein was reviewed in order
to highlight the important aspect of the world-economic system that the popula-
tion scale upon which it operates is due to its historical expansion to include the
less well-off producing and consuming masses in its sphere. While the explosive
growth in human population may in some immediate sense be due to medical
and other innovations, it is crucial to remember that innovations themselves are
possible only in a complex global system of education, training, distribution, sell-
ing and buying of new technologies and techniques —in a phrase, in a system
characterised by global division of labour.
The central take-home message of the chapter is thus the immense intercon-
nected variety underlying the organisation of human life in the form of global
industrial market society. In this guise the chapter has raised the all important
themes of everydayness of human activity as well as the individual differences in
perspective to, interest in and knowledge of the social. We shall return to these
themes again and again below and in Part 2 where they form the core of the







Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper,
void of all characters, without any ideas: —How comes it to be
furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy
and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience.
— John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be
more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects
must conform to our cognition.
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all.
— Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
The remaining chapters of this study reflect upon the social theoretical and philo-
sophical aspects of the foregoing argument. As such these chapters will be of a
rather different character from the preceding discussion, but they are essential for
providing a perceptive account of the cultural causes of environmental problems
in the intended breath and depth.
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As the argument of this thesis took shape and I thought about its theoretical
implications, to my surprise it began to seem to me that there obtain certain
paradigmatic tendencies in philosophy and social theory that steer thought to-
wards an ideological approach to the question of the cultural causes of environ-
mental problems. The following appears to be the main source of these tendencies.
The human collective performance of social systems and processes, in short social
or collective action, has in social theory and philosophy been widely conceived
as relying upon shared conceptualisations, ideas and the like —that is, ideology.
In the following chapters I shall discuss a range of authors exemplifying this, but
a central common theme among them is the idea of shared normative orienta-
tions as underlying cohesive social life. This tendency is itself underlined by the
idea of the essentiality of the mind —and associated mental phenomena such as
knowledge, intention, motivation and thought— to explanations of human action.
According to a very natural and paradigmatic picture1, our concept of action is,
in the words of a philosopher, “based on the idea of doing something at will under
the guidance of beliefs”2 and thus we feel that explanations of human action must
elucidate its mental source in beliefs and knowledge.
In sociological thought this individualistic idea often appears in a collectivised
form: social action flows from a collectively held and shared mental source of
action —a world-view, mentality, conceptual scheme, normative orientation or,
in short, an ideology— that drives social action as well as defines groups, com-
munities, cultures and ages3. While important differences exist among various
thinkers, this core idea of the importance of the shared mental source of action re-
mains widely accepted and so I shall assign it a label, the paradigm from sharing.
I shall argue these points in more detail by way of a brief intellectual historical
overview of selected aspects of the history of social theory in the following section.
In the second section, I shall preliminarily explore the alternative Wittgensteinian
philosophy of social action that I develop in more detail in the later chapters of
this thesis. I believe that the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein can be used
to construct an alternative theoretical position capable of conceptualising the or-
1Throughout this thesis I have used the word ‘picture’ in the sense in which Wittgenstein
frequently used it. The sense is summarised neatly by Nigel Pleasants: “A philosophical picture,
in Wittgenstein’s sense, is a theoretical representation which has lost its representational status
and has been reified into a peculiarly compelling portrayal of the essence of some phenomenon”




ganisatory character of the cultural causes of environmental problems although
we will have to read him differently than is customary.
In this Part 2, our ultimate purpose in challenging the paradigm from sharing
and the idea of the essentiality of the mind to explanations of human action
is that they lend support to the ideological approach to the cultural causes of
environmental problems. The paradigm fits very well with the view that there is
a shared mentality —the mechanical, imperialistic and utilitarian world-view—
at the root of the modern human relationship to nature and thus also at the
root of our collectively performed environmental problems. One could say, the
environmentalist argument that our ecological predicament has ideological roots
is a form of collectivism. However, it will be recalled that the argument of Part 1
was that social action in and towards the environment does not essentially draw
from how people and communities conceptualise nature, but how the life of the
masses is organised on a recursive, everyday basis. To put it plainly, it is not
helpful to look for the essence of our nature relationship in our heads —that is,
in our shared world-view, mentality, concepts, values or the like. Yet, as I shall
argue with examples below, a lot of existing social theory and philosophy of the
social sciences —in particular of the Wittgensteinian breed, that will be my chief
focus in this thesis— effectively looks for the essence of human sociality in our
heads in the form of a shared ideology if some kind. The task of this Part 2, then,
is to look for a theoretical picture that supports the views expressed in Part 1,
that is, we look for an organisatory rather than an ideological picture of social
action.
The Paradigm from Sharing
We begin with a brief intellectual historical sketch of the so-called ideological
approach and the closely linked paradigm from sharing. I say ‘sketch’ because
in the space available the remarks provided below admittedly fall far short of a
proper intellectual history of any rigorous quality.4
As briefly indicated above, by the paradigm from sharing I designate a par-
ticular picture paradigmatic to social theory regarding the human being as a
knowing and acting being. This could be characterised as the conception of the
human being as a symbolic, cultural being —that is, a being in possession of
4Stephen Turner also offers a brief intellectual history of a view very similar to what I refer
to as the paradigm from sharing (Turner 1994: Chapter 1).
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culturally mediated mental representations of the world around her according to
which she directs her actions in it. Consequently, it has seemed obvious in human
sciences that the attempt to explain human action, social action in particular, will
centrally have to involve reference to how human beings conceptualise social re-
ality, these conceptions being the shared source of cohesive social action but also
defining and demarcating collectives ideologically as unified cultures, societies,
peoples and as an age. I refer to this picture as collectivism.
I argue that there remains a distinct conceptual —if not intellectual historical—
link between collectivism and its historical roots in certain forms of classic indi-
vidualism, for the shift from individualism to collectivism has not been as radical
as it could be. The core of individualism is the view of the human being as
a knowing and acting being, a much criticised aspect of which is the putative
privacy and autonomy of the individual mind. Collectivism, by contrast, claims
to improve upon this and as it were multiplies the knowing and acting individu-
als aligning or interconnecting their mentalities: social action is collective doing
something at will under the guidance of shared beliefs. Thus, as was observed by
a social theorist, the shift is less radical than it may seem, for “[m]any alleged
ontological nonindividualisms turn out to be ontological individualisms ... their
“opposition” to individualism ... being a stand against too narrow a construal of
the stratum of the individual”5. In the standard collectivist critique, the core of
this narrow construal is the ignorance by individualism of the social construction
of human cognition. Collectivism views human cognition as social throughout
given rise to and maintained by the social processes of training and correction.
In the present view, the shift from individualism to collectivism is not com-
plete. The complete shift would involve abandoning the idea of the essentiality
of the mind to social action. In Wittgenstein’s words, we should focus on the
surroundings or circumstances, and not the source, of social action; or we should
not attempt to analyse the mental ontology (concepts, beliefs) but the organi-
sation of social action. In later chapters I shall argue that this non-ontological
and organisatory approach is implicit in the later Wittgenstein, while a lot of
Wittgensteinian secondary literature continue to read him as an ontologist.
To make explicit the nature of the shift from individualism to collectivism, I
shall attempt to illustrate the intellectual historical roots of collectivism in the
paradigmatic shift towards interest in the human mind in early modern philos-
5Schatzki 2002a: 127.
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ophy. As is now well-recognised due to critiques of individualism for example
by Richard Rorty6, the conception of the human being as an observer of facts
and entertainer of ideas can be seen to relate to the early modern philosophies of
Descartes and Locke and via them it has its roots in the emerging natural scien-
tific world-view. One key work here is John Locke’s Essay7 in which he develops
a version of what has come to be called the causal theory of meaning: Locke
discusses the process of experience giving rise to various kinds of ideas in the
human mind and how these ideas in turn are what language expresses. Similar
views were expressed by Descartes, Hume and others.
Of course significant historical shifts have since occurred in how philosophers
view human cognition, but also a certain continuity can be observed the core
of which lies in the continuing acceptance of the view from the essentiality of
the mind. Kant, for one, argued that perception is always laden with a priori
categories of cognition, a position that is not directly or naively realist as for
example Locke’s is. Still, at the same time Kant preserved crucial bits of the
heritage from Descartes and Locke —that is, the epistemological focus and the
central role of the mind, knowledge and ideas— and so for example Richard Rorty
spoke of “the Descartes-Locke-Kant tradition”8.
I shall suggest that we can see the philosophical groundwork from Locke and
others also as the groundwork for collectivism, the ideological approach and the
paradigm from sharing as they figure later in human sciences. At some point a
crucial collectivist modification was made to the classic individualist story and
here I believe the figures of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons rise to the fore,
not perhaps so much because they were first to put forward such ideas —they
were not—, but because of their immense influence in social theory, whether
subsequent writers agreed with them or not.9
In what way did Max Weber then link the individualistic views in classic
philosophy with later collectivist views in sociological and historical literature?
Kant’s influential idea of the categories of the human mind as imposing a form
upon experience, the mind thus as it were construing (our experience of) reality,




9See Turner 2010: Chapter 5, for similar observations about the history of collectivism with
reference to the work of the influential American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989) and
others.
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in the first place. But Weber played a crucial role in adapting Kant’s ideas
to social theory10. Weber’s methodological views were formed in the frame of
a 19th century German debate (Methodenstreit) about the proper method for
the emerging social sciences between hermeneutics and historicism on the one
hand and positivism on the other. It has been argued that among the 19th cen-
tury German intelligentsia existed a strong distaste of science and the scientific
method deriving from earlier idealism in German philosophy and the classic ro-
mantic sentimentalist literature11. As one commentator put it, to this climate
Weber responded with a “complex, middle-of-the-road position”12 insisting on,
with positivism, the importance of a systematic, scientific approach to explana-
tion of social phenomena but acknowledging, with hermeneutics, the historicity
of human ideas, values, motivations and the like. Weber’s approach can thus
perhaps be seen as a kind of amalgamation of two traditions and this in turn as
the dual root of modern social sciences.
Weber’s influential methodology, laid down with force and clarity in the be-
ginning of his monumental Economy and Society13, builds upon the ideas of in-
terpretive understanding, or verstehende Soziologie, and of causal explanation of
human conduct. Interpretive understanding is interpersonal understanding and
it concerns comprehending the aspects in which “the acting individual attaches
a subjective meaning to ... behavior”14. Interpretive understanding, Weber says,
cannot as such yield rigorous, systematic, human scientific knowledge. (His rea-
sons for saying this will be considered in Chapter 6, p. 118, below.) Materials
gained by Verstehen must be filtered by certain scientific methods, Weber argues.
One of these is to view human action as if it was ‘rationally purposeful action’, an
ideal type of action and a purely “methodological device” that does not assume
“actual predominance of rational elements in human life”, Weber says15. The
model conceptualises human action in terms of means and ends and thus even
actions taking place in an “emotional context” can be understood “intellectually”
in so far as emotions can be related to and they can be seen to have “influence
10See Schluchter 1981: Chapter III, on Weber’s relation to Kantianism and neo-Kantianism







on the course of action and the selections of means”, Weber writes16.
Note carefully the kind of balance that Weber here strikes between positivism
and hermeneutics. In Weber’s view interpretative understanding, or Verstehen,
can go some way towards capturing the individual’s experience of social reality.
General statements about social life, on the other hand, are made on the basis
of interpretative understanding but only after a process of abstraction to general
types. The notion of ideal type could thus be seen as the core of the compromise
that Weber strikes between hermeneutics and positivism: the ideal type is in-
formed by Verstehen but for Weber this is in the last analysis a methodologically
convenient generalisation. Nevertheless, the core of the collectivist turn prepared
here by Weber, and made explicit in Parsons, resides in the idea that the ‘sub-
jective meanings’ entertained in the human mind are the source of human action
but that human minds can be, as it were, in tune or aligned producing cohesive
social action.
Next in the story we must thus consider the role of the classic American soci-
ologist and a keen follower of Weber, Talcott Parsons. He was a great synthesiser
of classic European social theory most explicitly in his seminal The Structure
of Social Action17. A good place to begin our review is Parsons’ classificatory
scheme of ideas in terms of which the human being orientates her action in the
world and in social reality.
According to Parsons, ideas, first of all, are “concepts and propositions” re-
lating to “human interests, values and experience” and constitute systems where
they inferentially relate to each other. One main class of ideas, according to
Parsons, are existential ideas that refer to “external reality in some sense”, or
rather “to some phase or phases of this reality, real or imagined”. As another
main class alongside existential ideas are normative ideas that express, not the
indicative, but the “imperative mood” describing states of affairs that can be
seen as the ends of an actor.18 This categorisation of ideas can be considered to
form a central aspect of Parsons’ so-called action theory in that it is intended to
illustrate the ideological (cognitive) machinery behind human and social action.
Thus, Parsons insisted on the “voluntaristic” nature of human action, that is,
that it is “not determined by the facts of human nature and environment ... that
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by science”19.
For Parsons, society is held together by the collective commitment to shared
nonexistential and normative ideas, such as are formulated in religious systems.
Parsons spoke critically of “positivist thinking” characterised by “the strong ten-
dency ... to minimize the [social] importance of religion, to treat it as a matter of
‘superstition’ ”20 contrasting this with Emile “Durkheim’s view that religious rit-
ual was of primary significance as a mechanism for expressing and reinforcing the
sentiments most essential to the institutional integration of the society”21. This
general picture is constitutive for Parsons’ structural functionalism: actions or
“unit acts” take place within a “system of action” where unit acts are analysable
by a means-end schema reflecting, crucially, the situatedness of action within the
system, in particular with respect to the cohesion and functionality of the sys-
tem22. As Parsons put it, “[w]hat is essential to the concept of action is that
there should be a normative orientation, not that this should be of any particular
type”23. The exact content and direction of human ambition varies according to
the social setting and one’s upbringing24.
An aspect of this socially generated mentalities picture is Parsons’ view that
in a cohesive society, there operates a system of social stratification, as Parsons
termed it. This is “the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose
a given social system and their treatment as superior and inferior relative to one
another in certain socially important respects”25. The term ‘social stratification’
denotes the various means by which society maintains its internal ranking, its
internal cohesion and functionality26. In a cohesive society there is a convergence
in individual nonexistential, normative or moral ideas: “the scale of stratification
is a pattern characterized by moral authority which is integrated in terms of
common moral sentiments”27. Every member of society goes through the process
of socialisation meaning in Parsons “the learning of any orientations of functional












We have in Parsons a classic formulation of the general idea behind the col-
lectivism and the paradigm from sharing, namely, that social action springs from
a shared mentality. As we shall see in the following chapters, the idea takes dif-
ferent shapes in different authors, many of whom have been explicitly critical of
Parsons. Yet, I argue the core has survived in the view that human action flows
from our ideas about the world and that social action flows from shared ideas
about social reality.
So much, then, for the intellectual history of collectivism in relation to indi-
vidualism as it is conceived in this thesis. In a number of connections in Part 1,
I argued that the ideological approach characterises in a variety of respects our
intellectual orientation in explanations of human and social action. ‘The ideolog-
ical Marx’ (see Chapter 3 above) is another prominent source of the ideological
approach, and another is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) who in Beyond Good
and Evil29 expressed the view that modernity is characterised by the replace-
ment of religious ideology, in particular Christian ideology, with that of what
we may call the ideology of Reason. In other words, for Nietzsche modernity is
characterised by its belief in the power of Reason manifested in certain trends
within humanities as well as science and technology. Of course, for Nietzsche
this belief is false and no better than the belief it replaced, namely, belief in a
religious truth. For him they are both expressions of the age old human desire to
find Platonic truths over and above the human being herself. Yet, the paradigm
survives: the human being is an ideological being, albeit inherently confused and
fooled by false ideologies. Again, one might see something similar in the work
of the Frankfurt School. Its perhaps two most prominent protagonists Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued that modernity is characterised by the op-
erations of an instrumental notion of Reason suited to work out means-to-end
calculations efficiently but that has to by nature remain silent about matters of
moral, aesthetic and other evaluation30.
This is the conceptual juncture in which critical approaches such as environ-
mental history and environmentalism more broadly enter the picture. As dis-
cussed above (in Chapter 3), environmental history and environmentalism more
broadly, have in many cases a Marxian critical root. The ideological approach
to the cultural causes of environmental problems indeed crucially reflects the
29Nietzsche 1973.
30Horkheimer & Adorno 1971. Lodziak (2002) provides a differing, structuralist, reading of
these fathers of the Frankfurt School.
104 Chapter 5. Losing Everything Philosophically Astonishing
paradigm from sharing in arguing that the causes have cultural, ideological, roots.
These views again go together with a significant number of sociological and his-
torical literature on the idea of modernity as a rational age. Very central here
is the idea of modernity as essentially a particular kind of mentality : modernity
is rationalised, scientific, commercialised, capitalist and bureaucratic where these
characterisations are not only said to pertain to the societal structures but to
the mentalities of human beings performing these systems. The environmental
historical and environmentalist view of the human being as acting out our en-
vironmental problems from ideological motives is a detail in a wider picture of
modernity.
I am suggesting, then, that there are deep-seated intellectual forces at play
across a number of ‘schools’ that in terms of their general orientation favour the
ideological approach. The epigraphs at the start of this chapter seem to me to
articulate the essential continuity across philosophical schools —as well as the
contrasts in terms of which I see the later Wittgenstein as making a revolu-
tion in philosophy: both great traditions, the realist-empiricist (Locke) and the
constructivist-rationalist (Kant, neo-Kantianism), build paradigmatically upon
the essentiality of the mind and knowledge and beliefs contained in it, disagreeing
only over their origin. The idea of a revolutionary quality to the later Wittgen-
stein’s thought is not new31 and although I cannot go into this at present, I
believe that the idea of seeing the revolutionary quality in the rejection of an
ideological in favour of what I term an organisatory approach represents a novel
reading of Wittgenstein. The nolvelty resides in the present thesis offering a
consistently non-ontological reading of Wittgenstein which is in constrast with a
number of prominents readings for example by Peter Hacker and David Bloor. I
shall develop my reading of Wittgenstein’s views, as well as the contrast in which
it stands to other readings, in great detail in the following chapters, but the clos-
ing section of the present chapter offers a preliminary overview of his approach
elucidating also some of philosophical contexts in which his work emerged.
One might object that the later Wittgenstein himself played a significant role
in ‘the collectivist turn’ away from individualism and the associated vices such
as the view of the privacy of the mental. Moreover, the later Wittgenstein is
commonly described as an anti-humanist with significant relativistic and con-
31See e.g. Hacker 2001: 90-1 and Dilman 2002.
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structivistic tendencies which also go together well with collectivism.32 It is true
that Wittgenstein has been read in this way, but a different reading is possible
as the present thesis is at pains to illustrate. In the present organisatory read-
ing, Wittgenstein figures as more of a materialist in Marx’s sense (discussed in
Chapter 9 below) than as a constructivistic collectivist or an ideologist.
Wittgenstein, Meaning as Use and Social Reality
In this section I shall introduce certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
and indicate the kind of approach to social or collective action, and social life
more generally, it can be seen to give rise to.
Philosophers, at least in the Anglo-American tradition, have traditionally
taken naming as a fundamental aspect of language acquisition. Early language
training is thought to involve children pointing at things upon which they are
told the name of the object pointed at. Wittgenstein was critical of this focus
in philosophy of language and said of naming that “[a] child uses such primitive
forms of language when it learns to talk” but added that “[h]ere the teaching of
language is not explanation, but training”33. The child is being prepared, trained,
for something more than the mere tagging of objects with their names: “naming
is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory
to the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?”34, Wittgenstein wrote.
Typically of his style, the next passage in the text does not go on to answer the
question in any explicit way. A picture of Wittgenstein’s view, here as elsewhere,
emerges gradually as one puts together the different strands that he pursues in
different parts of his work.
What then, according to Wittgenstein, is naming in preparation for? One
might say that even if naming is an early step in language acquisition, the signif-
icance of the child’s calling for an object is not its mere naming, but may include
such things as that upon calling its name the child is given the object. Going
beyond this simple example, even apart from the various practical reasons re-
garding why it is useful to be able to refer to someone, that one names someone
is already in itself a more symbolically significant act than merely that of giving
someone a short-hand for referring to them. Thus, for example, as Wittgenstein
32See e.g. Sire 2004: 48.
33Wittgenstein 1958: §5.
34Wittgenstein 1958: §26.
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says, “children give names to their dolls and then talk about them and to them”
and goes on to ask us to compare the depth that this possibly implies with sole
ostensive concern: “how singular is the use of a person’s name to call him!”,
Wittgenstein exclaimed35.
There will be differences in our nose for significance here, but for one, naming
may imply that children cast their toys as kinds of inanimate human beings,
capable of feelings, intentions and so on, and thus they talk to them, comfort
them and so on. As opposed to being a mere tag, naming attaches a certain
significance to a thing, it connects the thing with human intentionality and thus
with human life more generally. Naming one’s doll can be seen as attaching some
human qualities, for example the ability to feel, to the doll.
These observations begin to expose the role, the use, of language in the context
of human interaction. For Wittgenstein, it was essential to see language and
thought in the context of such uses, that is, that we look at the use of names, for
instance, as involving such complex considerations as described above. We look
at language use as having a point. In my view, this is the import of Wittgenstein’s
claim that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”36.
Naming of course relates closely to what names refer to, their referents. This
takes us to another central concern in traditional philosophy of language that
Wittgenstein was critical of, namely, the relationship of words, concepts and
statements to things they talk about in the world, sometimes referred to as entities
and facts. Thus, typically, in philosophy one attempts to ‘analyse’ the connection
of such statements as ‘I’m in pain’ to the physical processes in the person’s body
who makes the claim or to the person’s phenomenological experience of pain. A
lot of Wittgenstein’s writings from the 1930s onwards, upon his famous return
to philosophy, concentrate on spinning paradoxes out of this picture which is an
important form of argumentation in the later Wittgenstein. I shall discuss some
examples below in Chapter 8 (p. 195 ff.)
Wittgenstein’s positive take on the meaning of such statements as ‘I’m in
35Wittgenstein 1958: §27.
36Wittgenstein 1958: §43. Interestingly, Wittgenstein in fact put a qualification to this phrase
that has become the slogan representing his whole approach. The quoted passage is preceded
by: “For a large class of cases —though not for all— in which we employ the word ‘meaning’
it can be defined thus:” (Wittgenstein 1958: §43). I believe, however, that the qualification
has no essential significance to the argument advanced here. For a detailed discussions of what
Wittgenstein may have meant by the qualification, see Baker & Hacker 2009: 152 ff. and Garver
1994: Chapter 12.
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pain’, by contrast, drew attention to the activities that surround the use of the
word ‘pain’. The exercise of our knowledge of potential real life circumstances in
which the word is used reveals the meaning, that is the use, of the word ‘pain’.
Thus, we may announce to our family members that ‘I’ve got a terrible toothache
since the early hours of this morning’ and prepare ourselves for going to see the
dentist. According to Wittgenstein, our knowledge of the meaning of the word
‘pain’ relates to such uses of the word in actual situations.
In philosophy, again, since the meaning of pain is typically associated with
some physical process in the body, or sometimes with something in the phe-
nomenology of one’s experience of pain, doubts arise as to whether the external
symptoms of pain really signal pain: “I can only believe that someone else is in
pain, but I know it if I am”, Wittgenstein has his imaginary opponent make a
typical philosophical statement about the philosophical epistemology of pain. In
a telling response Wittgenstein asks us to “[j]ust try —in a real case— to doubt
someone else’s fear or pain”37. His intention here is again to draw attention to
the actual circumstances, real cases, in which people talk about pains and that
in these cases the talk revolves in the first instance around the display of pain,
and what significance this has in the situation and to the people involved, and
not for example its neural nature.
Thus, most importantly for the present purposes, the cases in which people
display pains are humanly potentially serious situations and this is what is hu-
manly significant about them. Thus, when we display pain, doubt someone else’s
pain and so on, there are always longer strings attached to these activities, strings
that lead to the most diverse considerations pertaining to human life such as pains
as limiting human aspirations or faking pains as perhaps offering some sort of an
advantage (perhaps through pity thus evoked) to the person faking or exaggerat-
ing her pains. These are of course not at all deep observations, but express rather
ordinary knowledge of the social: for any given sentence “I can imagine circum-
stances [of use] that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and by that
it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing”, Wittgenstein observed38.
At any rate, understanding language implies an understanding of a wider picture
of human life and human aspirations in which a failure to understand, or partial
understanding, is also a possibility39. A significant use will be made later in this
37Wittgenstein 1958: §303.
38Wittgenstein 1975: §622.
39Wittgenstein 1958: Note on page 53.
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thesis of the idea that there are significant individual differences in perspectives
and thereby in people’s interests and knowledge of social life.
In Wittgenstein, as I shall argue in detail in the chapters below, emerges a
view of social life as a developmental process with a particular course in which ex-
pressing doubts and pains and so on figure as moves. Essential in this perspective
to human life is not as it were the mental ontological identity of doubts, pains,
intentions and beliefs in the physical (perhaps neural) make-up of the person in-
volved. What is essential is that the life process has some structure, direction,
course or point in the sense in which someone’s having pains leads to actions to
relieve pain or disrupts the current activity and plans.
Wittgenstein used two special terms to refer to the social reality within which
language, and human intellectual and intentional capacities more generally, are
used. These terms are ‘language-game’ and ‘form of life’. These terms do not
appear to be used by Wittgenstein in any mutually exclusive or in a singular
definite sense40. They both, however, belong to the same picture of language
use. As Wittgenstein put it, “the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a
form of life”41 and that “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life”42.
Both terms thus describe something about the context in which human being use
language but it appears that ‘form of life’ has a larger scope than ‘language-
game’, the latter term focusing on the specifically linguistic component of human
interaction where the former comprises thought, talk and action. However, in
what follows I will use the two terms practically interchangeably and in the same
sense as ‘social reality’, ‘the social’ as well as ‘organisation (of human life)’ and
‘social systems and processes’.
In my view, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of meaning as use is not strictly speak-
ing a philosophy of meaning of expressions at all, or it is so only indirectly. We
could say instead that it is a philosophy of what surrounds the use of expressions.
Here ‘expressions’ comprises at least written and spoken language, symbolisms
(in mathematics, engineering, etc.), facial and other bodily expressions, tones of
voice, and many other such ways of expressing or signalling something. The sur-
roundings of the use of expressions refers to the complex of human interactions,
artefacts, and so on, as they connect with purposes for which human beings en-




gage in interaction. Later on, in Chapter 6 (p. 120), I shall contrast this point
with the tendency in Wittgenstein literature to reduce the essence of social life
to concepts, in particular to collective standards or criteria for the application of
concepts.
An essential claim in my approach is that Wittgenstein’s views against brain
physiological and phenomenal understandings of pain (but also of such things
as reading, knowing and intention, all examples that Wittgenstein considers and
some of which we shall look at below) are also applicable against a distinct but in
my view related view we have already discussed above, namely, that human inter-
action in social reality draws from our (shared) ideas about social life. Wittgen-
stein can be read as recommending a refocus away from our ideas about the world
and onto what as it were surrounds these ideas. On account of this I refer to his
approach as non-ontological. Here, I shall argue, emerges a picture of social life
as a set of organised, often recurring, systems and processes which I shall in turn
relate to the argument of Part 1 from the organisatory character of the cultural
causes of environmental problems. I argue, thus, that there is a sufficient anal-
ogy here between Wittgenstein’s critical views on pain (as well as reading, etc.)
and the present social theoretical concerns, for underlying both the philosophi-
cal and the social theoretical views, is the aforementioned picture of the human
being as a being with an advanced mental life, a part of which are pains but
also knowledge, beliefs, intentions and the like. A central part of the sociological,
collectivised picture of the human being is that she is a symbolic, cultural being
in possession of culturally mediated conceptualisations. Consequently, as noted
above, it has seemed obvious in human sciences that to explain human action
will centrally have to involve reference to how human beings conceptualise social
reality43. Social action, in turn, must be explained by reference to shared ideas.
The discussion in the coming chapters will focus on two aspects of the ideologies
allegedly driving social action: their status as something mental as well as that
they are shared.
I approach the drawing of this analogy by attempting first, in Chapter 6,
to illustrate problems with the idea of shared mentalities, ideologies, beliefs and
the like and thereby make plausible the view that there are significant individual
differences in our perspectives, interests and knowledge of social reality. The
43The term ‘social reality’ draws from the philosopher John Searle (1996). While I find the
term a useful shorthand, I do not thereby endorse Searle’s views on the construction of social
reality. In fact, I offer some criticisms of his approach in Chapter 7.
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relation, explored in Chapter 7, of this claim to Wittgenstein’s concerns is the
following. While Wittgenstein rejected the view of the mental source of human
action as being essential to an account of social reality, he did not deny that
human beings are thinking beings either. Instead, he argued that in human
interaction the individual mental sources of human action are not at stake but
that interaction takes place on another plane than the mental, namely, in social
processes. This accommodates and in fact presupposes individual differences in
knowledge of the social in that human interaction appears as a reciprocal and
complementary process of differently placed actors with differing perspectives,
knowledge, beliefs and interests. As will be illustrated below, there are passages
in Wittgenstein that can be read, not merely as accommodating, but as gesturing
towards the existence of individual differences in knowledge (see the discussions
of ‘the beetle in the box’ and algebraic formula in Chapter 7, p. 194 ff. below).
At any rate, in the present view, Wittgenstein’s interest was not the source of
human and social action, whether shared or individually variable. He developed,
instead, a view of human action not focused on its source but its surroundings, or
what comes to the same, he looked at social life as a developmental process. For
this reason certain of his ideas allow us to develop a social theoretical methodology
alternative to those focused on the source of social action. This shall be developed
in Chapter 7 drawing on Wittgenstein’s phrase ‘agreement in form of life’. I shall
highlight the role of the everyday organisation of our performance of the social
as the key to understanding social action, a move which allows us to relate the
argument of Part 1 with that of Part 2. In the remaining chapters, in Chapter 8 I
discuss the issue that would most readily place the later Wittgenstein in the camp
of the ideological approach, namely the issue of the social character of normativity,
and then in Chapter 9 elucidate the present approach by way of highlighting
agreements and disagreements with existing social theoretical literature.
Conclusion
This chapter began with a brief intellectual historical sketch of the broader in-
tellectual orientations with which the present approach is at odds. I argued that
the heritage of the early modern philosophy, in particular its focus on the human
being as a knowing subject, has been only moderately modified in later human
scientific thought. For our purposes crucial is to note the collectivist move that as
it were socialised the production and functioning of the human mind. Even after
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this move, the idea of the essentiality of the mind to human and social action
has, however, prevailed. This move indicates the preservation of the ideological
approach in the collectivist paradigm from sharing.
I also offered a preliminary characterisation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
as a radical alternative to the ideological approach and the paradigm from sharing
and the present use of him as being based on an argument from analogy from
his approach in philosophy to social theory. Before taking up the task of detailed
articulation of this alternative in Chapter 7, the next chapter considers a number
of epistemological challenges to the paradigm from sharing that form the centre
of the present challenge to the paradigm.

Chapter 6
Knowing the Way About
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side
and know your way about; you approach the same place from
another side and no longer know your way about
— Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
The above metaphor illustrates Wittgenstein’s view that our ordinary knowledge
of meaning, just as our ordinary knowledge of the social, gets us by just fine, but
when we begin to theorise about it the whole thing begins to seem incomprehen-
sible. In Wittgenstein’s metaphor, the ‘another side’ could be the philosophical
analysis of language, but also the social theoretical analysis of social action, con-
trasting with the flow of ordinary life where we often do ‘know our way about’
with considerable ease. The attempt to articulate the hidden mechanisms of
thought, language and meaning underlying human activities is “as if we had to
repair a torn spider’s web with our fingers”1, as Wittgenstein put it. That is,
our gaze upon the complex spider web struggles to be fine enough to trace all its
details.
Wittgenstein advocated a kind of hands-off approach to the web: “We must
do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place”, he
declared2. He also said that “[t]he use of [a word] in the ordinary circumstances
of our life is of course extremely familiar to us. But the part the word plays in our
life, and therewith the language-game in which we employ it, would be difficult
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and do not know our way about? The answer is yes, but with the clarification
that while one may know one’s local streets rather well but we can still get lost
in the city.
The following discussion of a number of epistemological challenges to the
paradigm from sharing is intended to make plausible the view that there obtains a
considerable individual variety in the perspective to the social, in people’s interest
and sensitivity to features of social reality around them (interpersonally as well
as on the level of social institutions), and that there are therefore considerable
individual differences in knowledge of the social. In these circumstances, the
attempt to provide a general theory of our knowledge of the social is like trying
to repair a spider’s web with fingers. In the course of the discussion I try to
clarify where exactly I think there are individual differences in knowledge of the
social —and where perhaps not—, that is, I try to clarify what we are denying
when we deny shared ideologies as the basis of social life.
Epistemological Challenges
Recall first the example cases considered in Part 1 of actors’ collective perfor-
mance of environmentally consequential organisations of human life. These il-
lustrated that people have most diverse perspectives, interests, sensitivity and
knowledge of the social systems and processes that we collectively perform. I
argued for instance that it is by no means obvious that the actors who collec-
tively perform global industrial market society —that is, us— have by and large
a very clear idea of the functioning of global industrial market society. Nor is it
clear that significant numbers of us share something like a mechanical and utili-
tarian attitude to nature. Such differences between individuals, I argued, make
implausible any general ideological analyses of the human relationship to nature.
In the present Part 2, I shall pursue this same general line of argument in a
more abstract, theoretical or philosophical manner. Let us begin by noting that
essential to an ideological approach is that it seeks explanations by appeal to
the intentional capacities of the human mind as the mental source of human and
social action. In Chapter 3, for instance, we found a number of environmentalists
claiming that the modern human being has effectively internalised technocratic
materialism as the ruling value of her life. Parsons’ classification of ideas (dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 above) in terms of which people are said to conceptualise
(empirical and extra empirical) reality gives us some general idea of the various
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modes that human intentionality could be said to take. Throughout this thesis,
I have intentionally used the word ‘ideology’ and its cognates in a broad sense to
capture these various modes. The phrase ‘mental source’ is a loose but nonetheless
an ontological term designating the material basis of human cognition, probably
most intuitively described today as neural in character. Social theory of course
rarely says much in terms of how ideologies work ontologically or neurally, but
it is important to note that they retain the functionally efficient part of such a
picture, namely that an ideology is held by an individual or group and that it, as
it were, dispenses thought and action. One might think that it is unfair to draw,
say, some environmental historical account using terms like a world-view to ex-
plain human and social action towards the environment to a discussion about the
ontology of such claims. Yet, to expose the power of an ideological explanation,
it is crucial that we do not let the picture of the mental source of human and
social action to hold us captive and predispose us to a certain kind of an account.
I shall return to this point below under the rubric “the conjuring trick” (Chapter
7, p. 139).
I shall now attempt to unravel the plausibility of the ideological approach by
considering a number of ontological worries for theories of the mental source of
human and social action. One indispensable and highly stimulating contribu-
tion here surely is the American philosopher Stephen Turner’s critical work on
notions such as shared ideology, mutual knowledge and their kin. Turner’s pri-
mary target is the notion of practice conceived as drawing from shared skills and
knowledge, although he argues that a whole host of notions draw from a similar
source of plausibility. Turner mentions notions such as “tradition, tacit knowl-
edge, Weltanschauung, paradigm, ideology, framework and presuppositions”4 and
many others in the course of his discussion. I find Turner’s work fascinating and
very important but, as I shall indicate shortly, he too fails to shed the ideological
approach in all its aspects, in particular the view of the essentiality of the mind
in explanations of social action.
One example of an ontological problem is Turner’s challenge to the idea of
transmission of culturally mediated concepts to the novice: “if practices or pre-
suppositions are hidden things, or tacit, how do these things move through chan-
nels that are themselves public or open?”5, Turner asks. That is, if the source of
4Turner 1994: 2.
5Turner 1994: 45.
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human action is a shared tacitly and unconsciously held presupposition, state or
the like, then how is that hidden thing transferred through an array of its public
manifestations and implanted into the next person as an identical (?) tacitly and
unconsciously held presupposition?6
A related worry of Turner’s is that the “ ‘same’ overt behaviour in two people
may have a quite different causal ancestry in each person”7. Thus, it is highly
conceivable that two people learned chess in different ways, by different examples
say, or one from a rule book while the other by watching, and so on. Arguably,
their performances in a game of chess can be equally competent, but the source
of it presumably different due to the differing learning histories. Indeed, if a
person’s knowledge is a function of her learning history, then surely we do not
share knowledge, so different are our learning histories.
Talk of the ontology of human and social action as having its source in ide-
ology, world-view, mentality, conception, presupposition or the like faces one
general problem to which Turner time and again returns:
The concept of practice, whether it is conceived cognitively, as a kind
of presupposition, or causally, as a kind of mental trace which disposes
thought or action in a certain way, is epistemologically elusive.8
For Turner the epistemological elusiveness is first and foremost due to the
underdetermination of claims from sharing by the facts that can be adduced in
their support:
They may establish that phenomena of order may be produced by
people acting as if they are acting in accordance with certain shared
procedures or rules, but this is not the same as showing that these (or
any) shared procedures are the causes of the ‘order’.9
Turner’s charge would thus seem to be the classic one from inductive infer-
ence: no amount of confirming instances can logically justify the inference to an
underlying regularity, law, cause, source or the like. If these arguments amounted
to mere inductive scepticism I would not consider them particularly interesting,
for scepticism threatens to mark the end of all positive theorising10. To me the
argument highlights the fact that social theoretical appeals to the shared mental




10James Bohman (1997) reads Turner as a sceptic.
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source of human and social action are often made without much concern for how
such a picture works ontologically —that is, whether it is in fact plausible to
postule an ontologically unequivocal, uniform and shared mental source of social
action—, yet it is precisely their alleged power to dispense uniform thought and
action that is explanatorily crucial about collectively shared ideas.
Note that while Turner identifies something like the paradigm from sharing
and presents compelling arguments against it, his positive proposal takes a rather
different direction to the present approach. In Turner’s view, first of all, the
later Wittgenstein and/or his followers are the prime proponents of what I have
called the paradigm from sharing. Secondly, in his positive account of human
action, Turner argues that our actions are driven by “private habits, with a
variegated causal structure, that arise in response to public things”11. In other
words, Turner’s proposal is to reject the idea of shared mentalities as driving social
action in favour of the idea that there can be diversity in human mentalities,
but that given the social context of their occurrence actions can nevertheless
converge towards coherent social life. Turner’s alternative is thus also very much
neural-ontological in its focus12. Turner has since developed his views elsewhere
arguing for instance that “[t]he discovery of mirror neurons suggested a non-
collective mode of transmission of practices” by providing “an alternative [theory]
to habituation or connectionist learning as a mechanism of acquisition”13.
Now, I do not object to this idea as such, but note that there would be
ingredients in Turner’s arguments for a more radical alternative. In the present
view, as shall be argued in more detail in Chapter 7, given individual differences
in knowledge of the social, the focus should move away from the mental source,
whether shared or not, of human and social action to the organisation of social
action. Thus, the present argument differs considerably from Turner’s in that it
proposes a wholly non-ontological or organisatory approach.
At any rate, Turner’s arguments cast doubt on the plausibility of the onto-
logical machinery seemingly needed to run the view from shared ideology as the
source of social action. I shall return to the issue in Chapter 7 where we criti-
cally discuss the philosopher John Searle’s explicitly ontological account. I shall
now consider certain less theoretical, and therefore hopefully intuitively more
11Turner 1994: 105.
12As Andrew Pickering put it: “He [Turner] is not against the invisible [mental ontology] per
se, only the idea of a shared invisible” (Pickering 1997: 327).
13Turner 2007: 110, 118.
118 Chapter 6. Knowing the Way About
approachable, reasons for rejecting the ideological approach.
Max Weber —the provider of the argument from the role of the spirit of capi-
talism in the historically divergent courses taken by the Orient and the Occident—
provided a whole barrage of considerations as to why interpersonal, and even
intra-personal, understanding is a problematic object of study. As noted above
in Chapter 5, Weber’s intention was to illustrate that knowledge of the social
gained by Verstehen needs to be checked by certain more rigorous means to yield
robust scientific knowledge. In this context Weber advances the following argu-
ments.
First, “the conscious motives” may well, even to the actor himself, conceal
various “motives” and “repressions” which constitute the real driving force of his
action”14, Weber says. Where this is the case, “even subjectively honest self-
analysis has only a relative value”15, he continues. Nevertheless, these are the
materials that the sociologist has to work with in trying to reconstruct the in-
dividuals’ “motivational situation”, even where any given motivation “has not
actually been concretely part of the conscious intention of the actor”16. Second,
similar to Turner’s argument, Weber observes that “processes of action ... may fit
into exceedingly various complexes of motives”17. In other words, while two ob-
servable actions may seem similar they may nonetheless spring from very different
motives. And finally, third, Weber says that “the actors in any given situation are
often subject to opposing and conflicting impulses” and as “the relative strength
of conflicting motives” is very hard to establish, and thus “very often we cannot
be certain of our interpretation”18, he concludes. Worries such as these about
understanding individuals by attempting to reconstruct their mentalities explain
why Weber thought, as we saw above in Chapter 5, that interpretive understand-
ing of subjective meaning must be complemented by scientific techniques.
It may be in order to note in passing that to argue that the reconstruction
of actors’ motivations and the like is problematic is not to argue for the absolute
privacy of motivations or other mental contents of individuals (as famously re-
jected by Wittgenstein). Nor is it to argue that motivations cannot be known.







tivations and the like, are in many cases complex, multi-layered, on-going and
therefore very difficult processes. Think for instance of what depths of personal
psychology we may get to chart upon really getting to know another person as
opposed to when we make more superficial, passing acquaintances. In my view,
in its summary attributions of motivations and the like the ideological approach
clashes with such intuitions about the complexity of the human being —or, alter-
natively, the ideological approach operates with a very different, simpler, picture
of the human being as an intentional being.
Weber’s worries might also be taken to reflect what any textbook on sur-
vey research will tell you about the difficulty of operationalising and validating
concepts19. The difficulty is that of ascertaining that respondents all have alike
understandings of a given term used in a survey question or in terms of which
the respondent is probed in an interview, and conversely that a concept used to
describe the respondents views is faithful to their perspective.20
In a similar vein, the editors of a collection of sociological work on social
norms identified one principal disagreement dividing the contributing authors:
there are those who view “norms as clear constraints on action” and “those for
whom norms are more plastic social constructions”, adding that it tended to be
the game theorists who hold the former view21.
Again, the sociologist Richard Sennett’s distinctions between belief, value and
ideology illustrate similar difficulties with drawing conclusions about people’s mo-
tivations, knowledge and beliefs. Belief, Sennett defines, is “consciously involved
in the behavior of the person who holds it”22. Ideology, by contrast, does not
touch behaviour in any direct manner and Sennett argues that “[m]uch of the
opinion which people hold about social life never touches on or strongly influ-
ences their behavior”23. Ideology, according to Sennett, is close to values in that
both do not intimately relate to behaviour but rather are parts of “language by
which people rationalize their social world”. Other such parts of language include
for instance “prized ideas”24. What Sennett seems to be arguing is that the idea
of beliefs as the source of human action may seem relatively unproblematic be-
19See e.g. Sapsford 2007: Chapter 5.
20See also the classic myth-busting study by Philip E. Converse (2006/1964) about the notable
differences in political knowledge and views of elites and masses.
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cause it can be represented as something local and concrete: “there is an apple
in my basket”. But then, to introduce values and ideologies —“apples are good
for me” or “I’m a supporter of organic farming”— into the mix arguably already
brings in significant ambiguities as to the role of them as the shared mental source
of action.
In sum then, philosophically speaking shared ideas, values, norms and the like
are ontologically suspect. Moreover, there are commonsensical reasons for being
suspicious about claims from the effect of shared values, ideas and ideologies
on human and social action. The ideological approach, and the accompanying
paradigm from sharing together with the view from the essentiality of the mind
as the location of the mental source of human action, might thus constitute a
natural picture, but it is by no means an unproblematic one.
Mastery and Criteria
Let us take a brief excursion to two notions frequently made use of in Wittgen-
steinian literature that can in an interesting way be related to the above discus-
sion, namely those of mastery and criteria. I shall argue that many Wittgen-
steinian authors often work with a rather quick and shallow concept of mastery
understood as knowledge of the collective criteria or standards according to which
it is correct to apply a given expression in a given instance. In this section I try
to make plausible the view that not only are there individual differences in level
of mastery and knowledge of criteria, but also that it makes better sense to locate
the essence of human sociality, not in shared mastery of criteria, but in shared
social organisation of human life viewed as a set of recurring and developing
processes.
Consider Wittgenstein commentator Marie McGinn’s words:
Learning the language-game involves, both becoming master of these
different performances, and coming to recognize and understand these
distinctions in the actions of others. In the latter case, this involves
our detecting and responding appropriately to subtle and complex
patterns of behaviour, which we have a nose for but which we cannot
always make explicit.25
One is here perhaps thinking of something like our nose for what Wittgenstein
called pain-behaviour as a kind of a signal: “A child has hurt himself and he cries;
25McGinn 1997: 173.
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and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences.
They teach the child new pain-behaviour”, Wittgenstein wrote26. There will
indeed be a considerable body of broadly shared criteria on the basis of which
human beings can recognise the condition of the other. Yet, I think it should be
intuitively clear that there are also considerable differences in people’s emotional
intelligence or sensitivities. There will be again differences in how people go on
to react, say, to others’ pains, whether with pity or by thinking that the other is a
helpless whiner or something else. These differences are significant, for they affect
the course of human interactions. Pain-behaviour is thus not an uncontroversial
counterexample to the present challenge to shared mentalities.
A deeper issue here is that of taking criteria (say, for being in pain) to con-
stitute the essence of human sociality which I think would be misleading. In this
view, to know what pain is is to know the criteria in terms of which one signals
pains, but this misses the significance of pains to human life. That is, it having
been recognised that someone is in pain leaves open the wider questions such as
what is to be done now and why.
A similar point was made by the philosopher Lars Hertzberg against the
Wittgenstein commentator Peter Hacker. Hertzberg argued that “in representing
the learning of concepts as the learning of a technique” and “in citing imitation,
repetition and recognition as central to what it means to become a speaker, Hacker
conveys the impression that language is a surface phenomenon, a mere set of con-
ventions”27, for “to relate to someone as a speaker is not a matter of noting that
she lives up to some standard or conforms to some pattern”28. It seems that
Hertzberg’s intention in propositions such as “learning to speak means learning
to express oneself by means of words”29 or “finding ourselves interacting ... in
ways involving words”30 is to gesture at the view that the essence of human so-
ciality goes beyond the criteria in terms of which we, say, express pain. Focusing
on concepts and criteria, Hertzberg says, “misrepresent the place of language in
our lives” by viewing the “life we live with language in too abstract terms. (It is
true that we find a similar tendency in Wittgenstein’s own work.)”, he adds31.







122 Chapter 6. Knowing the Way About
standing rules in what from my point of view is a misunderstanding of Wittgen-
stein’s use of the word ‘rule’. In (Wittgensteinian) literature one often finds
analyses of the ontology, or social ontology, of rule-following—say, in John Searle
or in David Bloor’s collectivism discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. In
the present reading, however, Wittgenstein’s approach to criteria and rules and,
language, thought and meaning in general, was not ontological at all as I shall
illustrate in more detail in Chapter 7.
That said, the notion of rule is certainly central to Wittgenstein’s later philos-
ophy. In the Investigations, the word appears first in a familiar, everyday sense,
that is in the context of a discussion of the rules of a game32. Later the term
is also used in the sense in which we may say of someone that she is following
a rule even though no explicit teaching by using rules nor explicit formulating
and recording of rules has taken place33. However, given Wittgenstein’s overall
philosophical aims of which more in Chapter 7, I argue that the most central
sense in which the notion is used is critical : a rule is that something that many
have seen to determine meaning, intention, usage and so forth, namely something
mental (a state or disposition34) or even metaphysical (a Platonic idea)35. It is
used in particular in the critical remark against the view “that if anyone utters
a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to
definite rules”36. One could thus argue that although rules and rule-following
are central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, he is not interested in rules as
such (as a formulation, as mental content, etc.), but rather in the form of life
in which rule-following conduct, that is regular and intelligible behaviour, takes
place37. Missing the critical sense in which Wittgenstein spoke of rules is part of
the ‘mastery as knowledge of criteria’ picture.
Going back to Hertzberg, I read him as taking issue with a too static charac-
terisation of human sociality implied by the focus on concepts and their criteria of
application. The social processes of correction and training are considered to form
32Wittgenstein 1958: §3.
33Wittgenstein 1958: §53-4.
34One may be inclined, perhaps justifiably, to distinguish more carefully between mental
states, mental processes and dispositions and then map beliefs, knowledge, intention, moods,
conceptual scheme, world-view, ideology and the like under appropriate headings. For the
present purposes, however, all of these are understood as ontological features of our mentality
and hence are both part of the ideological picture of human action being powered by features
of human mentality. No finer distinctions need to be made for the present purposes.
35Wittgenstein 1958: §74.
36Wittgenstein 1958: §81.
37See in particular Wittgenstein 1958: §82.
123
the social subject, her conceptual capacities and mastery, as if steering subjects
towards a state of homogeneous sociality, that is, sharing of ideology. By con-
trast one could say that these social processes are effectively the very process of
sociality itself characterised by ‘negotiation’, exchanges and interactions between
heterogeneous actors. Anthony Giddens appears to be making a similar point
when he writes that “ ‘Socialisation’ should be understood as an element of the
continuity of social reproduction —of the inherent temporality of social process—
rather than as just referring to the temporality of the personality formation of
the child”38. I shall discuss Giddens’ view in more detail shortly.
I want to, however, also raise the question about the extent that human social-
ity is characterised by a shared mentality, ideology, mastery of the same criteria
and so on. As indicated above, even after shared criteria having been applied
and a given utterance, event or the like labelled as an instance of something, the
question has not been touched as to what is the significance of these happenings
and how shall we react to them. In such a perspective to social reality, of interest
is the social as a developmental and organised process.
Think here of Wittgenstein’s famous builder and his assistant at work in
a construction site one giving and the other taking orders such as “slab!” and
“pillar!”39. Is it not at least as essential in this scenario that there obtains division
of labour between the two builders as that each one knows what a ‘slab’ is, that
is, masters the same criteria? One could even extend the point and argue that
the builder and the assistant do not in fact know the same thing about slabs,
for what the builders knows about slabs is, say, how they can be joined together,
whereas the assistant has to have no idea about that but knows instead that
upon “slab!” he has to fetch one. Here, then, not the builders’ shared knowledge
(which they might not have), but that they operate in a shared organisation of
activity, emerges as the essential character of their activity.
The general picture of social life emerging here is focused on it as a form
of organisation of human action, not one focusing on whatever knowledge so-
cial actors may have of the social systems and processes which they collectively
perform, where there will be considerable individual differences. This theoreti-
cal picture corresponds with the gist of the more empirical argument of Part 1,
namely that our collective performance of environmental problems does not flow
38Giddens 1979: 128.
39Wittgenstein 1958: §2.
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from a shared world-view about nature, but rather from social action being me-
diated by its form of organisation. Part of this broader line of argument are the
critical discussions pursued in this Part 2 against the notions such as the shared
source of social action, criteria and mastery as well as the emphasis on individual
differences in perspective to and knowledge of the social. In the next section I
continue this project with a critical discussions of existing social theory, namely,
Anthony Giddens’ complex and intriguing views on social life.
Giddens on Social and System Integration
Let us begin with Giddens expressing what we could read as an epistemological
worry about shared ideologies as the basis of social action. He argues that “[w]e
have to recognise that what an actor knows as a competent —but historically
and spatially located— member of society, ‘shades off’ in contexts that stretch
beyond those of his or her day-to-day activity”40. The implication that interests
us in this is that if actors are in such a way situated in their knowledge of social
reality, it would seem to follow that the social cannot be conceptualised in terms
of an ideology shared by the actors. In this section I shall argue, however, that in
Giddens’ system this implication is not followed through and that instead, upon a
closer analysis, a fairly classic view of the social as based on what he calls mutual
knowledge can be seen to underlie also Giddens’ approach.
Consider here Giddens’ distinction between social integration and system in-
tegration41. In Giddens, the pair draws attention to a difference in kind of inte-
gration that spatial distance between actors generates. Thus, social integration
refers to integration with those face-to-face or otherwise in contact, whereas sys-
tem integration refers to ties with spatially distant actors who nevertheless can
be said to link with me in terms of the system within which we both operate42.
In other words, social integration is integration or lack of it between social ac-
tors whereas system integration denotes that between parts of social systems,
structures and institutions43.
Interestingly however, as we shall see, Giddens does not appear to match
this difference in kinds of spatial locations of integration with a corresponding
40Giddens 1979: 73.
41This pair of notions has a prominent history and uses in social theory. See Lockwood 1964,




difference in knowledge that one has of or that powers social integration on the
one hand and system integration on the other, although arguably such a duality
would be called for. Giddens does distinguish between kinds of knowledge —that
is between practical / discursive knowledge discussed in more detail below— but
this distinction does not map against the two senses of integration. I shall return
to this important point soon.
We should try to see the distinction between the two kinds of integration in
the context of Giddens’ wider system of thought about social reality. It is an im-
pressive system that draws from various disciplines from semiotics to philosophy.
In his classic theoretical works, the New Rules and the Central Problems44 the
critique of others is perceptive but Giddens’ own ideas, often expressed in bor-
rowed terminology45, and at times in almost impenetrable prose, are sometimes
harder to get to.
The central idea of Giddens’ system is that of the duality of structure, the view
that social life can and should be seen at once as a structured system imposing
limits on human conduct as well as continuously reproduced by free agents. This
is expressed by Giddens in the phrase that there is a duality, rather than dualism,
of structure46. The continual process of unfolding of this duality in the flow of
human activity is called the process of structuration47.
Giddens develops this key theme of duality of structure by way of a num-
ber of related dualities. These include the pairs analysis of strategic conduct /
institutional analysis and the aforementioned social integration / system integra-
tion. The former pair denotes a distinction that is “methodological rather than
substantive” in nature, Giddens says48, and it concerns the manner in which the
social analyst views action, whether from the actors’ or the institutions’ point of
view. In other words, the difference is in whether the materials drawn upon in
action are viewed as properties of the actors (say, their knowledge and capacity
to reason) or as features of practices and institutions. Giddens’ terminology here
is ‘bracketing’ and ‘placing an epoché on’ one point of view or another.
It is evidently important for Giddens that we should not over-intellectualise
44Giddens 1976, 1979.
45The prominent American sociologist Lewis A. Coser wrote that “[I]n listening to so many
voices, the reader fails to hear clearly Giddens’s own” (The American Journal of Sociology,
86(6), 1981).
46Giddens 1979: 5.
47Giddens 1979: 69 ff.
48Giddens 1979: 80.
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our collective performance of the duality of structure. Thus, Giddens makes the
aforementioned distinction between practical and discursive consciousness, the
former being “knowledge embodied in what actors ‘know how to do’ ”, while the
latter concerns “what actors are able to ‘talk about’ and in what manner or guise
they are able to talk about it”49, as Giddens characterises the distinction. This
would seem to allow for rather loose attributions of knowledge such as potentially
inarticulable practical know-how and some manner of discursive knowledge. Im-
portantly for the present purposes, Giddens’ distinction does not allocate different
types of knowledge to the different modes of integration, as noted above.
There is also the idea of unintended consequences of action that further de-
intellectualises Giddens’ picture. These are “of central importance to social the-
ory”50, Giddens argues, and they draw from the observation that my actions may
contribute to the collective performance of the practice even if the contribution is
in no way present in my intentions, Giddens’ example being how my speaking of
English contributes to the continuity of the language51. This allows for the view
that an actor may contribute to a larger system of social action without having
the appropriate intention or indeed knowledge of the system. This fits with the
earlier quoted observation from Giddens that “[w]e have to recognise that what
an actor knows as a competent —but historically and spatially located— mem-
ber of society, ‘shades off’ in contexts that stretch beyond those of his or her
day-to-day activity”52.
Giddens also argues that the performance of the duality of structure is a
continuous, spatially and temporally located flow of conduct which is however
not to be thought of as “a series of discrete acts combined together”53. Rather,
acts are “constituted” in “a reflexive moment of attention” that “breaks into the
flow of action” and conceptualises the flow as broken up into acts. In an earlier
work, Giddens wrote that he distinguishes action or agency used “generically
to refer to the lived-through process of everyday conduct” from acts which are
‘elements or segments’ in the former54 adding that the “categorization” of action








attention”55. In my view the plausibility of these claims resides in the observation
that in general reflexivity is not part of the flow of human action, but rather as
it were a special moment in which attention turns away from one’s engagement
in flow of conduct to analysis of the conduct. For instance, social theory itself is
the activity of systematic and reflexive analysis of the flow of conduct. Giddens
appears to agree as he says of actors’ accounts of intentions and reasons that
they “only form discrete accounts in the context of queries, whether initiated by
others, or as elements of a process of self-examination by the actor”56.
There is for Giddens, however, also reflexive monitoring of conduct and char-
acterised by him, not as reflexive stepping-back from the flow of conduct, but
as taking place very much in the flow as “monitoring the setting of interaction,
and not just the behaviour of the particular actors taken separately”, as he puts
it. Relevant here is also what Giddens calls the rationalisation of action, that is
“the capabilities of human agents to ‘explain’ why they act as they do”. This
takes place “in the course of practical queries, in the context of daily social life”
somehow incorporating —or being ‘caught up in’ or ‘expressive of’— practical
consciousness as well as unconscious motivations and norms.57
Giddens’ idea of duality is obviously intended as a kind of grand synthesis of
points of view into social reality and perhaps this is fine as the study of the flow
of human life can well be seen as characterised by constant switching between
the different sides of Giddens’ duality as well as the frame with which the analyst
looks at the flow. One feels, however, that at some point one must as it were pick
a side58.
Giddens’ view of the relationship of norms, meaning and power is also shot
through with the idea of duality. Giddens argues that norms both constitute and
sanction meanings. That is, social practices both constitute meaningful or intel-
ligible actions and sanction conduct. He adds that “[a]lthough is it important to
separate them out conceptually, these two senses of right and wrong —intelligible




58One reviewer argued that Giddens “offers no new system but rather a diagnostic criticism”
of consensus (Howard L. Parsons, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41(1/2), 1980).
In Anthony King’s view, Giddens’ system does not manage to overcome but essentially preserves
the tension between system (determinism) and agency (freedom) (King 2005: 228 ff.).
59Giddens 1976: 82.
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Power too has a dual character “as involved institutionally in processes of inter-
action, and as used to accomplish outcomes in strategic conduct”60.
Consider now Giddens’ take on the question of our knowledge of the social.
Here Giddens states that there are “standardised elements of stocks of knowledge”
that are “applied by actors in the production of interaction” and these “form the
core of the mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is
sustained through and in processes of interaction”61. In what sounds like quite
a classical sense of knowledge (“the Descartes-Locke-Kant tradition”62), Giddens
says that mutual knowledge is stored in the mentality of actors “as memory traces
... of ‘how things are to be done’ ”63. Later he also writes that mutual knowledge
is “founded in ordinary language categories”64.
How extensively mutual or shared should we think of this knowledge? As we
saw above, Giddens himself gives a reason for viewing it as fairly local: as social
actors we are historically and spatially located in our particular activities and our
knowledge shades off in areas beyond that. Another way to approach the issue is
to ask what is the role of mutual knowledge in Giddens’ system? The answer is
not easy to give, but one way to approach the issue is again by returning to the
idea of the duality of structure.
Thus, mutual knowledge can be seen from the agency side of the duality as
knowledge stored in ‘memory traces’ and made use of, for example, in strategic
conduct by individuals65. Mutual knowledge can also be considered, says Giddens,
“[o]n the methodological level” as “a non-corrigible resource which the social
analyst necessarily depends upon, as the medium of generating ‘valid’ descriptions
of social life”66. Later he states more strongly that “[m]utual knowledge is a
necessary medium of access in the mediation of frames of meaning”67. As we
saw above, Giddens also evidently wants to preserve a more substantial role
for ‘mutual knowledge’ than a mere methodological role, but there nevertheless
remains a strong sense in which the existence of mutual knowledge is for Giddens
first and foremost a necessary methodological presupposition. One is tempted to









conclude that, while Giddens offers a range of considerations that question the
notion of mutual knowledge, he also cannot help but appeal to it, not as a mere
methodological construct, but also as a substantial reality of some sort.
The first thing we note about this is that the appeal to mutual knowledge as a
phenomenon of the agency side of the duality is where, despite a vocal rejection of
Parsons’ structural-functionalism, Giddens too can be seen to preserve the core of
the ideological approach and the paradigm from sharing: social life is reproduced
by actors in possession of mutual knowledge of the social.68
At the same time, there is also this somewhat odd double-sided dual nature
to Giddens’ mutual knowledge: it is both a set of mental traces and a method-
ological posit, whereas one feels that if mutual knowledge does exist then one
would not have to introduce it as a methodological posit. As suggested above,
to clarify things it would perhaps be of help to divide mutual knowledge in two
kinds according to Giddens’ distinction between face-to-face social integration
and system integration with spatially and temporally remote others mediated by
social systems, structures and institutions. Certainly, it would seem, our under-
standing of people is of a different kind from our understanding of social systems
and processes, although there may also be overlap. We should thus acknowledge
that there are limitations of scope to mutual knowledge on the agency side and be
thereby able to account for differences in people’s perspective and thus knowledge
and beliefs about the social.
In Giddens’ mutual knowledge, two essentially distinct frames of reference get
unnecessarily mixed up; call them local and global. From the agency side, mutual
knowledge would seem to be this localised, contextualised, situated knowledge
particular to some fairly local practices. From the structure side, however, there
is some generality to the notion of mutual knowledge and indeed it is not taken to
represent anyone’s knowledge as such but is rather a methodological posit. Thus,
mutual knowledge turns out to have two senses and accordingly two sources of
plausibility: mutual knowledge as local to a practice, and mutual knowledge as
the investigator’s global category. This means, however, that the two are not two
sides of the same Giddensian duality but distinct issues with differences in scope
and source of plausibility.
In the larger context of the argument of this thesis, the foregoing critical
discussion of Giddens illustrates the implausibility of attributing shared ideologies
68Pleasants (1999: Chapter 4) comes to the same conclusion about Giddens’ system.
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over some global scope. Such attributions, as we have seen in earlier chapters, we
find in the ideological arguments of many environmentalists and environmental
historians as well as philosophers and social theorists in the context of their
theories of social action.
Individual Differences
The foregoing discussion is a part of the present argument of highlighting indi-
vidual differences in perspective and thereby knowledge of the social as well as of
the attack uagainst the idea of there being a shared source of social action, such
as the one we find Giddens here claiming to be discovering in mutual knowledge.
The present challenge to the paradigm from sharing is also a central point of
disagreement between the present view of Wittgenstein and a number of repre-
sentatives of Wittgensteinian social theory and beyond. In the following chapters
I shall discuss the theme from different angles providing in particular details on
the form in which these ideas can be seen to appear in Wittgenstein.
I want to briefly indicate where I take individual differences in knowledge
of the social to reside. The reader may have the suspicion that the argument
from individual differences in knowledge of the social runs at its smoothest on a
macro scale and that most of the mileage made by the present approach is due to
the macro scale example we have been using, namely, our collective performance
of environmental problems mediated by our performance of the world economic
system. Such a world-system is easy to see as being best analysed by some non-
ideological approach due to the sheer number of culturally and geographically
dispersed individuals the system encompasses. My reaction here is that, on the
one hand, running the argument on such a macro scale largely suffices for the
main objective of the present study, namely that of showing that the root of the
cultural causes of environmental problems resides fundamentally in our everyday
activities mediated by the form of their organisation.
I also believe that social institutions, such as money, are organisatory rather
than ideological constructs. Arguably, this so-called social kind is in some sense
given rise to and maintained performatively by collective agreement as it were.
But it is absolutely essential to note that we do not all share knowledge and beliefs
about the various forms of money, we do not all use the same forms of it and
thus that the core of our collective performance of money is not ideological but
organisatory. In such a perspective, the various forms of money are important
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instruments of human life as we know it. The case of money brings out the
contrast between the organisatory and the ideological approaches particularly
well and I shall return to this point below (in Chapter 8) once more ground has
been set for it to be possible to fully highlight the contrast involved.
On the other hand, I do think that the same argument can be put forward on
a micro scale as well. As argued above, all forms of interpersonal knowledge, and
indeed even intra-personal knowledge, pose potential difficulties. The point is
not a sceptical one of it being impossible to know what people really think, know
or believe. This relates to Wittgenstein’s view of the idea of logically private —
that is, not even in principle understandable— language, thoughts, feelings and
the like as cancelling out as irrelevant comparable to the irrelevance of a turning
cog wheel not connected to any other wheel69. The point is rather that such
shared knowledge is not automatically culturally acquired in some wide-ranging
completeness. True, there will be in society and culture shared knowledge about,
say, various gestures and symbols as signals, although even there differences in
sensitivity, interest and knowledge are bound to exist. Perhaps there is also an
inter-culturally shared frame of reference, something that Wittgenstein called
“common behaviour of mankind”, which can serve as “the system of reference
by means of which we interpret an unknown language”70. All these, however,
should not make us disregard the obvious individual differences in knowledge of
the social.
In the case of Wittgenstein’s favourite example, chess, there may be homo-
geneity in terms of what the players know of the rules of the game, that is, how
the game is played, but it is by no means sure that individual players share
knowledge of why to do something particular in the game. The why here can
denote differences in understandings of the tactical dimension of the game —why
this move makes sense here— as well as that players may engage in the game for
different motives and reasons. To understand and contribute to social life is to
have a grasp of how’s and why’s. Here there, however, are considerable individual
differences.
A dimension of these differences is that while a given social system may be
seen to have certain properties, as for instance in the way the relative stability
of the world economy depends on continuous economic growth (see Chapter 3,
69Wittgenstein 1958: §271.
70Wittgenstein 1958: §206.
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p. 33, above), this does not yet necessarily imply anything about the mentalities
of those who perform the system. Thus, if the world economic system is charac-
terised by the drive to ever more growth this being a feature of how the system
functions, this does not necessarily describe why individuals perform the system.
One may well argue that individuals may come to internalise the mores of the
system thereby effectively adopting the ideology of the system, as for example an
individual worker may presumably come to adopt the ideology of the maximum
efficiency and rationalisation as the goal of her activities at work. She may in-
ternalise that goal even to the extent that she feels a sense of fulfilment due to a
good performance at work, thus as it were identifying her own satisfaction with
that of the organisation she works for.
Is this, however, a typical reaction or necessary for participation in the social
institution in question? Furthermore, that an individual may internalise the
mores of the organisation could be described as a point about her personal identity
building, and not, say, about her relationship to whatever the social institution
relates to, say, nature. In identity building of this kind one does not have a
relationship to nature, but rather to the organisation by way of it affording one
a medium of identity building. In this case the human relationship to nature
could perhaps be said to be indirect and mediated by the societal frame in which
individuals act, but this should not obscure the fact that in our example the main
relatees are the individual and the social organisation.
I hope enough has now been said to cast doubts on the ideological approach
and the paradigm from sharing as uncovering the essence of human sociality.
Articulating an alternative Wittgensteinian organisatory picture in more detail
is the task of the following.
Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed a number of problems with the ideological approach
and the accompanying paradigm from sharing and the idea of the essentiality of
the mind to explanations of human action. I reviewed Stephen Turner’s work
who to my knowledge is virtually the only one to have identified and criticised
something like that which I have termed the paradigm from sharing, although we
saw that Turner’s positive contribution cannot take us towards a sufficiently radi-
cal alternative precisely because it too retains the traditional focus on the mental
source of social action. I also reviewed arguments from Max Weber and others
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with the intention of reminding us of difficulties with attributions of knowledge,
motivation and the like.
The intention in this chapter has been to cast doubt on the very natural
ideological picture of human action and its source paving thereby the way for an
organisatory approach. The point has not been to suggest a whole-sale rejection
of any reference to motivations or knowledge and beliefs in explanations of human
action, but to argue that we need to take better account of individual differences
in our knowledge of the social and that we need to examine the effect of this on
our explanations of social action. In the next chapter we shall take up the task of




Agreement in Form of Life
In view of all this, it is not surprising that the working-class
has gradually become a race wholly apart from the English
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie has more in common with every
other nation of the earth than with the workers in whose
midst it lives. The workers speak other dialects, have other
thoughts and ideals, other customs and moral principles, a
different religion and other politics than those of the
bourgeoisie. Thus they are two radically dissimilar nations, as
unlike as difference of race could make them, of whom we on
the Continent have known but one, the bourgeoisie. Yet it is
precisely the other, the people, the proletariat, which is by far
the more important for the future of England.
— Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in
England in 1844
Having in the previous chapter reviewed a set of philosophical problems with the
ideological approach, I shall now turn to articulating the philosophical bearings
of the organisatory alternative in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
I shall approach the discussion by contrasting the Wittgensteinian view with
that of the philosopher John Searle on the construction of social reality. Searle’s
is an explicitly ontological approach focusing on the shared mental source of social
action and as such it exemplifies well the ideological approach to social life. It
casts social life as drawing from shared ideology and I will show that it encounters
certain problems as a result of this. Searle is aware of them, although I shall argue
that his attempts to address them is ultimately unsuccessful.
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Searle on the Construction of Social Reality
Searle is an established, well respected, and one could say a classic name in
modern Anglo-American philosophy and his approach to the question from the
nature of social reality bears the characteristic marks of his trade: the question
is approached with a heavy focus on issues in the philosophy of mind. Not
surprisingly then, Searle’s account proceeds by way of discussing a set of forms
of human intentionality that in his view underlie social institutions.1. I shall first
introduce Searle’s position and then compare it with my reading of Wittgenstein.
To begin with, Searle frames his project as fundamentally ontological —
“about how social facts exist”—, the key task of which is the description of the
ontology of social reality in a way that does not make use of peculiar ontological
entities: “we need to figure out how social reality fits into our overall ontology”,
Searle writes. A crucial link shall turn out to be certain forms of human inten-
tionality which in Searle’s view have their basis in human consciousness which in
turn is ontologically just a feature of certain complex organisms.2
One of the central forms of human intentionality is what Searle calls ‘status
function’, this is the human capacity to attribute statuses to people and things.
‘S is a father’ expresses such an attribution of status. What makes the status
function special is that the status attributed to someone does not denote an
intrinsic property of the person or thing in question; it is not something in “its
physical structure”, as Searle puts it3. Rather, the status function expresses the
“assignment or acceptance”4 that the person or thing is allowed to perform a
certain function or that a material object has a certain function, for instance,
that money functions as a vehicle of exchange and repository of value.
Searle also speaks of the assignment of a function, a form of status function,
which denotes the human capacity to conceive of things as tools. A wooden
stick is not intrinsically much at all, but used by us, say, as a walking cane it
gains a distinct function. Due to the human intentional capacity to endow things
with functions, material objects (sticks of wood, disks of metal as well as human
beings) are also social objects (walking canes, coins, fathers and mothers) with
1I draw from Searle 1996 and 2005. The most recent version of Searle’s views can be found
in Searle 2010.
2Searle 1996: 5-7. This ontological concern is a common tenet often foundational to con-





associated roles given by our assignment of statuses and functions.
On Searle’s analysis, then, social institutions are characterised by the collec-
tive acceptance and adherence to particular statuses and functions and that these
thereby gain the status of rules. Searle uses the term ‘constitutive rules’ to refer
to rules in accordance with which we collectively perform certain actions that in
themselves constitute the institution. Thus, Searle says that institutions
typically require structures in the form of constitutive rules X counts
as Y in C and that institutional facts only exist in virtue of collective
acceptance of something having a certain status, where that status
carries functions that cannot be performed without the collective ac-
ceptance of the status. This I am claiming is the glue that holds
society together.5
Thus, despite the emphasis on individual cognitive abilities as the ultimate
ontological foundation of human sociality, Searle’s approach contains fundamental
social elements too, for one, the appeal to the collective acceptance of statuses as
holding society together.
There is also another sense in which Searle’s approach is social. He argues that
among the forms of human intentionality there is one referred to as ‘we intention-
ality’ or collective intentionality6. This means that individual human beings are
capable of thinking that a collective, say a football team, is collectively engaged
in something examples of which could be formulated as ‘we are attacking’, ‘we are
trying to score a goal’ and so forth. Searle holds that collectively intentionality
does not reduce to a collection of individual intentions expressed in ‘I intend to
score and everyone individually in our team intends to score’ or some such ar-
ray of individual intentions. Rather, Searle argues, collective intentionality is an
independent, irreducible form of intentionality just as ‘I intend to ...’ is. Searle
is not particularly clear on this, but for him all “social facts” appear to be of
the we-type7, although he does allow that the we-type also somehow contains
intentions of the I-type as for instance while playing a game of American football
I may intend to block (I-type) although this happens as a part of our team inten-
tion to engage in passing play (we-type), to give an example that Searle uses8.
Some have indeed found Searle’s account of collective intentionality ambiguous9.
5Searle 2005: 9-10.
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Finally, Searle also introduces the notion of Background “of capacities, abil-
ities, tendencies, and dispositions”10 to denote acquired or innate, biological,
non-representational, pre-intentional, automated, instinct or reflex-like skills car-
rying forward, but also enabling in the first place, human activities within social
institutions. The Background also includes knowledge about the world in terms
of what is physically possible or typical in it —including knowledge that swallow-
ing a key and opening a door with it by moving one’s guts in particular ways is
hard if not impossible, as Searle amusingly puts it, reflecting his relaxed style of
writing11. These skills are not expressions of the human intentional capacity but
in a particular way make the exercise of intentional capacities possible12. Else-
where, Searle characterises the Background as “a set of presuppositions for the
application of intentionality, including a set of abilities”13.
The function of the Background in Searle’s theory is thus that it completes the
picture of the human performance of social institutions by filling in the apparent
gaps for example in knowledge about typical physical possibilities in the world
left open by status functions and human intentionality in general. Perhaps we
can say that the notion of Background is a response to the feeling that, as human
action is very complex, the only way to explain it is to assume that “we have
to take a great deal for granted” when we act in such complex ways, as Searle
writes.14
Searle argues that “much of Wittgenstein’s later work is about what I call
the Background”15 but we have reasons to doubt this. Unlike Searle’s project,
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy cannot be described as containing attempts to
analyse the in part hidden or unconscious “semantic contents” and “intentional
contents generally”, as Searle describes his objects of interest16. For Wittgenstein
a formal semantic theory would probably essentially seem like an attempt by
“the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like”, as
Wittgenstein put it17. A deeper point of disagreement is that, in contrast to











not ontological at all in the sense introduced in Chapters 5 and 6, namely, one that
would focus on finding the basis of human sociality in human mental ontology of
(shared) intentions, beliefs, motivations and world-views, ideologies, mentalities
or the like. In what follows I shall defend and discuss various facets of this claim.
The Conjuring Trick
For the present purposes the crucial aspect of Searle’s account is its heavy focus on
the role of human mentality in the constitution of social reality. To use a notion
of Wittgenstein’s, Searle’s analysis very much focuses on finding the source of
human and social action, and as we have seen, in Searle’s analysis the source
appears as a shared mental object of some kind. In the present view this places
Searle in the camp of the proponents of the paradigm from sharing, and the
ideological approach more generally (as described in Chapter 5 above). In this
and the following section I shall discuss two charges against Searle’s account:
one challenging the internal coherence of Searle’s account of the existence and
functioning of shared knowledge of the social, and another more fundamental one
claiming that accounts of the source appear to miss the plane upon which social
interaction takes place. I begin with the latter issue.
Consider the well-known case from the Investigations of the pupil being taught
to complete a series of numbers. In the example, the pupil is meant to write
down a series of natural numbers and Wittgenstein discusses the teaching and
learning process to illustrate the nature of understanding. The teacher may
guide the pupil in various ways to reproducing the appropriate numbers “but
the possibility of getting him to understand will depend on his going on to write
it down independently”, Wittgenstein adds18. That is to say, the criterion that
the pupil has really understood what he is supposed to do is that he eventually
reproduces the series independently by himself. The pupil may have something
describable as the ‘inner sensation’ of a flash of having understood19 and we may
indeed assume all sorts of mental goings-on taking place in the pupil’s mind,
but on Wittgenstein’s view on the plane of human interaction the check of his
ability is his concrete performance supervised by the teacher. This is to say,
when we observe the learning situation such are typical moves taking place in
18Wittgenstein 1958: §143.
19In the Investigations, Wittgenstein spends some time discussing the significance of flashes
of understanding (see e.g. Wittgenstein 1958: §138. ff.).
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such situations.
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on displaying competence would seem to stand in
some contrast to the intuitive and deep-rooted picture —acknowledged but not
adopted by Wittgenstein— that to theorise about human actions we must go to
its alleged source, namely the mental structures in the mind or brain. A picture
like this typical of an ideological approach, can be seen to inform Searle’s views
too. In the context of the completing series of numbers example, Wittgenstein
has his interlocutor summarise the essentials of this picture saying that
to have got the system (or, again, to understand it) can’t consist in
continuing the series up to this or that number: that is only applying
one’s understanding. The understanding itself is a state which is the
source of the correct use.20
To this Wittgenstein retorts with the above quoted “application is still a criterion
of understanding”. The point, as I read it, is to view the teaching situation as a
process of exchange between the teacher and the pupil and noting that it is the
development of that process that is important to the persons involved. In such
a point of view, a central aspect of the proceedings will be the teacher judging
the effects of the teaching by the pupil’s applications of what has been learned.
In such a point of view, understanding and knowledge figure as “modes”21 of or
“moves”22 in the process of interaction, to use words that Wittgenstein employed
in similar discussions in other contexts.
To understand the power of Wittgenstein’s point we must first rid ourselves
of the intuition that what is fundamentally at stake in human interaction, say in
interpersonal understanding, is knowledge or assumptions about other peoples’
mental states. For example, imagine someone informs me about some matter.
Here I may indeed doubt that person’s honesty. I am not, however, trying to
judge or guess the state of mind of the other, whatever that could in fact mean.
Rather, as Wittgenstein put it, “the main thing he guesses at is a context”23, or
that I am interested in “the circumstances —that is, on what happened before
and after”24 the suspect statement made by the other person. In other words, the
significance of a statement is not its ontological character but such things as have
20Wittgenstein 1958: §146.
21Wittgenstein 1958: Part II : i (p. 174)




to do with the developmental process of interaction, say, the statement turning
out to be a lie and the effect of lying upon my relationship to the liar. At the
same time, there is no one answer as to what the significance of a lie is, for there
will be differences in how individuals react to having been lied to. Something
similar goes for the teaching scenario: the teacher is not trying to guess when the
decisive mental occurrence has taken place in the pupil’s head, but the teacher is
focused on the teaching process and the signals the pupil gives.
In the following powerful passage of the Investigations a similar point is made
with the example of expecting and hoping that contrasts hoping conceived as a
mental going-on and hoping as seen in certain surroundings:
§583. “But you talk as if I weren’t really expecting, hoping, now
—as I thought I was. As if what were happening now had no deep
significance.” —What does it mean to say ‘What is happening now
has significance’ or ‘has deep significance’? What is a deep feeling?
Could someone have a feeling of ardent love or hope for the space
of one second —no matter what preceded or followed this second?—
What is happening now has significance —in these surroundings. The
surroundings give it its importance. And the word ‘hope’ refers to a
phenomenon of human life.
Note that Wittgenstein is not here giving an answer as to the significance of
hoping. He recognises that it can amount to a lot of things because people have
differing sensitivities —a nose for— to these things. What is essential, however,
is that hoping is a phenomenon of great human significance and that hopes, fears,
expectations and ambitions have to do with how the course of human existence
develops for someone. Due to this developmental aspect, Wittgenstein denies
that love can be felt for a second only.
It is the adoption of a developmental perspective, as it could be called, to
human interaction that in my view is one of the later Wittgenstein’s most valuable
and exiting contributions. It is also this aspect that in the present view paves
way for an organisatory, rather than an ideological, approach to social action and
thereby to our collective performance of global industrial market society and its
environmental problems. In essence, to view social life as a set of (recurring)
developmental processes allows us to focus upon them as organised activities
engaged in by differently placed actors and hence also that they do not flow from
a shared mentality. Part 1 showed that we need a social theory of this kind
to understand the cultural causes of environmental problems. I shall flesh out
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these claims more fully later in this chapter as we have explored some more of
Wittgenstein’s ideas.
I note in passing that despite the emphasis on display of competence Wittgen-
stein is not to be thought of as a behaviourist. It is hard to state concisely why
Wittgenstein was not a behaviourist, among others because behaviourism comes
in a number of flavours and goes together with a quite specific intellectual his-
torical baggage of associations —I have in mind, for instance, the behaviourists’
claim that behaviourism represents the first “scientific analysis of behavior”25.
Among different flavours of behaviourism, for example the logical behaviourist
“claims that propositions about the mental are semantically equivalent to propo-
sitions about behavioural dispositions”26. Wittgenstein has been characterised
as an “analytical behaviourist” who claims that “[w]hen we attribute a belief, for
example, to someone, we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal
state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he
or she might do in particular situations or environmental interactions”27. What
one can concisely say is that Wittgenstein did not argue that all talk of men-
tal states should be replaced by talk of behaviour or that statements containing
references to putatively mental phenomena really only refer to behaviour. In a
phrase, Wittgenstein did not affirm or deny mental ontology. In my reading, he
thought that human activities should be described as systems of interaction, and
one should therefore describe the system, not the mentalities of the participants,
whatever they may be in particular cases. Wittgenstein advocates thus, not an
affirmation or denial of human mental goings-on, but a particular perspective to
social life.28
Central is to note the non-ontological character of Wittgenstein’s approach.
In a passage, rare in its frankness for Wittgenstein’s style, he states his position
in quite straightforward terms:
Try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all. —For
that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what
sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, ‘Now I know
how to go on’.”29
In the perspective that Wittgenstein recommends, understanding is thus not a
25Skinner 1971: 20.
26Glock 1996: entry for ‘behaviour and behaviourism’.
27Graham 2008.
28See Pleasants 1999: 76 ff. for a similar view of Wittgenstein and behaviourism.
29Wittgenstein 1958: §154.
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mental process, but it is looked at as a wider phenomenon consisting of the
circumstances (social processes, surroundings, language-game, form of life) in
which we talk about having or having not understood, try to get the other to
understand and so on. It is the fact that such social processes take place, and not
that some mental processes take place, that in Wittgenstein’s view is humanly
significant about ‘understanding’.
Wittgensteinian methodology for describing the nature of human sociality
would then move the focus away from the underlying individual intellectual or
intentional capacities, representations and whatnot —without, however, denying
mental goings-on either!—, whereas Searle for instance does just that, namely,
focuses on the various forms of human intentionality as the source of human
action. The following passage in the Investigations is as if in direct dialogue with
Searle:
How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states
and about behaviourism arise? —The first step is the one that alto-
gether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their
nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them
—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of
looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means
to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the con-
juring trick [Taschenspielerkunststück] has been made, and it was the
very one that we thought quite innocent.)30
Searle, by contrast, writes:
It is important to see that when we talk about the Background we
are talking about a certain category of neurophysiological causation.
Because we do not know how these structures function at a neuro-
physiological level, we are forced to describe them at a much higher
level. There is nothing disreputable about that. When I say, for ex-
ample, that I am able to speak English, I am talking about a causal
capacity of my brain.31
Searle makes here what Wittgenstein above called the ‘conjuring trick of defin-
ing what it is to know a process better’ when he says that, although we do not
know what the brain processes of speaking English are, still to talk about speak-
ing English is to talk about someone’s exercise of a ‘causal capacity of the brain’.
To this intuition Wittgenstein would probably comment:
30Wittgenstein 1958: §308.
31Searle 1996: 129.
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When philosophers use a word —“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”,
“proposition”, “name”— and try to grasp the essence of the thing,
one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this
way in the language-game which is its original home?32
In my reading, Wittgenstein’s objection here can be put thus: Searle’s char-
acterisation of ‘speaking English’ completely misses the social aspect, the use-
aspect, of why it is sometimes important for someone to convey to the other
person that she is able to speak English, which is arguably the more important
aspect than the neurophysical when we are trying to understand what goes on in
the social reality. Certainly, in any real situation where the phrase ‘I’m able to
speak English’ is used, it is rarely used to remind the other of, or somehow else
to make reference to, such a capacity of the brain. This certainly is not the only
use and for sure not a fundamental use that underlies other uses. For if this were
so, then the person ignorant of the neurophysiology of the brain or of the idea of
the mind or brain the seat of human intellectual capacities would misunderstand
remarks such as ‘I’m able to speak English’.
A similar statement to Searle’s was made by the prominent Wittgenstein
commentator Saul Kripke who wrote that “[c]oming to understand, or learning,
seem to me to be a ‘mental process’ if anything is” and so for example “ ‘It’s
all in your mind’ means that no genuine physical pain is present”, he argues33.
Again, while it probably seems that Kripke is here articulating a platitude that
no one could possibly deny, yet, to treat understanding or imagining a pain as
essentially a mental processes completely misses the social processes of human
interaction within which we come to understand, point out that the pains are
not real and so on. That is, it is exactly their role in the developmental course
of human interaction that is humanly significant about these things! A parallel
mistake is to treat, say, the crossing of the finishing line by the winning biker
in the Tour de France as essentially a complex physical occurrence in certain
space-time co-ordinates. This is certainly not what is humanly interesting about
the crossing and the same goes with understanding and pain.
I believe there is a close link here between the present critique of the social
theoretical and philosophical emphasis on the mental source of human and social




subject ideology’34. The phrase ‘cerebral subject’ denotes the idea of the essen-
tiality of the brain to the constitution of a human person, her identity and her
capacity to act. And thus Vidal and his colleagues have written critically of such
views that the essence of what they see as essentially social categories of be-
haviour (emotions, for instance35) is reduced to their neural basis. In such cases,
I believe a similar forgetting of the role in the developmental course of human
interaction of what are cast as mental processes occurs often in social theory and
philosophy of social sciences when social institutions are reduced to their social
ontology.
One caveat, however, must be noted. The cerebral subject ideology is often
thought to draw from a fundamentally naturalistic background holding something
along the lines that “human beings posses a fixed nature or that their actions can
be legitimately explained only in mechanistic terms, as a mere result of law-like,
causal, regularities”36. I argue, however, that often even on the face of it antinat-
uralistic positions, such as collectivism, preserve the ideology in the continuing
emphasis on the essentiality of the mental source of human and social action.
That some forms of collectivism should be seen as adherents to the cerebral sub-
ject ideology is to me justified by two observations. First, as I argued above in
Chapter 5, collectivism too can be seen to draw from the emphasis laid in early
modern philosophy on human cognition —in Vidal’s view, the cerebral subject is
an “anthropological figure inherent to modernity”37 the formative historical roots
of which he locates in the Cartesian-Lockean picture of human selfhood with con-
sciousness as its only necessary property. Second, claims like Searle’s do not so
much base their plausibility on empirical findings —consider here for example
what Searle says on the Background— but upon them having, in Wittgenstein’s
words, “a form of account which is very convincing to us”38. That is, they build
upon the intuitive picture that what is essential about human and social action is
its mental source. Similarly, as Vidal puts it, “[t]he idea that ‘we are our brains’
” underlying the cerebral subject ideology “is not a corollary of neuroscientific




38Wittgenstein 1958: §158. The same can I think be seen to go for a whole host of other
ontological views expressed in collectivist positions such as Giddens’ unconscious and mutual
knowledge (see Chapter 6 above), David Bloor’s alignment of sources or indeed Barnes’s boot-
strapping model of human cognition and Theodore Schatzki’s unformulable knowledge (see
Chapters 8 and 9 below, respectively).
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advances, but a prerequisite of neuroscientific investigation”39. I shall return to
the issue of the conjuring trick again on a number of occasions below.
Where There is No Body There Is Spirit
Let us now turn to the second problem for Searle, this one a problem in the
internal cohesion of his social ontology.
Something similar to what I have described as Wittgenstein’s non-ontological
approach is explicitly rejected by Searle when he argues that the social reality
cannot be sufficiently described “from the external behaviorist point of view,
because the description of the overt behaviour of people dealing with money,
property, etc., misses the underlying structures that make the behaviour possi-
ble”40. Moreover, Searle seems to dismiss such an approach as an easy task that
does not get to the core of human sociality. Everyone knows that “[c]ars are for
driving; dollars for earning, spending, and saving; bathtubs for taking a bath”41,
but Searle suggests that the real intellectual challenge begins, and Searle’s ana-
lytical task begins, when we attempt to get beyond the functional understanding
of the role of things in our lives: “we are left with a harder intellectual task
of identifying things in terms of their intrinsic features without reference to our
interests, purposes and goals”, Searle says42. In a way, then, Searle is engaged in
exactly the opposite project from Wittgenstein’s.
In Searle’s view, to understand human sociality we must dig into the structures
of social ontology significant parts of which he has traced to reside in people’s
minds as unconscious dispositions and the like (the Background). On the other
hand, in a dramatic turn of plot, Searle appears to set his ontological approach
a challenge by writing that we cannot “describe those [mental] structures as sets
of unconscious computational rules, ... because it is incoherent to postulate an
unconscious following of rules that is inaccessible in principle to consciousness”43.
His problem, as he sets it, is that he wants “a causal explanation that will ex-
plain the intricacy, the complexity, and the sensitivity of our behavior as well
as [its] spontaneity, creativity, and originality”44 that at the same time does not
39Vidal 2009: 7.
40Searle 1996: 5. Note however that Wittgenstein was not a behaviourist for reasons indicated






“postulate an unconscious following of rules that is inaccessible in principle to
consciousness”. In other words, Searle wants to account for the immense com-
plexity of social reality by appeal to our knowledge of it —significant parts of
which must be unconscious, it seems— without appealing to a problematic, in
principle inaccessible, form of unconscious knowledge.
Searle attempts to meet this challenge by way of the idea that our knowledge
of the social
can be causally sensitive to the specific forms of the constitutive rules
of the institution without actually containing any beliefs or desires or
representations of those rules.45
The same idea is repeated shortly after:
[the social actor] doesn’t need to know the rules of the institution
and to follow them in order to conform to the rules; rather, he is
just disposed to behave in a certain way, but he has acquired those
unconscious dispositions and capacities in a way that is sensitive to
the rule structure of the institution.46
In other words, the picture proposed here by Searle seems to be that social
life is organised by rules but that the mental contents of the minds of individuals,
which power our actions in social reality, need not necessarily be of those rules
but merely something functionally equivalent to those rules. On the face of it,
this seems intuitive: I need not know the laws of football exactly as they are
written in the book but only in ways that make my actions sensitive to those
rules47.
Now, whatever the intuitive merits of Searle’s account, it yields a contradic-
tion within the ontology of his system. The dilemma is that these unconscious
dispositions and the like are said not to be the rule structures themselves, but
merely sensitive to the rule structures, which is confusing as the rules should,
according to Searle, at the same time consist of shared intentional structures (see
p. 137 above). So it seems that in Searle’s ontology the rule structures both are
and are not shared intentional structures which is a contradiction. Remember,
Searle declared at the start that his aim was to lay bare the ontology of social re-
ality without appeals to any curious ontological creatures, yet by divorcing rules
45Searle 1996: 141.
46Searle 1996: 144.
47This example is adopted from Gunter Gebauer’s discussion of Searle (Gebauer 2009: 152).
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from intentions in individual minds he has set rules ontologically free again. The
football laws have become ontological free-floaters to which individual players’
intentions are causally sensitive.
Also, as far as I can see, Searle has not given an account of unconscious rule-
following either. To the contrary, he remains committed to holding both that
unconscious rule-following is incoherent and that one may follow rules without
having “any beliefs or desires or representations of those rules”.
Searle thus fails to meet the challenge he set himself and it is instructive to
consider why. In the most immediate sense, he is not able to give a plausible
account of how individuals are supposed to hold all this extensive and shared
knowledge about social statuses and functions without a recourse to the idea
of the knowledge being unconscious, an idea which Searle himself recognises as
questionable. He resorts to a fix from dispositions coupled with the idea of their
causal sensitivity to rule structures which, however, conflicts with the ontology of
collective acceptance he has posited earlier as the glue holding society together.
In my view, however, there is a deeper underlying problem here having to do
with the conjuring trick of defining the ontological as the proper object of inves-
tigation. Informing Searle’s approach is the implicit assumption that phenomena
designated by terms such as rules, knowledge, and beliefs must reduce to some-
thing ontological, in particular, to the shared mental source of social action —and
hence the feeling of the necessity of offering a theory of social ontology. This is
an aspect of the above explored picture of human and social action as springing
from a mental source and the collectivist view of the human being as a social
being in possession of culturally mediated conceptions that drive our activities.
The mental source is conceived of as our knowledge of the social, our concepts
and motivations, and where the attribution of explicit knowledge seems problem-
atic we attribute it to the unconscious, sometimes also habitual, character of this
knowledge. In Wittgenstein’s metaphoric words, “[w]here our language suggests a
body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit”48 which allows us
to preserve the paradigm that human and social action is “everywhere bounded
by rules”49. That is, where we think beliefs must guide our activities, but we
cannot quite plausibly attribute certain beliefs and knowledge to ourselves, we




we preserve the paradigm by satisfying ourselves that here too our activities are
guided by beliefs, albeit unconscious ones.
Such ideas, however, as we have seen with Searle, lead to problems in the
internal cohesion of his social ontology. Hence, I conclude that we abandon the
ideological approach to the shared mental source of human action and try some-
thing else. Here we come, then, to Wittgenstein’s approach in which, as I read
him, social life is viewed as a set of (often recurring) developmental processes in
which knowledge and beliefs figure as modes or moves within the developmental
course of human interaction. As I shall attempt to illustrate below, looking at
human sociality as a set of developing processes turns attention to the organi-
sation of human interaction. In the analogy I develop between Wittgenstein’s
philosophical ideas and certain social theoretical issues, the points made can be
articulated in terms of the notions of division of labour, individual differences in
perspective and therefore in knowledge of the social. In the remaining sections
of this chapter I take up a more detailed characterisation of these ideas.
Source and Surroundings
I begin with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s source-surroundings distinction. The
distinction is implicit in the foregoing discussion and it is central to Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy reflecting the aforementioned non-ontological character of his
approach.
Consider this passage in the Investigations :
If one says that knowing the ABC is a state of the mind, one is think-
ing of a state of a mental apparatus (perhaps of the brain) by means
of which we explain the manifestations of that knowledge. ... [but]
there ought to be two different criteria for such a state: a knowledge
of the construction of the apparatus, quite apart from what it does.50
Wittgenstein indicates here that ‘knowledge of the ABC’ can well be thought of
as a mental phenomenon, the state of mind that is knowing the ABC — or how-
ever exactly the ontology of knowing should indeed be best described, whether
as a state, disposition or something else. However, Wittgenstein adds, knowing
the ABC can also be described in terms of what this knowledge of the ABC does,
what it is, as it were, good for. The latter is a matter of seeing in what ways the
knowledge of the ABC can be significant in the flow of human life. As I argued
50Wittgenstein 1958: §149.
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above with reference to Wittgenstein’s example of a pupil completing a series
of numbers (p. 139), in my reading Wittgenstein’s approach is fundamentally
characterised by this latter point. I believe that the reading of Wittgenstein con-
structed around this point, and in particular how this underlies the contrast with
the family of the so-called ideological approaches, constitutes a novel approach
to his later philosophy.
Again, in Chapter 5 above, I argued that Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning
does not so much focus on the meaning of expressions as the surroundings of the
use of expressions. In this vein, for instance Wittgenstein’s view of the meaning
of ‘pain’ focuses on human interaction as it were around pains and pain-language
focusing in this way on the significance of pains in human life, I argued. The
turn side of this is that Wittgenstein rejected the view of pain as an essentially
physiological (neural) or phenomenal (as experienced by the subject) thing. In
the Investigations, the same treatment is given to a number of phenomena such
as reading51, intending52, knowing and understanding53. By analogy from these
cases, I argue that human and social action too is not to be analysed in terms
of its (shared, tacit, unconscious) mental source but it is to be looked at as an
organised system, or a set of systems, of human interaction.
Wittgenstein did not deny that human beings have mental goings-on when we
understand, mean, read, or calculate —he appears to be in a certain sense agnostic
about the mental54. His point is rather that the ordinary usage of such terms as
‘pain’, ‘to read’ and ‘to intend’ is not correctly elucidated when they are seen as
making reference to the mental source of activity or capacity designated by these
terms. Rather, we must see these uses in a wider picture of human life within
which we take interest in such things as pains and the ability to read. Strikingly
contrasting claims from John Searle and Saul Kripke were quoted earlier in this
chapter that identify the significance of the ability to speak English and faking
pains with a mental going-on or lack of it.
The present view thus is that, while there may be senses in which it is perfectly
51Wittgenstein 1958: §156. ff.
52Wittgenstein 1958: §34.
53Wittgenstein 1958: §148.
54Consider e.g. “Now, ask yourself: what do you know about these things?” (Wittgenstein
1958: §158.) and “So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored
medium.” (Wittgenstein 1958: §308.) Wittgenstein seems also to have entertained the possi-
bility of a radical rejection of the idea that human action has a mental source or cause: “No
supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with
associating or with thinking” (Wittgenstein 1981: §608., see also footnote 55 below).
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legitimate to be interested in understanding, reading or pain as material or neural
processes (for example, in the development of pain killers), if however we are
interested in understanding human sociality we must focus on the role, the use,
of expression in social life with particular reference to the significance to human
life of what occurs, what is being talked about and so on. Wittgenstein’s example
of the significance of children’s naming dolls discussed above in Chapter 5 argued
a similar point in an interesting manner: it illustrated that name is not just a tag
but gives a being or a thing a certain place and significance in human life whatever
that may be in particular cases. An analogous point was made in Chapter 6 in
the critical discussion of mastery as a conceptual skill amounting to knowledge of
the criteria in terms of which we identify social kinds in our environment: there
is a difference between social criteria of identification of events, artefacts and so
on and their role, use and significance in human life.
Thinking about the role, significance or function of words or phrases, and
more generally of expressions, in human life means effectively to look at human
life as a set of processes that, as it were, develop and go somewhere. In this thesis
I have spoken about the organisation of human activity to denote this process-
aspect of human existence. In my reading, Wittgenstein’s use of language-game
and form of life implies a similar perspective to social life.
Consider here the following passages from the Investigations that contain
important general insights into Wittgenstein’s methodology:
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look
at what happens as a ‘proto-phenomenon’ [Urphänomene]. That is,
where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.55
The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of
our experiences, but of noting a language-game.56
In these passages, ‘explanation’ and ‘experiences’ denote aspects of the kind of
view that Wittgenstein opposes, namely that there is for instance a mental pro-
cess of intending that signals a mental going-on, the alleged source and essence of
55Wittgenstein 1958: §654. The word ‘Urphänomen’ most likely refers to Goethe’s use of
it in his natural philosophical writings. Wittgenstein is known to have been attracted by
Goethe’s ideas e.g. about causality and from time to time apparent allusions to Goethe appear,
although unreferenced, in Wittgenstein’s writings (as in the above quoted passages, see also
Wittgenstein 1981: §605. ff., in particular the example from the seed in §608.). Unfortunately,
I cannot pursue this interesting line of research here. James C. Klagge’s work are a good source
of further study into the topic (Klagge 2003, 1999, 1989).
56Wittgenstein 1958: §655.
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intending. For Wittgenstein the relation of ‘the essence’ and the context is con-
verse: for him thinking, intention and knowledge appear as features of the model
or prototype: “[t]hat is to say, the phenomena of hope [or knowledge, intention,
etc.] are modes of this complicated form of life”57, to quote in full the passage
we have already referred to. The point is, to attribute to someone for instance
an intention or knowledge should not be seen as noting or assuming a mental
going-on, but essentially as situating her actions and words in a wider context of
action, its surroundings. In this picture, one notes not only that the other person
is angry but also why and what consequences this may have. In these cases, as
I argued above, there obtain individual differences as to what we have ‘nose for’,
what we know of, are interested in or are sensitive to.
I think it is important to observe that when I above summarised Wittgenstein
as saying that attributions of intention or knowledge are not attributions of a
mental going-on to a person, I do not mean Wittgenstein wanted to give an a
priori judgement as to what must be going on when a person attributes to another
an intention. Rather, in the present reading, the issue is all about adopting a
particular organisatory perspective to human life. When Wittgenstein spoke of
language-games and forms of life as often recursive processes within which human
life is lived, he was not attempting thereby to trace what people must be doing,
what must be going on in our heads, when we ‘play’ a language-game. One could
say that the point is to distinguish the actual ontology of understanding, whatever
that may be, from our reflective accounts of it and take care of “presenting the
model as what it is, as an object of comparison —as, so to speak, a measuring-rod;
not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond”, as Wittgenstein put
it58. Our accounts should not be thought of as probing “the basis, or essence, of
everything empirical”59 such as the essence of social action in shared knowledge
and expectations about what happens in social life as social theory often has
it.60 Yet, we can say, as I have done on a couple of occasions above, that to
understand social reality is to understand it as a process (language-game, form
57Wittgenstein 1958: Part II : i (p. 174).
58Wittgenstein 1958: §131.
59Wittgenstein 1958: §89.
60It is worth emphasising again, as we did above in Chapter 6 in our discussion of Weber,
that the point is not a sceptical one of it being beyond human capacity to analyse the source
of social action or that one would not be able to get to know what people really think or know.
This relates to Wittgenstein’s point about a logically private —that is, not even in principle
understandable— language, thoughts and feelings cancelling out as irrelevant comparable to
the irrelevance of a turning cog wheel not connected to any other wheel.
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of life) —to which we, however, have different perspectives and in which we take
different interests and so on. This, it should be stressed, is not an ontological
point about the structure of human understanding, but an observation about the
general purposeful character of human activities. In such a view, social processes
do thus appear as having a point or another, that is, human activities develop and
go somewhere. This is not, however, to attribute a particular goal, motivation or
the like to the participants.
This relates to Wittgenstein’s approach of giving a grammatical as contrasted
with a causal account. The former kind of an account he also sometimes called
giving a “logical” or “conceptual”61 account. Wittgenstein was, first of all, clear
that his approach “is not a causal but a conceptual [grammatical, logical] one”62.
We gather from various passages in the Investigations that descriptions of gram-
mar involve describing the use of for example words and phrases in the context,
surroundings or circumstances of the flow of human life, descriptions that tend
to have an essentially mundane and everyday character63. A causal explanation,
in contrast to a grammatical account, aims at elucidating the mental source of
human action. Thus, Wittgenstein said that giving a causal explanation of rule-
following might involve the description of the causal mechanism given rise to by
conditioning such that “I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular
way, and now I do so react to it”. Wittgenstein then added that “[b]ut that
is only to give a causal connexion; to tell how it has come about that we now
go by the sign-post; not what is actually essential about this going-by-the-sign
[worin dieses Dem-Zeichen-Folgen eigentlich besteht]”64. It is essential, Wittgen-
stein concluded, that “there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom”. That
is, as I read the passage in the light of the present organisatory reading, it is
essential that the going-by-the-sign is seen in some wider context of human ac-
tivity such that the going-by-the-sign appears as part of a system or as serving
a purpose. In Wittgenstein’s view, then, we should not be tracing the mental
mechanism behind human action —for “ask yourself: what do you know about
61Wittgenstein 1958: §566., Part II : xi (p. 203).
62Wittgenstein 1958: Part II : xi (p. 203).
63Consider e.g. Wittgenstein’s frequent appeals to our knowledge of the ‘circumstances’ of
language use in the Investigations (§33., §87., §117.)
64Wittgenstein 1958: §198. I have rendered the original translation “not what this going-
by-the-sign really consists in” to “not what actually is essential about this going-by-the-sign”.
In German one distinguishes between ‘bestehen in’ and ‘bestehen aus’ where the latter can be
used to denote the parts that compose something, whereas the former phrase is used to denote
the essential feature(s) of something.
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these things?”65— but describing the processes in which we follow rules such as,
say, when we follow the sign-post indicating a one-way street. In Wittgenstein’s
view, what is essential about one-way street signs is not that everyone is disposed
not to go the wrong way upon seeing one (even if we all were), but that there
exists a system in which such signs play a role. Grammatical accounts describe
such systems, and not for instance their ontological basis in a (shared) mentality,
ideology or the like (even if there was one).
As a further clarification one might add that for me to give a reason for hav-
ing done something is seen by Wittgenstein as relating my act to some system of
human action (“I couldn’t drive down there as it is a one-way street”), and not in-
dicating that a particular mental going-on (reasoning, consideration, motivation)
went through my head and caused me doing so. Yet, there is a great temptation
to think that a reason —or knowledge, belief, intention— is ultimately or essen-
tially a mental going-on out of which also spins the picture of social action as
action under the guidance of shared (unconscious and tacit) beliefs (as discussed
in Chapter 5). In such an ontological view, reasons appear as “quasi-objects”66
in the human mentality and as such effectively as causes of action.
I wrote earlier that to my knowledge the present reading of Wittgenstein, in
particular the use I make of this reading, presents a novel approach to his later
philosophy and above (in Chapter 6) I have already indicated how, for example,
Giddens’ Wittgenstein-inspired social theory is in a certain core respect (mutual
knowledge) an ideological approach and thus in contrast with the present view.
I shall discuss other examples of Wittgensteinian social theory in this and later
chapters. Now I want to show that some Wittgenstein commentators in philoso-
phy do not appear to have fully appreciated the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s
de-focus away from the mental source as the essence of meaning and understand-
ing.
Consider for example the reading of Wittgenstein’s concept of understanding
provided by the prominent Wittgenstein commentators Gordon Baker and Peter
Hacker67. They quite correctly reject a number of views of the source of human
65Wittgenstein 1958: §158.
66Pleasants 1999: 108.
67Baker and Hacker wrote the monumental four volume exegesis of the Investigations (some
of which has recently been revised by Hacker). Whether one agrees with their view or not,
the volumes continue to be a very valuable source on Wittgenstein in particular because they
frequently provide references to earlier or similar versions of the passage or phrase at hand in
numerous other manuscripts and notebooks written by Wittgenstein giving thereby interesting
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action as various types of state of the human mental apparatus: experience,
process, mental state, dispositional state or disposition. In my view, however,
they take the wrong turn as they go on to identify Wittgenstein’s conception of
understanding as “akin to an ability”, for this struggles to make a clear break
between the ontological approach to the source of human action and the non-
ontological approach to the surroundings of human action. This can be seen in
the following passage referring to Wittgenstein’s learning to complete series of
numbers example:
[W]hat is signalled by the utterance ‘Now I understand!’, is the dawn-
ing of an ability, not the performance of a mental act signified by the
verb ‘to understand’ in an occurrent sense.68
The passage thus rejects understanding as a mental occurrence in the brain.
Yet, what is this ‘dawning of an ability’ with which occurrences are replaced if
not something taking place in the mental life of the person at hand? It may not
be right to say that in the process of learning there is a moment where the person
for the first time performs some one particular ‘mental act of understanding’, but
to replace this talk with talk of the dawning of an ability merely suggests that the
learning process is gradual (dawning) process but a mental process nonetheless
leading to the establishment of an ability. At the very least there is ambiguity
here as to what extent an ontological approach to understanding is rejected by
Baker and Hacker.
In a number of places Baker and Hacker, as well as Hacker separately, char-
acterise Wittgenstein’s project as “clarification of concepts”69 which on the face
of it would seem like a non-ontological project. Yet, the concepts to be clarified
are said to be those actual concepts that people employ which is an ontological
claim: “to say of a person that he understands a word is to characterize him
as having, at a particular time, a capacity, a mastery of a technique”, Hacker
writes70. The point is related to the above considered critique by Lars Hertzberg
of Hacker’s emphasis on the linguistic skill as a conceptual capacity (Chapter 6,
p. 121 above). Again, elsewhere Baker and Hacker write first that “the meanings
insights into the developmental history of and internal connections in Wittgenstein’s ideas.
Indicating the status enjoyed by Baker and Hacker’s work, Crispin Wright called theirs ‘the
official view’ of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
68Baker & Hacker 2009: 382.
69Hacker 2001: 282.
70Hacker 2001: 282.
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of words are not entities of any kind” and so “a fortiori they are not ideas in
the mind”, but a little later they say that “the meaning of a word is an object
of understanding. It is what is understood or known when one has mastered the
technique of the use of that word”71.
Given that Wittgenstein quite explicitly asked us not to think of understand-
ing as a mental process at all, it is surprising to find Wittgensteinian philosophers
persisting with thinking of understanding as a matter of concepts that the sub-
ject entertains and keeping the focus on the mind as the locus of human action.
Thus, Theodore Schatzki, for instance, argued that historically Wittgenstein’s
view “can be seen as swimming in the emergent stream of [late 19th century]
process-metaphysical approaches to mind”72 according to which “behavior ... ex-
presses such and such a condition” only in the setting of human activity or “prac-
tices on the background of which others are able, on the basis of that behavior,
to understand and say that this is the actor’s condition”73. Given the source-
surroundings distinction, I think it is, first, wrong to say that Wittgenstein’s
philosophy is underlined by a process concept of the mind and, second, that the
significance of pain-behaviour is that it shows that a person is in a particular
mental condition (as discussed above in Chapter 6, p. 120 ff.). In my reading,
to requote Wittgenstein, he tried “not to think of understanding as a ‘mental
process’ at all” and saw the significance of pain-behaviour in their place in and
consequences to the developmental process of human interaction.
Agreement in Form of Life
Having above discussed Wittgenstein’s distinction between the source and the
surroundings of human and social action, I shall now turn to the implications
of the distinction to the nature of sharing or agreement underlying social life.
The approach splits in two arguments. The one given in this section focuses
on elucidating Wittgenstein’s notion of agreement in form of life as agreement
in organisation of human life as opposed to ideology. The section after puts
forward a view of the agreement drawing from a particular understanding of what
Wittgenstein called the blindness of rule-following as characterising agreement in
form of life.




Let us, then, begin with the question: what is the nature of collective agree-
ment underlying social life if not ontologically characterisable as shared beliefs,
conceptions, dispositions and the like giving rise to coordinated social action? In
my reading, Wittgenstein’s account of the collective agreement underlying social
institutions is agreement in organisation implying quite an explicit rejection of
agreement in ideology. As Wittgenstein put it, the agreement underlying social
life “is not agreement in opinions but in form of life”74.
What, then, is agreement in form of life? We do not find Wittgenstein’s views
on this issue summarised neatly in one place, but must attempt to construct
a picture of the place of this idea in Wittgenstein’s system of thought. I shall
construct a picture in which agreement in form of life is agreement by the fact
that human life is organised around certain shared forms of interlocking activities.
Let us have an exegetical look at ‘the agreement in form of life passage’, §241.
There, as quoted above, Wittgenstein describes the human agreement underlying
social life as agreement in form of life (Übereinstimmung der Lebensform) and not
in opinions (Übereinstimmung der Meinungen). But then, in §242., he describes
the agreement also as agreement in definitions (Definitionen) and judgements
(Urteilen). We are thus faced with this exegetical question: if Wittgenstein
rejects shared opinions, but not definitions and judgements, as characterising
the collective agreement in what way do definitions and judgements differ from
opinions?
Studying a number of passages in the Investigations where the German word
for ‘judgement’, das Urteil, and its cognates appear75, we see that in these pas-
sages Wittgenstein again emphasises the importance of seeing the talk of judge-
ment of competence and intention, not as making reference to a mental state of
the competent or intending person, but as against the backdrop of the circum-
stances in which one makes judgements of competence and intention or in which
one exhibits competence and intention. This is, as we have seen, a recurring
and a central theme in Wittgenstein’s writings. The same treatment is given to
definitions. Wittgenstein points out that there are particular circumstances for
the giving and making use of ostensive definitions as well as criteria by which we
74Wittgenstein 1958: §241. It is sometimes said that because the term ‘form of life’ makes only
a very small number of appearances in Wittgenstein’s writings it must not be a central concept
to his approach. However, a striking general characteristic of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work
is how much space is devoted to exposing and dispelling confusions, a symptom of which is that
terms constitutive of his positive contribution, such as ‘form of life’, make only rare appearances.
75See e.g. Wittgenstein 1958: §487-9.
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judge that such a definition has been understood76.
The point, as I read it, goes back to the idea of social life as a developmental
process and for example judgements and definitions as moves or modes of such
processes. It is intuitive to think that a judgement, for instance, is quite a definite
mental occurrence and that the person having that occurrence can well tell what
she means, intends, knows, believes and so on: “it is just the queer thing about in-
tention, about the mental process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique,
is not necessary to it”, as Wittgenstein had his interlocutor say77. Wittgenstein,
however, thought that there lie various dangers here in thinking about intentions
as having this independent character. It can appear, for instance, that my inten-
tion is this mental object in my mind, that somehow contains everything that I
mean. This way it begins to seem that “the whole use of a word” must be “before
my mind” when I understand it, a view that Wittgenstein evidently thought of
as an absurdity78. One may then also be led to make all kinds of assumptions
about this mental object and its ‘queer’ capacities, perhaps casting some of them
as unconscious contents of the mind: thinking appears as “an incorporeal process
which lends life and sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach
from speaking”, Wittgenstein wrote79. Another danger is that social life begins
to seem like a mere spin-off of human mental capacities, and thus for instance
that I can really only surmise that others are in pain, a view that Wittgenstein
evidently also thought of as an absurdity80.
Most interestingly for the present purposes, placing overt focus on human
mentalities makes us lose the view of social life as a set of developmental processes
engaged in by differently placed actors. Hence, as I argued above, the essence of
learning does not reside in some mental occurrences in the mind, but from a social
developmental perspective, learning is a social process involving the interaction
of at least the teacher and the pupil. Looked at as a process, the essential moves
made in teaching are the quite ordinary moves of the teacher giving examples,
the pupil responding in them and so on. Wittgenstein, thus, as it were turned the
frame of reference around and saw the social processes as primary and intentions
and knowledge as mere moves or modes of social processes. And, to go back






to the discussion at hand, judgements and definitions too must be seen in the
context of their use, and not as independent mental goings-on in a person’s mind.
What, however, of agreement in opinions? How does this contrast with agree-
ment in judgements and definitions, as Wittgenstein appears to suggest? I suggest
reading the passages under consideration (§241. and §242.) in the light of the
source-surroundings distinction and seeing Wittgenstein’s objective as critical. In
such a reading, ‘opinion’ is used by Wittgenstein as a kind of a belief in the sense
in which I above spoke of independent mental goings-on giving rise to a picture
of social life as a mere spin-off. Opinion is thus used in a critical sense similar to
Wittgenstein’s use of ‘rule’ discussed above (Chapter 6, p. 122). These uses relate
to his general rejection of the view that speaking and thinking are like “operat-
ing a calculus according to definite rules”81 where the application is “everywhere
bounded by rules”82. Wittgenstein’s view of course is that we should not think
of opinions as mental goings-on at all, but as moves taking place in the course of
social processes, which expresses the non-ontological character of his approach.
All this points to a particular understanding of the collective agreement under-
lying human life. We should not think of the agreement in form of life to consist
of agreement in opinions, but in agreement about some wider frame within which
particulars appear. This agreement about the wider frame in turn is not essen-
tially ideological agreement —that is, sharing of knowledge and the like about
the social— but agreement in organisation. The underlying motivation for this
view is the aforementioned idea that social life is a set of interactive processes
characterised by their process-character (language-game or form of life), not by
what goes on in the heads of the participants. To agree in form of life is thus
not necessarily to know the same as other participants but to share a life’s sphere
with others, or to live life organised in a particular way.
Think here again of Wittgenstein’s builders (see the earlier discussion in Chap-
ter 6, p. 123). I indicated above that we can even think of the builder and the
assistant as having differing knowledge about the slabs and other building mate-
rials, but what they have in common is that they both contribute to the same
process, namely that of building something. The builder and the assistant could
thus be said to operate in a system of division of labour. One could enquire into
the reasons as to why the builder and the assistant engage in the building pro-
81Wittgenstein 1958: §81.
82Wittgenstein 1958: §84.
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cess, but arguably this would no longer be an analysis of the constitution of the
social process, for the answers would be of some particular kind such as ‘I need to
work to earn money’ or some other such individually divergent motivation which
arguably do not characterise the essence of the total social process. Something
similar could easily turn out to be the case should we examine the knowledge
of the social process that the builder and the assistant respectively hold. Their
knowledge and interests in the building process would quite possibly differ. The
important point is that their knowledges could be considerably different, yet the
building process would not suffer from this provided that they both still cover
their differing, particular lots. This is to say, the building process in its totality
need not be ‘present’ in the builders’ mentalities in order for the process to suc-
ceed. Hence also, the social process of building cannot be analysed by looking
at the mentalities, collective or otherwise, of the builders, for this would yield a
partial picture only. Essential is that the builders be seen working within a shared
organisation of activity and this they do in reciprocal and complementary roles.
In my reading, this is precisely the gist of the builders scenario in Wittgenstein,
namely, that it illustrates the meaning-as-use of expressions such as “block!”,
“pillar!” and “slab!” in the system of building the house. Their meaning-as-use
resides essentially in their employment in the building process, not in what the
builders thereby think.
In sum, the social process in its totality is not present in my mentality as I
perform my lot in it, yet any one of us is a performer of the system as a whole.
We thus as it were agree in form of life, or in the organisation of our activity by
contributing to it. And hence, due to the lack of a total representation of the social
process in the heads of the performers, we can say following Wittgenstein: our
collective performance of the social is blind. Next section discusses the appearance
of this idea in Wittgenstein.
I Obey the Rule Blindly
The word ‘blind’ refers to Wittgenstein’s use of the word in the Investigations
§219. There he writes: “When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule
blindly”. The central difficulty with a non-ontological approach to the social is
the one of giving an account of our collective performance of social reality that
does not over-intellectualise and ideologically homogenise us and do this in the
face of the powerful contrary intuitions embodied in the ideological approach and
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the paradigm from sharing. Blind agreement in form of life is intended to describe
just this kind of a non-intellectual blind agreement in the organisation of human
life.
I shall approach the issue by discussing a differing reading of Wittgenstein’s
notion of blindness given by David Bloor. I offer a more exhaustive discussion of
Bloor’s views in Chapter 8.
In Bloor’s reading the blindness is conceived ontologically as designating cer-
tain habitual, machine-like operations of the human cognitive capacities, for ex-
ample as we classify objects as instances of some particular kind of a thing.
As Bloor argues, in place of a causal-deterministic approach to rule-following
“Wittgenstein substituted a more down-to-earth account, using biological ideas”83.
The biological analogy, Bloor continues, is that “we should think of ourselves as
having instinctive responses to the examples used in teaching”84. The instinct
is, as Bloor clarifies, that upon being presented a limited set of samples “we
instinctively generalise”85 and automatically continue to label similar things as
instances of the same thing. This is in our biological make up and one would be
inclined to say that it therefore operates causally. Yet, Wittgenstein explicitly
rejected causal explanations: “Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one”,
he wrote86.
We may have biological instincts in the sense that Bloor argues, but I doubt
that Wittgenstein was making a reference to them in the places that Bloor cites
as the source of his attribution of this view to Wittgenstein. Thus, Bloor cites
Wittgenstein in On Certainty and keeping in mind that there the general topic
and context of discussion is sceptical doubt, among others, of our ordinary knowl-
edge attributions, will help us to see that no biological analogy is being made use
of by Wittgenstein there.
A typical line of reasoning we find in On Certainty goes as follows. In ordinary
situations we quite comfortably say things like I know that the train leaves at
two, meaning for instance that I have double checked the time-table, Wittgenstein
observes87. Sceptical doubts, of course, press beyond such assurances questioning
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doubts about our ordinary convictions as well as to attempt to give grounds
for everyday certainty. Here Wittgenstein offers two passages characterising our
ordinary convictions and certainty in relation to the demand for justification,
both of which Bloor cites in support of his biological view. The passages read:
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to
hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly
expressed and probably badly thought as well.)88
But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond
being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.89
Despite certain connotations attached to the word ‘animal’ in the latter pas-
sage, the appearance of the phrase ‘form of life’ in the former passage makes clear
that no biological instinct is offered as the mechanism by which we have ordinary
epistemological certainty. Wittgenstein is not talking about biologically grounded
instinct when he speaks of our ordinary certainty as something animal. As the
first approximation, let us say he is talking about the matter-of-course natural-
ness in which the familiar course of the flow of everyday human life is familiar
to us. The issue is not about the character of our knowledge of everyday life
being perhaps like a habit —living routine everyday life can require considerable
mental efforts on daily basis— but that certain things are naturally a part, and
others are not, of our activities or language-game: “it is there —like our life”,
Wittgenstein wrote90. We do not deal here with extreme subtleties underlying
our language use and hidden from view but, as Wittgenstein observes in a pas-
sage that we have already quoted above, “[f]or each one of these sentences I can
imagine circumstances that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and
by that it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing”91. In these and
other ordinary circumstances it is clear what it is to know and to be justified.
But philosophy distorts these ordinary well-known uses as brought out by this
amusing passage from On Certainty :
88Wittgenstein 1975: §358.
89Wittgenstein 1975: §359. A note on the remark in brackets. I would not read this as
Wittgenstein questioning his own point as Baker and Hacker suggest (1985: 241). I read it as
an expression of Wittgenstein’s life long doubts about his own capacities and the accompanying
self-disciplining towards ever higher achievements and clarity of thought (see Monk 1990: 23
ff. and Janik & Toulmin 1996: 236 ff.). One should also bear in mind that On Certainty is by
no means a polished text but a posthumously published notebook, essentially a philosophical




I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again
“I know that that’s a tree”, pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone
else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn’t insane.
We are only doing philosophy.”92
Consider another passage from Wittgenstein that Bloor cites in support of his
biological view, presumably again because of the word ‘animal’:
I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to
which one grants instinct but not ratiocination [Raisonnement]. As a
creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive
means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not
emerge from some kind of ratiocination.93
This passage too we can read as pointing, not to a biological instinct, but to the
familiar course of human life in which we communicate in ways that relate to the
familiar activities in the frame of forms of life. The human being as ‘an animal in
a primitive state’ is the human being in everydayness engaged in everyday actions
within which she also employs specific forms of language, knowledge and so on.
One of the central points made by Wittgenstein in On Certainty is that our
reliance on everyday knowledge is based neither on ignorance nor an implicit refu-
tation of sceptical doubts, but as I would like to put it: on the organisation of life
around everyday knowledge, activities, artefacts and so on. Thus, Wittgenstein
spoke of there being no place for sceptical doubts in everyday life, unlike how ev-
eryday knowledge (‘the train arrives at 05:15’) ties with my intentions, material
objects around me, and so on. Suppose the sceptic posed us the question how
could one ever be sure of not having been to the moon? Wittgenstein writes:
Why is it not possible for me to doubt that I have never been on the
moon? And how could I try to doubt it?
First and foremost, the supposition that perhaps I have been there
would strike me as idle. Nothing would follow from it, nothing be
explained by it. It would not tie in with anything in my life.94
From the point of view of everyday circumstances, the doubt about one having
been on the moon seems exceedingly irrelevant as nothing in life seems to point
to that possibility. There is no place for such an event in our lives, unlike there
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Wittgenstein, however, presses the matter further and observes that just as
nothing speaks in favour of one having been to the moon, so nothing speaks
against it. Perhaps one just forgot the episode? The doubt, however, is so
outlandish that one, as it were, can neither seriously entertain it nor completely
deny it either.
If one cannot deny a sceptical doubt, can one affirm some apparently core
belief about our existence, say, “the principle that what has always happened will
happen again (or something like it)”, Wittgenstein enquired, and wrote then:
What does it mean to follow this principle? Do we really introduce it
into our reasoning? Or is it merely the natural law which our inferring
apparently follows? This latter it may be. It is not an item in our
considerations.95
Wittgenstein’s conclusion thus is: at least in ordinary circumstances, consider-
ations that counter sceptical doubts are not explicit ‘items in our considerations’.
Again and again, throughout On Certainty and elsewhere, Wittgenstein must
observe the groundlessness of our form of life and language-games. We do go
about our activities with certainty that we have not been on the moon or that
the table continues to exist when I am not looking at it. And here Wittgenstein
makes the above quoted remark: “I would like to regard this certainty, not as
something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life”96. He is not
talking about habitual certainty, implicit or explicit assumptions, or anything of
the kind. The certainty, rather, flows from what is naturally a part of human life
and what is not.
The certainty talked about here is not ideological but organisatory in nature,
a crucial categorical difference. Gunter Gebauer expresses this well writing that
Wittgenstein’s philosophical position builds upon certainty as a “non-epistemic
attitude to the world”97 where the certainty is “woven into the language-game
itself”98, the way it functions.
Similarly, in the analogy that I have been developing from Wittgenstein’s
philosophical views to social theory, to agree in the organisation of everyday life
is not to be analysed ideologically as a set of conscious or unconscious epistemic
95Wittgenstein 1975: §135.
96Wittgenstein 1975: §358.
97Gebauer 2009: 158. “Hier hat Wittgenstein eine Möglichkeit gefunden, aus einer nicht-
epistemischen Einstellung zu Welt eine philosophische Haltung zu gewinnen.”
98Gebauer 2009: 159. “Aber das Eigentümliche dieser Gewißheiten ist, daß sie in die Sprach-
spiele selbst eingewoben sind wie Muster in eine Textur.”
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attitudes, but as having a deeper character of the very process of living human life
being tied to its organisation. The difficulty here is one of resisting the tempta-
tion of giving an account of our knowledge and performance of social reality that
over-intellectualises that performance —or one that intellectually homogenises
the actors, we might add. That is, there are the temptations discussed above to
think that our knowledge is more complete than we can formulate, and that the
essential processes of knowing are hidden in the unconscious and tacit medium of
the human mind. This idea, that there is more than meets the eye, is particularly
apparent in Searle’s idea of the Background and also there in Bloor’s appeal to
biological instincts. They are attempts “to get hold of the mental process of un-
derstanding which seems to be hidden behind those coarser and therefore more
readily visible accompaniments”, as Wittgenstein put it99. Repeatedly Wittgen-
stein insisted, however, that we do not need a philosopher —or indeed a social
scientist— to tell us how human sociality really looks like. This comes out in
remarks such as that of the order ‘stand roughly there’ as not requiring a philo-
sophical analysis to make its meaning clear100. The certainty we have to do with
here is non-epistemic, that is, not a matter of beliefs or knowledge of some kind,
but of human life taking place in particular surroundings.
The point can also be made in terms of the role of certain “constancies” of
human life, examples of which in the Investigations often pertain to the constan-
cies of the material world. Just like the assumption of the persistence of the
size of the object is not part of my hidden assumptions as I weigh cheese, to
use Wittgenstein’s point101, so too in the analogy I am developing from Wittgen-
stein’s philosophical views to social theory various aspects of social reality are not
implicitly assumed or known by me when I operate in social reality. Baker and
Hacker’s words convey the point: “we teach and explain ... our language-games
under certain conditions ... but that background is not part of the explanation”
and it is not “written into the concepts” we use102.
In my reading, then, what Wittgenstein is trying to get at with his musings
on certainty, blind rule following and agreement in form of life all amount to the
same basic idea: human life is lived under certain conditions and our relationship




102Baker & Hacker 1985: 230.
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is a distortion to attempt to analyse our relationship to our societal surroundings
as fundamentally epistemic. Rather, social life is best looked at as a set of often
recurring developmental processes, language-games or forms of life organised in
particular ways of which no particular social actor, or a majority of them, need
to have shared knowledge or beliefs.
Note that this takes us back to the idea of the everyday character of our
societal existence talked about in detail in Part 1 (see Chapters 3 and 4). We
emphasised there, and again here in connection of Wittgenstein’s views, that the
human being is a thinking being but that we should be careful not to homogenise
us as intellectual beings and over-intellectualise our collective performance of the
social by attributing to it a shared general mental source. As the historical ex-
amples of Part 1 illustrated, we can very well see human action as very much an
intellectual achievement, but the considerations coming to bear in people’s every-
day activities concern essentially the local and particular situations at hand and
display therefore great individual variety. As I read him, the same idea appears in
Wittgenstein in a slightly different guise. The key idea is that it is in vain to look
for representations of the general societal conditions of our existence in the minds
of the actors. We often are blind to the general conditions of our existence. Yet,
this is not to deny that “all sorts of things”103 may go on in people’s heads as they
operate in social reality although there is nothing “philosophically astonishing”
about these possibly complex and intellectually demanding but still essentially
very mundane and everyday considerations that we engage in the course of our
everyday activities. Thus, the picture we have in Wittgenstein of social action is
very much the same as we saw in Part 1 to underlie our collective performance
of global industrial market society: we are engaged in a considerable variety of
everyday activities marked by global division of labour but it would be wrong
to think of them all having some deep, hidden, philosophically or sociologically
astonishing, shared and general mental source.
Finally, let us round up by noting that the issue of Wittgenstein’s remarks on
blind rule following relates closely to the suggestion once made in the Wittgenstein
literature that it was because of his conservatism that Wittgenstein advocated the
picture of blind, de-intellectual human adherence to established forms of life104.
In this argument, for a conservative thinker there is something in the nature of
103Wittgenstein 1958: §335.
104See Nýıri 1976, 1982 and Bloor 2004. Mannheim 1986 is a classic historico-sociological
articulation of the nature of conservatism.
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the human being that sees her act traditionally, without reason(s) and reflexivity.
Now, I note first that biographical work on Wittgenstein does not unequivo-
cally support the claim from his conservatism105. Second, while there may be more
than a kernel of truth to the conservative picture, I believe that his would miscon-
strue Wittgenstein’s picture of the human being as, as it were, a de-intellectual
being. To see this, note that had Wittgenstein made use of the conservative pic-
ture he would have been slipping from what I take to be his general occupation,
namely that of describing the surroundings, to searching for the source of human
action, in this case in the inherent conservative quality of the human being. Thus,
to keep with the central general character of Wittgenstein’s approach, we must
look for an account of the de-intellectualised picture of the human being as an
account of actors in particular societal surroundings, in the social frame, within
which the human being lives life.
Wittgenstein and the Cultural Causes of Environmental Problems
Having above developed the key themes of the present Wittgensteinian approach
I now want to relate them explicitly to the argument of Part 1 from the cultural
causes of environmental problems.
In Part 1 I argued that it is essential to see our collective performance of global
industrial market society and its environmental problems as organisatory rather
than ideological in character. In Part 2 I have argued that an approach capable of
picturing this is forthcoming in the later Wittgenstein’s non-ontological perspec-
tive to the surroundings rather than the mental source of language, thought and
action. That is, in this perspective, essential to social action is its process-like,
reciprocal and complementary character engaged in by differently placed actors
in division of roles or labour who nevertheless agree in form of life or in the
organisation of human interaction.
In the reading of Wittgenstein that I developed above social life emerges as
a process of interaction of differently placed actors. In my reading central to
Wittgenstein’s thinking was that any attempt to grasp these processes proceeds
by way of a model, language-game or form of life. A language-game, however, is
not essentially a hypothesis about what must be going on in the mentality of those
who engage in the form of life but rather a picture of the course and development
of these processes. This is not to say that the members of a collective necessarily
105Monk 1990 and Janik & Toulmin 1996.
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share a picture of the process in which they engage —this would again be to look
for the shared source of social action. Rather, as I have emphasised all along,
there will be individual differences in how we conceptualise social reality.
This again does not preclude agreement in form of life, for in social life I
have daily interactions with people whose full perspective I know next to nothing
about: I shop at the supermarket without necessarily knowing anything about
how the shop is run and what are its wider organisational and institutional pre-
conditions. The same can be argued to go for many core institutions within
which we live life: I act within them without extensive stock of knowledge about
central aspects of their functioning. In the analogy I have been developing from
Wittgenstein’s philosophical concerns to social theory, this non-epistemic relation
of social actors to the majority of the conditions of our societal existence is the
gist of Wittgenstein’s remarks on blind rule-following. There will be others, say
the supermarket manager, who acts in a complementary role taking care of that
side of the social process. I will naturally have some expectations about how
others link up with my activities, yet in the perspective proposed here essential
for interaction is not that actors know the same things about it, but that we work
in differing but complementary roles within a shared organisation of human life.
In Part 1 I argued that one chief aspect in terms of which a constructivist or
collectivist account of social life fails to account for the deep problematic character
of environmental problems resides in them viewing the organisation of human life
as an ultimately arbitrary, collective, culturally mediated decision. I shall discuss
the theme more closely and with an example from social theory in Chapter 8
below. Here I want to note, however, that in the Wittgensteinian organisatory
perspective social processes are very much characterised by their purpose. The
purpose, to be sure, is not to be understood simply as a Parsonian ‘system goal’,
but as potentially individually variable, denoting simply the general purposeful
nature of human activities. Hence I have emphasised the individuality of our
motivations, conceptions and knowledge.
How purposes are built into the Wittgensteinian organisatory and develop-
mental perspective can also be seen in the case of pain-behaviour discussed in a
couple of connections above. Here pain-behaviour is not seen simply as an expres-
sion of an underlying physical condition but as a mode or move in circumstances
with human significance. That is, certainly a humanly significant aspect about
having pains is that they hinder satisfying human life and that something should
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be done about them, which of course are philosophically unastonishing remarks
about pains but nevertheless of great human significance. Via the notion of hu-
man significance, human activities around pains thus display a certain purposeful
orientation towards curing pains and towards restoring and preserving satisfying
human life. By contrast, as argued above, many philosophical and social theo-
retical accounts have often focused on pains merely as something one can display
and for which there is collectively known and accepted criteria.
Finally, the organisatory perspective can also accommodate the idea that
social systems and processes —for instance global industrial market society— can
serve an important purpose —the maintenance of human material well-being (all
inequalities notwithstanding), for instance— that at the same time does not as
such have to appear in the motivational, conceptual or other contents of any of the
actors involved in the reproduction of the system. As argued above, in my reading
something analogous emerges as the underlying point of Wittgenstein’s builders
scenario, namely, to illustrate the meaning-as-use of the commands employed in
the building process with respect to the function of the building process regardless
of what the builders themselves happen to think as they use these notions.
The foregoing has placed a lot of weight on the notion of ‘organisation’ but
denied that this can be cashed out in terms of what people singly or collectively
know and believe about it. What, then, does define organisation? In a fundamen-
tal sense, the present approach holds onto the view of a fundamental vagueness
pertaining to the idea of organisation, one that parallels Wittgenstein’s rejection
of ‘essences’. In Wittgenstein’s view, our demand for clarity must give in in the
face of the vagueness of the phenomena we want to sum up under a common
term, for “these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use
the same word for all, —but that they are related to one another in many dif-
ferent ways”, he wrote106. One could say, organisation is a family-resemblance
phenomenon: “the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some
one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres”,
as Wittgenstein characterised it107. He also emphasised that our articulations of
the essence are purpose-laden (“Only whom are we informing of this? And on
what occasion?”108) which relates to the aforementioned view that an explana-
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of everything empirical’.
In this thesis I have connected these theoretical views with the more em-
pirical phenomena of division of labour and the resulting differences in actors’
perspective and knowledge of the social systems and processes that we neverthe-
less collectively perform. The organisation of human productive activity on global
industrial market societal basis is a family-resemblance phenomenon defined by
the relationality or interconnectedness of the component activities. The whole
will appear differently as seen from the different perspectives and the whole is
not represented in any individual’s head in its totality —or at least this is not
essential to the functionality of the whole or the individual within the whole. At
the same time, the various everyday productive and consumptive activities can
of course be brought under the common header of, say, ‘world-economy’ by the
analyst ‘for a particular purpose’.
We have here, then, an approach to social action that gives us all the essential
elements for conceptualising the cultural causes of environmental problems. Our
collective performance of global industrial market society and its environmental
problems can be seen as flowing —not essentially from a shared set of attitudes,
knowledge or conceptions of nature— but from everyday activity within the larger
scale organisation of human life on everyday basis. Our relationship to the or-
ganisation of our activities, furthermore, is non-epistemic in that the organisa-
tion constitutes the everyday conditions of our societal existence and activities.
Yet, we engage in the collective performance of the social in an immense variety
of activities springing from an immense variety of considerations, interests and
knowledge. These activities and the mental goings-on underlying them, however,
are not philosophically or social theoretically very astonishing but rather every-
day and mundane, yet the complexity of organised human life is astonishing. I
think Nigel Pleasants’ observation about Wittgenstein’s approach is spot on here:
Wittgenstein has often been criticised for advocating a ‘commonsense’
view of the social and natural world, in which everything is just what it
appears to be, and there is nothing puzzling, troubling or mysterious
to understand ... However, I think that Wittgenstein’s attitude is
quite the opposite of this; he is trying to say that, on the contrary,
the world is vastly more complex, puzzling and mysterious than can
be captured in a philosophical theory.109
I have argued that upon a closer look, a differing and intellectually homogenis-
109Pleasants 1999: 23.
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ing tendency can be seen at work in the family of views I have termed the ideo-
logical approach. One of the central challenges in this thesis has been to counter
the powerful intuitions that steer our thinking for example about social action
towards an ideological approach. Forming the core of these intuitions I desig-
nated the idea of the essentiality of the mind to human action, the view that
human action is essentially action under the guidance of beliefs. I argued that
in sociologically minded thought this core idea is often collectivised giving rise to
the so-called paradigm from sharing: social action is action under the guidance
of shared beliefs, knowledge, normative orientation, world-view or the like. I cast
the environmentalist argument from the ideological nature of the cultural causes
of environmental problems as a form of the same collectivist argument. In my
mind, such views wrongly intellectually homogenise human action.
Conclusion
This chapter began with an overview of John Searle’s analysis of social institutions
whose account, in a useful contrast to the present Wittgensteinian approach,
focuses on the source of human and social action. This led us to characterise
Wittgenstein’s approach to the social as non-ontological drawing from the idea
of the surroundings or the organisation of human life, as opposed to the source,
in analysis of human and social action. I introduced the key Wittgensteinian
themes of agreement in form of life and blindness of rule-following illustrating
how my reading differs from certain other readings in Wittgenstein-scholarship.
Finally, I related these ideas to the view expressed Part 1 of the cultural causes
of environmental problems.
In the remaining chapters I shall continue the exposition of the present organ-
isatory social theory by way of a series of critical comparative discussions with
existing works in social theory. In the next chapter, I shall discuss the present
reading of Wittgenstein in relation to the issue of the social character of nor-
mativity, an issue that most readily would seem to relate Wittgenstein to the
ideological approach. In the final chapter I shall attempt to draw some interest-
ing, constructive as well as critical parallels with existing social theory.

Chapter 8
Collective Inquisition and a Private
Ceremony for Nothing
Even so, it moves.
— Galileo Galilei
In this chapter we shall discuss the notion that would most readily seem to tie
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy with the paradigm from sharing and the ideo-
logical approach more generally, namely that of the social nature of normativity
and the closely related idea of the social, collectivist or constructivist, nature of
meaning. According to a somewhat popular reading of the later Wittgenstein,
language-games and forms of life are best seen as conceptual schemes particu-
lar to, for instance, a culture or other such community and that they can be
incommensurable with one another. Most importantly, according to this view,
conceptual schemes are given raise to and maintained self-referentially by the
community.1
In the foregoing chapters we have already critically discussed several aspects of
the idea that the essence of human sociality resides in shared mentalities, world-
views, or conceptual schemes, as one might also call them. What I shall do in this
chapter, however, is to give the organisatory point of view to a number of debates
had about normativity and the social nature of meaning in the Wittgensteinian
literature. The purpose is to show that the ideological reading of Wittgenstein is
not the only way to make sense of Wittgenstein’s remarks about these issues.
1For a recent Wittgensteinian take on the issue, see Glock 2008. Some classic philosophical
contributions to the debate here include Winch 1964 and Davidson 2001.
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I begin with a critical discussion of normativity as conceptualised in the so-
called Strong Programme. The Programme, associated with the work of David
Bloor, Barry Barnes and others, has done a great deal in sociology of scien-
tific knowledge towards countering what could be called causal-deterministic ap-
proaches —or meaning determinism and normative determinism, in Bloor’s ter-
minology2— to the history of science in philosophy and history of science as well
as to more theoretical issues in philosophy of language. According to this so-
called causal-deterministic family of views that Bloor and others have justifiably
attacked, meaning is in general, or in some circumscribed areas of discourse, solely
or ideally a matter of causal contact of individuals with the world in the process
of which entities, or human experiences of entities, become meanings of words
and that it is only contingent, and unfortunate, that meanings are in some way
socially influenced.
Despite this remarkable historical role of the Programme, I shall argue that
the Programme understands the social nature of meaning in a way that conflicts
with another central later Wittgensteinian theme, namely that of the rejection
of the focus on the mental source of meaning, language, thought and action in
favour of their surroundings as discussed above in Chapter 7. Quite emphatically
Wittgenstein said that “try not to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’
at all”3, yet I think it can fairly easily be illustrated, as I shall do below, that the
Programme’s reading of Wittgenstein builds upon a particular ontological view
of the cognitive processes underlying human sociality. Ultimately, I object to the
Programme’s theoretical views of the social nature of meaning and normativity
because they can be seen to support the paradigm from sharing and the ideological
approach to human and social action. As we shall see below, in the Programmers’
accounts the idea of sharing, in particular ideological sharing, plays a crucial role.
Barnes and Bloor on the Social Nature of Meaning
I begin with a critical review of Barry Barnes and David Bloor’s account of
the social nature of meaning the core of which is the Programme’s account of
normativity. I will consider Barnes first, for in many ways the aspects of the
Programme’s theoretical contribution that I shall critique receive their clearest




nature of meaning over such classic Wittgensteinian philosophers as Elizabeth
Anscombe and Peter Winch saying that “[t]he most developed account, and the
one that I have found most useful, is Barry Barnes’: ‘Social Life as Bootstrapped
Induction”’4. For expositional reasons, my critical discussion of Barnes, however,
begins with a different paper, yet, as we shall see below, the views expressed in
the two papers are practically identical.
In Barnes’s On the Conventional Character of Knowledge and Cognition the
exposition of the social nature of meaning begins thus:
[t]he present concern ... is to obtain some understanding of concept
application. And the obvious way is to consider how people learn to
apply concepts — that is, how they learn to classify.5
This passage reflects the character of many later works in the Programme in
its taking classificatory activities as the paradigmatic example in terms of which
the Programme’s theoretical contribution is articulated6. Barnes writes, however,
that “[t]he conclusions derived will ... be offered as conjectures concerning con-
cepts and beliefs generally”7, that is, that “all systems of verbal culture” can be
elucidated by the example of classificatory activities8.
Barnes would appear to be suggesting that classifications provide us with a
way of understanding the meaning of general terms. A general term, say ‘animal’,
stands for all these creatures that we call animals, or the meaning of ‘animal’ is
this group of creatures. However, Barnes goes on to point out, the need may
arise to include new members in the group, and as this happens it needs to
be negotiated as to whether the new candidate in fact is an animal. Existing
members of a group will bear a certain resemblance to each other on the basis
of which they have been classified in that group. These resemblances, based on
the properties of the individuals in question, aid us when we wonder whether the
new instance should be included in the group.9
4Bloor 1996: Footnote 3. Bloor refers to Barnes 1983.
5Barnes 1981: 305.
6As we shall see below, most classic articulations of the Programme’s theoretical stance make




9Barnes 1981: 309. Barnes replaces the term ‘extension’ with that of ’tension’ in order to
distinguish his approach from the tradition in philosophy. The contrast is illustrated by Barnes
as follows: “To talk ... of the tension of a term is to accept that its future usage is indeterminate.
To talk of extension is to imply that future proper usage is determined already.” (Barnes 1981:
Footnote 7).
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However, says Barnes, it can never be unequivocal as to whether the new
instance in fact is similar enough to warrant inclusion or not: “there is no scale for
weighting of similarity”10, Barnes claims. Reality does not come neatly packaged
and labelled, or as Barnes puts it: “ ‘[r]eality’ does not mind how we cluster it”11.
Why, then, do systems of classification tend to remain reasonably stable and
have a seeming normative weight upon our usage? Here Barnes offers his socio-
logical conclusion: socially managed training and directing of the identification
skills see the individual make the right decision between the different available
ways to classify experience. ‘Right’ here means the right or correct way to clas-
sify according to a given community or group of language users. In other words,
certain social processes make sure that, of all the systems available, individuals
choose and stick to one particular kind of a classificatory system. As Barnes puts
it:
Suppose ... that two individuals in a community were to differ over
what they took to be a routine act of concept application. ... Per-
haps the two individuals were developing the notions of sameness for
different ends. Consider now ... which of the two individuals had
correctly labeled the creature. ... [I]f, in their particular community,
all other competent members happened to agree with the ascription
[of one individual] ..., then that would be ... the correct ascription.12
Here we have an important statement of Barnes’s position as to where the
social nature of meaning resides that needs to be made explicit. The role of the
social is to bring the individual in line with the rest of the community by the
social processes, on the one hand, of driving her attention to these rather than
those similarities and, on the other hand, of correcting the individual in her usage
such that she exercises her cognitive capacities upon the same similarities as the
rest of the community does. In this connection Barnes speaks of “verification” of
the individual’s usage by the community13.
In Barnes’s view the language learning situation is one in which the teacher, if
she does not use linguistic definitions, “makes direct reference to the environment”
(ostension) as a result of which the learner “acquires all his information about







by the individual’s network of concepts, “a model of the conceptual resources
acquired by an individual as he becomes a competent member of his community”,
Barnes says15.
As indicated above, the points made above appear also in what has become
somewhat of a classic in the Programme literature, Barnes’s Social Life as Boot-
strapped Induction16. In the bootstrapping paper, the social nature of meaning
is again discussed by the example of classification, this time by the question how
does the general term ‘leaf’ come to stand for all leaves? Barnes contrasts his
own ‘inductive boot-strapping model’ with another referred to as ‘the pattern-
recognition stereotype’.
The latter model is basically the causal-deterministic model and has it that
as we observe various particular instances of leaves we acquire ‘a pattern for leaf’
with the aid of which we are able to conduct ‘routinized, habituated, pattern-
matching’ procedures17. How does Barnes’s inductive boot-strapping model differ
from this other model? Barnes accepts the pattern-recognition model in so far
as that both models can be construed as involving the operation of what Barnes
terms the designation device. It is a “reification” representing “the property of an
individual agent, his means of routinely attaching a specific term to instances”18.
In other words, a designation device is a way of characterising someone’s cognitive
system into which observations enter and in which they are labelled as instances
of, say, leaves. The difference between the two models is that in Barnes’s model
there is an additional social element bringing in the normative element to the clas-
sification. The fixing of the reference of a term is cast as convergence in individual
judgements due to collective reinforcement of particular kinds of judgements. In
other words, in both models the human cognitive system operates in the same
way, that is as an individual designation device, but in Barnes’s model the indi-
vidual cognitive systems are joined together in a system characterised by social
feedback loops that reinforce individual classifications in line with the community.
Although Barnes would protest, we can I think see why the picture put for-
15Barnes 1981: 309. The model Barnes describes as Hesse Nets referring to the work of
the philosopher of science Mary Hesse. In Barnes they represent the conceptual system, or a
part thereof, possessed by individuals. It is a network of concepts (like ‘cat’, ‘dog’, including
also processes and properties) (Barnes 1981: 308) with associated instances (Bill Clinton’s cat,
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ward by Barnes could be called individualistic completed by social processes of
training and correction by virtue of which, according to Barnes, the nature of
meaning can be said to be social. Note that David Bloor characterises his soci-
ological account of normativity by saying that in such a theory “[t]he emphasis
must shift from individual, psychological and biological processes to sociological
processes”19. However, although Bloor obviously takes Barnes’s work to cham-
pion just that kind of a switch, once we have scrutinised Barnes’s social account
of normativity we see, I think, that the sort of a shift of emphasis called for
by Bloor is not obviously true of Barnes’s account: there is hardly a shift of
emphasis away from individual, psychological and biological as much as a mere
addition of a social element to the traditional picture. Barnes after all runs his
argument exactly as the traditional causal-deterministic approach would, except
for the addition of the social processes of training and correction.
The sense in which I identify Barnes’s views as individualistic is succinctly
described in the words of Theodore R. Schatzki: “[m]any alleged ontological
nonindividualisms turn out to be ontological individualisms ... their “opposition”
to individualism ... being a stand against too narrow a construal of the stratum
of the individual”20. In my view, the Programme is individualistic in this sense
charging narrow individualism for ignoring the effect of the social processes of
training and correction on the constitution of the individual cognition.
We find this form of argument also in Bloor. The example case discussed is
the familiar one from classification and a dummy position constructed by Bloor
for the ease of making his argument is the causal-deterministic position accord-
ing to which the meaning of a term, say ‘dog’, is the ‘inner pattern’ inside the
individual’s head that she acquires by empirical, causal, contact with dogs that
by its similarity to future cases determines the future correct usage of the term.
Here Bloor points out that
[s]urely that inner pattern provides the content of the name ‘dog’,
that to which outer reality must be fitted if it is to be counted as
a dog. Admittedly, this only gives us the individual language user’s
own, personal understanding of the word ‘dog’.21
Bloor continues saying that “[a]s yet the causal machinery invoked in the





wrongly”22. Here Bloor’s “claim is that normativity is grounded in consensus”
and “consensus operates by reference to its normative character —that is, it is
created and exists through its use as a standard for commentary and sanction”23.
Elsewhere Bloor reaches the same conclusion by using Wittgenstein’s example
from the pupil being taught to continue a series of numbers. Upon being given
the order to continue the series 2, 4, 6, the pupil is always in principle faced with
“the problem of taking the next step, of moving from previously known cases to
new cases”, Bloor argues24. In Bloor’s characterisation the problem is ontological
having to do with the abilities of the brain: “we cannot possibly conjure up
in our mind, or bring into consciousness, all of these cases to which the rule
is ‘meant’ to apply. The content of our consciousness in this regard must be
finite”, Bloor writes25. In the picture Bloor proposes, instead of having the mind
contain the blueprint of an infinite number of future applications, “we should
think of ourselves as having instinctive responses to the examples used”26. Thus,
in Bloor’s view, we have an “innate tendency” to generalise from examples and
it operates such that “we do not extract from them any general idea ... [but]
instinctively pass on”27.
This parallels Barnes’s view of the human mind as a finite pattern-matching
designation device considered above, as does the next step that Bloor takes in his
argument. For Bloor goes on to note that “[s]o far the account has said nothing
about whether the move to the next putative instance of a rule or concept is right
or wrong”28. Normativity requires a standard of comparison which is social in
nature: “following a rule counts as a ‘right’ step ... if it is aligned with the steps
everyone else, or nearly everyone else, takes”, Bloor writes29. That is to say,
[t]he normative properties of rules, then, do not derive from the in-
stinctive sources of individual activity, but from the alignment of these
different sources in the majority of cases ...”30
We see then that Bloor’s account is ontologically individualistic in the same
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sates the causal-deterministic picture with the sociological add-on of the social
processes of training and correction that align individual mental sources. In a
way the Programme’s view is thus not far from Parsons’ collectivism (see Chapter
5 above)31, in that in both views human sociality is consensual based on sharing
of norms, knowledge and beliefs.
The Programme’s reading also bears a certain resemblance to Saul Kripke’s
prominent Wittgenstein reading. Kripke famously claimed that Wittgenstein
posed “the sceptical problem ... that anything in my head leaves it undeter-
mined what” I actually intend, mean and so on32. Let us note first that Kripke
attributes here to Wittgenstein, I think wrongly, an ontological albeit sceptical
view supposed to “deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored
medium” that Wittgenstein claimed to know nothing about and not to be inter-
ested in33. At any rate, the solution Kripke saw Wittgenstein as offering here
revolved around the idea, also found in the Programme, that the community
“have justification conditions for attributing correct or incorrect rule following
to the [lone] subject”34. Thus, the individual “who claims to have mastered [a]
concept ... will be judged by the community to have done so if his particular
responses agree with those of the community” and that “[t]hose who deviate are
corrected and told ... that they have not grasped the concept”35. Here of course,
as with most views focused on the criteria of concept application as the essence
of human sociality, the community being in possession of justification conditions
effectively functions as the shared mental source of the community’s judgements
and their activity.
Kripke identifies two aspects in Wittgenstein’s view: one, the idea of collective
justification or assertability conditions and, two, the observation “that the game
of asserting ... has a role [or utility] in our lives”36. The second aspect promises
to keep the use of concepts in focus, but it is notable that, as far as I can see, the
aspect in fact plays no fundamental explanatory or other role in Kripke’s view,
although he mentions the aspect frequently. Similarly to Hacker and others’
view discussed in Chapter 6 below (p. 120), and to the Programme’s view of
money discussed later in this chapter, the focus is fundamentally on the collective







criteria of attribution of concepts, and not at all on what humanly significant
may be going on in situations in which one for example reports pains37. As
argued in Chapter 7, in the present reading of Wittgenstein, looking at the use
of expressions, conduct and so on as moves made in the context of some wider
social process shifts the focus on the developmental course of this social process
as an organised process going somewhere. Essential here is the organisation of
this developmental process, not that the social actors know or believe the same
things about the process, which they in fact may not do.
Why I cannot adopt the Programme’s account of the social nature of meaning
in addressing the cultural causes of environmental problems goes back to objec-
tions essentially similar to those I have regarding Kripke’s view. First of all, the
Programme’s reading of Wittgenstein is ontological and, as illustrated in Chapter
7, the correctness of reading Wittgenstein as providing an account of the source
of human and social action, is highly suspect if not plainly mistaken as a reading
of Wittgenstein.
I believe, secondly, that collectivism can reject individualism in a more funda-
mental way which involves rejecting the ontological in favour of a non-ontological
organisatory approach to social action, more of which below. Third, the core of
my objection to the Programme is the same as I have raised in previous chapters
against other ideological approaches, namely, that it is wrong to construe human
sociality as residing fundamentally in shared ideology (consensus)38. As I have
argued in previous chapters, given differences in people’s perspective, interests,
knowledge and beliefs about the social, and division of labour as the foundation
of social systems and processes, a shared ideology cannot be considered the foun-
37Consider e.g. the example cases of describing a dream, saying I’m in pain and identifying
a table (Kripke 1982: Footnote 82, p. 99, p. 105).
38I should note that there is in my mind quite a significant gap between the theoretical
pronouncements of the Programme and some of its actual empirical work. In my view, the
Programme’s official methodology accords no place for the study of the circumstances of lan-
guage use and conduct focusing instead on the processes of collective alignment of sources. Yet,
for instance, in an early book length treatise (Barnes 1977) Barnes’s approach builds upon the
idea of the constitutive relation of (scientific) knowledge to interests with which we engage in
knowledge production in the sense in which for instance map making is typically orientated to
the practical usage of maps for navigation. Another example is Bloor’s discussion of Ludwig
Fleck’s account of the emergence of syphilis as an illness (Bloor 1983: 34). In terms of its theory,
in a range of publications, the Programme is at best ambiguous about the distinction between
human sociality as based on shared beliefs as contrasted with shared organisation of activity,
and at worst it lands in the beliefs side of the distinction. Thus, while Bloor does sometime
speak of “agreement in action” (Bloor 1997: 16), there remains an overwhelming sense to the
theoretical view of the Programme that it builds upon the idea of social life as ‘alignment of
sources’, that is agreement in norms, knowledge and beliefs.
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dation of human sociality and social action. Ideological consensus as the basis
of human sociality fails because there is no extensive sharing of knowledge about
the social and that cannot thus be the object upon which consensus operates. A
more plausible notion of consensus, I suggest, concerns the sharing of organisa-
tion of human life where the sharing and agreement in question is not ideological
but organisatory in nature, a crucial categorical difference. I shall elucidate these
complex claims in the next section.
Organisation and the Social Nature of Meaning
As argued above, in the Programme’s account, meaning and normativity draw
essentially from consensus understood ideologically as socially constructed and
enforced ‘alignment of sources’ of human and social action, to requote Bloor’s
phrase. By contrast, throughout this thesis, the objective has been to cast doubts
on the idea that social life builds essentially upon ideological sharing advocating
instead the view of social life as agreement in the organisation of human life.
In this section I shall explore the contrast between these two conceptions of
consensus and consider the implications to the notions of social nature of meaning
and normativity of switching the focus from the source of human and social action
to the organisation of human life.
A crucial element to the Programme’s conception of normativity is that there
are collective checks (Barnes’s ‘verification’) upon individual conduct as well as
initiatory training to novices these being the mechanisms that socially construct
and maintain the alignment in the sources of human and social action. Bloor goes
as far as to say that without consensus there is no meaning: “Meaning, surely, is
that by reference to which we determine right or wrong usage. So as yet, meaning
hasn’t been provided for”.39
It is not clear to me why an idea having not been accepted collectively, that is,
it having no normativity, would mean that the idea is contentless and therefore
meaningless —yet, this is exactly what Bloor seems to argue: “no normativity,
no content; no content, no meaning”, he writes40. For example, that I think that
a whale is a fish but be subsequently corrected by the community who call it a
mammal should not really mean that my thought that whales are not mammals




As I see it, Bloor’s argument seems to invoke an equivocation of the meaning of
the words ‘content’ and ‘meaning’. We may say that social acceptance is capable
of shifting meaning such that old usage is no longer accepted as meaningful, that
is, as correct. This the community could be thought to be able to achieve by
‘the power-move’ of simple stigmatisation of deviance. The various senses in
which someone can be deviant here are “actors’ categories”, as Bloor puts it41,
involving a community deciding that someone is deviant and so she is deviant.
Here in my view a soft sense of the words ‘meaningful’ and ‘meaningless’ is
employed by Bloor and it can amount to a number of things. It may mean that
using a given concept in the old way would be met with puzzlement, possibly by
incomprehension, or that it would be seen as an outdated practice, somewhat as
the parents’ involvement in the negotiation of a future husband for their daughter
is in many cultures now outdated. This does not exclude the possibility of,
for example, historical knowledge of the old ways of using concepts, that is, of
recovering the meaningfulness or intelligibility of the old usage —and that not
by adopting the practice of which it is a part, but by comprehending it. I do not
take Bloor to want to deny this, but I think this is what his position implies.
In contrast to the soft sense, there is, however, also this hard sense of meaning-
fulness, or lack of it: something is plain nonsense or otherwise incomprehensible,
it has no meaning, it has no content. Bloor’s choice of words (‘no content’)
suggests the latter hard usage, but the view of normativity as relying on a con-
sensual ‘power-move’ only supports the conclusion employing the former softer
use. This is significant because the question from the social nature of meaning
revolves around it: does the community determine meaning by a power-move of
simply stigmatising the deviant use or does community have a stronger role here
of determining content and meaning in the harder sense too?
My answer builds around the idea of agreement in organisation of human
life from Chapter 7: performativity is based on agreement in the organisation
of human life essential to which is not to know the same things as other actors
but to engage in reciprocal complementary processes of human activity. From
such a point of view, a consensual power-move that stigmatises deviance is a
possibility of which we indeed have historical examples such as the case of Galileo.
Stigmatisation, however, is not a particularly interesting phenomenon from the
point of view of philosophy of language and meaning. As to the harder ‘no
41Bloor 1997: 105.
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content’ sense of a community determining meaning(lessness), when we think
about situations in which a collective could be said to verify conduct, what this
verification is like and what its object is, we should see that such processes are not
usefully thought of as consisting essentially of verification of individual knowledge
and conduct by the community which result in unconditional declarations of
meaninglessness.
To see this better, begin with considering a problem regarding the idea of
collective verification of conduct as noted by Stephen Turner whose challenges to
the paradigm from sharing we discussed above in Chapter 6. Turner makes his
points against Kripke’s collectivism but due to the similarity of the Programme’s
and Kripke’s views42, the point can be raised against the former too. Where
Barnes spoke of ‘verification’, Kripke used the word ‘tests’43 upon which Turner
seizes and points out that in fact “[t]he are no such tests for most of the practices
that are transmitted as part of a ‘form of life’ ”44. Moreover, Turner continues,
the community of speakers arguably contains a good number of moderately as
well as seriously deviant persons “and perhaps no perfect speaker”45.
In support of the view that the idea of collective verification or test is prob-
lematic one might note that where mathematical operations, as well as scientific
taxonomical activities, are perhaps an example of practices that are fairly clearly
delineable activities and where a rather explicit collective check upon individuals
can perhaps be argued to exist, for a great number of other social activities this
is not so. Taking a mathematics exam at school seems to be a prime example
of a collective check operating upon a fairly well delineable activity. For a great
number of other practices, however, there cannot really be said to exist explicit
tests, nor is the activity itself clearly cut out from the surroundings. Baker and
Hacker seem to be onto something similar as they write that “[m]astery of a tech-
nique is manifest in practice, in doing certain things” but that “a single act in
accord with a rule is not (save in complex settings) an exhibition of mastery of
a technique”46. Thus, for example, on the face of it my behaviour may fail to
comply, say, with regard to some norm about friendship. Yet, it is conceivable
that further debate can be had and reasons advanced as to why I did not comply,
42See Bloor 1997: 7 ff. for a discussion on differences and similarities.
43Kripke 1982: 92 and in passim.
44Turner 1994: 75.
45Turner 1994: 74.
46Baker & Hacker 1985: 161.
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or to what extent did I not comply, what anyway is compliance, and so on. In
such cases normativity is not a clear dualistic matter of deviance or compliance,
but a matter of looking at the various facets of the ‘complex setting’ within which
the act can be seen to appear.
This can be elucidated further by considering Peter Winch’s view of norma-
tivity based on the idea of intelligibility. Published first in 1958, Winch’s seminal
The Idea of a Social Science was an early attempt to trace Wittgenstein’s sig-
nificance to social sciences. At first blush Winch seems to be making the very
same points as the Programme concerning the social processes of training and
communal verification/tests of individual conduct: “it is contact with other indi-
viduals which alone makes possible the external check on one’s actions which is
inseparable from an established standard” and “given a certain sort of training
everybody does, as a matter of course, continue to use these words in the same
way as would everybody else”, Winch writes47.
Yet, Winch also makes the point that for us to have a reason to think that
someone was following a rule it suffices that it is “in principle possible for other
people to grasp”48 what the person is doing. The phrase ‘in principle’ allows
for some considerable flexibility in interpretation of conduct, and rightly so. For
instance, often we do not just write off another person’s deviant behaviour but try
to make sense of it, even if we find it unorthodox or perhaps morally objectionable.
We are to a significant extent able to make sense of, make intelligible, deviant
behaviour. It seems to me that the nature of normativity is understood in Winch
more broadly than in Bloor. Winch’s conception allows us to take a broader look
at some form of organisation of human life in which the deviant conduct might
be seen to fit. Or as Winch puts it: we look for a context in which “[i]n view
of such and such considerations this [a deviant act] will be a reasonable thing to
do”49.
By contrast, the point of view proposed by Bloor is that a given piece of con-
duct can be intelligible in so far as we see it against “the background of paradig-
matic social interaction”50. Saul Kripke makes a similar point: in making the
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that is, we see his conduct as exemplifying something we know from our own
community. In sum, the contrast between Bloor and Winch is this: where Bloor
ties all intelligibility to the possibility of drawing an analogy with existing prac-
tices, Winch’s view allows that enquiries into a foreign practice do not in all cases
have to proceed by seeking analogies with what we know, but merely seeking to
construe the foreign organisation of human life as a form of organisation.
Robinson Crusoe
The contrast matches the two different positions taken by Peter Hacker (and
Winch) on the one hand and by David Bloor (and Saul Kripke) on the other
hand in the once fierce debate in Wittgensteinian literature on the question from
the nature of rule-following by the solitary Robinson Crusoe52. The significance
of the case of Crusoe is this: if the ship-wrecked loner can follow rules in isolation,
then rule-following would not seem to be an essentially communal business.
The discussion must be prefaced by a host of clarifications. First, the case
of Crusoe’s rule-following could be seen to contain two separate questions: one,
is Crusoe able to set himself rules and follow them in isolation, and two, upon
what basis can an external observer of Crusoe plausibly attribute rule-following
to Crusoe? Secondly and relatedly, it is often insisted that the issue is not about
Crusoe’s ability to remember what he did in the past, but a conceptual issue
about the nature of rule-following as a concept. There are in my view, however,
significant wobbles in the literature as to what extent writers keep with this
insistence to which we shall return soon.
Third, most would agree that the human capacity for language and thought
can only develop properly in a social setting of human interactions —hence, feral
children often fail to develop in these respects—, so the abilities of Crusoe too
have a developmental history of that kind. Fourth, most would again admit that
certain practices are social activities by definition, such as commerce defined as
exchange between at least two parties. The question is rather whether some
similar line of thought applies to other kinds of rule-following.
Consider now what seems to me to be an obvious departure from the insis-
tence that the issue is purely conceptual. One such would seem to be the Pro-
gramme’s conception of normativity as the basis of which the following passage
from Wittgenstein is often quoted: in solitary rule-following “whatever is going
52See Hacker 2001: Chapter 10 and Bloor 1997: Chapter 8 and Kripke 1982: 110.
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to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about
’right’ ”53. One aspect of the Programme’s understanding of this passage is that
in it Wittgenstein raises the threat of misidentification faced by the lone Crusoe
and that it is sceptical in import: “take 100 trained language users, operating
to the same specification, and before long, some of the outputs will diverge from
one another”, Bloor argued54. This to me seems to imply the non-conceptual
worry that the individual ‘labelling machines’ cannot be trusted to continue to
remember right and thus, without communal checks, mistakes made by individu-
als will eventually “reduce norms to the merest subjectivity”55. A related way in
which the Programme discusses normativity as a non-conceptual issue is in the
sense in which the community could be thought to be able to make a power-move
and simply stigmatise deviance. This is not a conceptual point about meaning
and hence rule-following, but about how community excludes certain meanings
by a power-move, somewhat as the Catholic Church apparently practically forced
Galileo Galilei to denounce heliocentricism.
Here is another way in which the debate slips from being conceptual and
draws in the question of human abilities, this time those of the external observer
trying to determine whether Crusoe follows rules or not. To requote Bloor and
Kripke above, in their view we are able to make Crusoe’s conduct intelligible in
so far as we see it against “the background of paradigmatic social interaction” or
in so far as we “are taking him into our community”. By contrast, Peter Hacker
insists that “our judgement that he is following his rules is quite independent of
any judgement about how most members of the English-Speaking Peoples would
react”56. In other words, according to the Bloor-Kripke position intelligibility
can only flow from viewing the foreign in analogy with what we know however
abstract the analogy, whereas Hacker insist that understanding does not require
an analogy at all but that the human mind is capable of understanding the foreign
organisation even if it lacks any analogy with ours, provided that “regularities of
action of sufficient complexity”57 can be observed in the foreigner’s conduct. The
latter would also describe Peter Winch’s account of intelligibility above.
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but ontological in nature. They appear to me as revolving around a dispute about
the human capacity to understand, a question of as to what degree of abstraction
can human understanding get to in trying to conceptualise foreign conduct and
to what degree an individual is able to remember. This to me is the underlying,
although unmentioned, issue in Bloor’s characterisation of his disagreement with
Baker and Hacker58: the latter hold that human individual ‘natural propensities’
(to focus attention and remember fairly consistently, etc.) can generate regularity
and complexity of conduct and hence normativity, whereas for Bloor this position
simply fails to account for normativity by simply positing it. Where we go wrong
here, I suggest, is that the question from normativity is framed ontologically as a
question about mental contents, beliefs and the like, that then invite ontological
speculations about human mental capacities, the capacities of beliefs to determine
future activities and so on.
As discussed at length in Chapter 7, in my reading Wittgenstein’s approach
was not ontological at all. I believe Wittgenstein’s intention was to highlight
the organisatory aspect of human life with warts and all —that is, with human
ingenuity, errors and insufficiencies included— as the hallmark of human life,
whatever its basis in knowledge and beliefs. Thus, I believe the case of Robinson
Crusoe too is not helpfully approached as a question about Crusoe’s capacities to
set himself rules or external observers’ capacities to understand Crusoe. Rather,
all we can say is that in so far as Crusoe leads a human life it will display organ-
isation, regularity, a function or directedness (intentionality) towards a point to
whatever extent he may be capable of it in isolation.
To see this by way of an example, imagine Crusoe giving himself the rule to
stand on one foot for a minute each morning. We can imagine that he would slip
from obeying this rule, remember it wrong and whatnot. But now, by contrast
consider that some rule set by Crusoe for himself becomes truly embedded in
the flow of his life, in this case of solitary life, and that the action sanctioned
by the rule becomes an important part of the organisation of that form of life
and consequently harder to drop without modifying the form of life. Our Crusoe
may have, for example, set himself the rule that every day at noon he is to erect
a temporary shade for his tomato plants to protect them from the burning sun.
Now he might well on occasion forget this, but it is also clear that continual
forgetting would have an impact on the kind of life he lives —for example, that
58(Bloor 2007: Footnote 9).
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he leads a farmer’s life, or that he has access to tomatoes with nutritional value
central to Crusoe’s survival, and so forth. And of course there would be that
shade lying about, as well as other gardening equipment that he regularly uses,
reminding him of what he is to do —although ‘reminding’ is not the right word
here, for gardening equipment and practices are an essential part of how he lives
life on a day to day basis, not something he has to remember or decide to use.
The point is, it is all the same whether Crusoe can remember or will eventually
get confused with the rules he gives himself —at most it is tragic if he forgets.
What is important is that he attempts to live an organised life and this is the
hallmark of human life. From this perspective it makes little sense to ask whether
he could forget the practice, for then he would be forgetting how to live his life.
Also the worry from ‘whatever is going to seem right to him is right’ is out of
place here.
What, then, was Wittgenstein on about in the above quoted passage about
whatever is going to seem right is right? The context is the example case of
someone keeping a private diary “about the recurrence of a certain sensation”
which the person notes in her diary by the letter S59. This (PI §258.) and the
following passages are complex in the course of which a number of points are
made, but in my reading the line that comes two remarks later at §260. sums up
the moral of the discussion: “... a note [in a diary] has a function, and this “S”
so far has none”. That is to say, human activities are part of organised activity
with a point or function (a conceptual observation) whatever that may be —we
do not need to agree on this (individual differences in knowledge)—, and the
private diarist’s markings too need to be seen in relation to some such system
and a function otherwise we are merely left wondering with Wittgenstein: “[b]ut
what is this ceremony for? for that is all it seems to be!” —a private ceremony
for nothing60.
The same point about human conduct being characterised as systematic and
having a function is also made at PI §268.:
59Wittgenstein 1958: §258. In ‘Notes for the Philosophical Lecture’ found in Wittgenstein’s
Nachlass (MS 166), the diary is referred to as Robinson Crusoe’s diary. See Rush Rhees’
notes on a lecture with this topic in Wittgenstein 1993: Chapter 11. The availability since
2000 in electronic format of virtually all of Wittgenstein’s unpublished writings, his Nachlass
(Wittgenstein 2000, 1996), allows us to easily locate several mentions of Robinson Crusoe
by Wittgenstein in these writings, some of which have also been translated and published in
Philosophical Occasions (Wittgenstein 1993: Chapters 10., 11. and 14.). Unfortunately, space
does not permit an exegesis of these mentions here.
60Wittgenstein 1958: §258.
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Why can’t my right hand give my left hand money? —My right hand
can put it into my left hand. My right hand can write a deed of gift
and my left hand a receipt.— But the further practical consequences
would not be those of a gift. When the left hand has taken the money
from the right, etc., we shall ask: “Well, and what of it?” [Nun,
und was weiter? ] And the same could be asked if a person had given
himself a private definition of a word; I mean, if he has said the word to
himself and at the same time has directed his attention to a sensation.
As I read it, the passage makes two points. First, giving a gift is typically
something taking place between persons —although this is not quite right as I can
give myself a gift in the sense that I can as it were reward or spoil myself for a job
well done —it seems to me that this could be legitimately referred to as ‘giving
a gift’. Bloor makes this conceptual point about the quoted passage saying one
hand cannot “genuinely buy” from the other if buying is understood in the usual
sense of an exchange between two parties61. We have no problem with admitting
this conceptual point, for as noted towards the start of this section, most would
agree that certain activities by definition involve more than one person.
We can also follow Bloor saying that Crusoe can name a previously unknown
bird he finds on the island, but that he cannot bring the institution of naming to a
“culmination” which Bloor characterises as it becoming “a veritable institution”
or “a collective practice”62. As far as I understand, these are remarks about social
institutions typically involving many people. Bloor’s points, being conceptual,
are correct, yet the other points he makes about normativity —the one from
power-moves and the human labelling machines being prone to mistakes— are
not conceptual.
The second point, also conceptual but distinct from Bloor’s, that the above
quoted passage from Wittgenstein makes is this: the right hand giving the left
hand money is divorced from any point or function. We can as it were imagine
the transaction to take place but ‘what of it?’ —it would seem to have no point.
We can think of a function for it —say, someone does it as a joke— and then it
makes sense. The same goes for private definitions: it is conceivable that I keep
a diary of a recurring pain and show it to my doctor to aid his diagnosis. Here it
is even conceivable that I struggle to describe what kind of a pain I have, and in
this sense my pain could be said to be private. The doctor may also have a fair




if she is unable to correlate it with anything in my physical condition. But cases
like this are also part of human life, of social reality.
Let us sum up the complex considerations of the foregoing two sections. I set
out with noting the central role of the idea of communal verification or tests to
the Programme’s ideas of normativity but argued, drawing from Turner, Baker
and Hacker, and Winch, that such communal checks hardly ever are clear cut
matters such that we could speak of communal verification and acceptance or
rejection of individual conduct. The Programme was shown to operate with a
strong notion of normativity that claims to be able to radically split between
deviance and compliance illustrated for example by the fact that in Bloor con-
sensus is drawn in as determinant of meaning. I sought to clarify the battle
lines by distinguishing between conceptual and non-conceptual remarks about
the issue. Non-conceptually, meaning and normativity are social in nature for in-
stance by the collective being in principle capable of a power-move that represses
deviant meanings. Wittgenstein, however, I argued, approaches meaning solely
conceptually and his approach here can be characterised as organisatory: what-
ever problems his isolation and limitations of capacities might pose for Crusoe, in
so far as Crusoe leads a human life his conduct will display organisation, function
and directedness towards one point or another. In this point of view, essential
to meaning, intelligibility and meaningfulness of human conduct —whether indi-
vidual or social action— is that it is organised. This admits of lapses in memory
and mistakes without immediately calling to question that organised human life
is taking place. Also, in this point of view, the question of collective verification
and collective declaration of deviance are of secondary importance.
In closing, I would like to point out that I am aware that Bloor’s point with
his attack on individualism was to counter the idea that if we allow that indi-
viduals can initiate institutions by themselves then we have moved a great deal
towards accepting the causal-deterministic picture of meaning, rule-following and
associated issues. It is important to Bloor and the Programme that human life
does not appear as being spun in the privacy of individuals’ heads, an insistence
with which we sympathise. I want to highlight that the organisatory approach
does not challenge such views. To the contrary, to view social life as an essentially
organisatory achievement is very much to stress the sociality of human existence.
The present disagreement with the Programme lies in its relation with the ideo-
logical approach and the paradigm from sharing: as discussed above, ultimately
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the Programme views social life as based upon the alignment in sources of social
action to use Bloor’s phrase.
Organisation and Arbitrariness
I conclude this chapter with another critical challenge to the Programme, in
particular to its collectivist constructivism. As noted on a couple of occasions
above, one of the major points of the collectivist-constructivist position is the
observation of a certain arbitrariness pertaining to meaning arising from cer-
tain self-referential, collectively performative nature of social institutions. In this
view, the striking characteristic of social reality becomes its self-referentiality,
that is, how it appears to be given rise to by a collective decision, and not what-
ever purposes or point it might serve, hence the arbitrariness, contingency. In
this vein, some Strong Programmers have argued that for example the nature
of a technological artefact cannot be exhaustively defined by its function, as ap-
parently some rather recent approaches in the relevant branch of sociology have
argued, but that it is essential to note the self-referential nature of what it is
to use an artefact correctly63. The point is fair as such, but by downplaying
functions constructivism in general threatens to lose contact with human life as
purposeful activity. Let me try to explain.
Recall here the argument of Part 1 that the difficulty of meaningfully address-
ing environmental problems resides in the tight coupling of human well-being with
the organisation of human life on a global industrial market economy basis —all
the inequalities and conflict notwithstanding. In other words, one might say that
global industrial market society serves an important function, namely that of
maintaining a certain level of human well-being on this planet, all inequalities
notwithstanding. Moreover, to dismantle the organisation would throw up the
challenge of transferring to some other form of organising the everyday life and
well-being of the masses.
Now, conceptualising the global industrial market societal form of organisa-
tion of human life as a self-referential achievement does not as such allow us to
comprehend the drastic changes needed in the organisation in order to address
environmental problems precisely because of the de-emphasis on the function of
the organisation by the collectivist-constructivist position. To requote Conrad
Lodziak, he pointed out that “[w]hen the consumption of food, for example, is
63Schyfter 2009.
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treated solely as a symbolic activity, the main purpose of consuming food does
not figure in its explanation”64. Similarly, to understand the problematicity of
environmental problems and that of addressing them is to understand the deep
functional interconnections between the form of organisation of human life and
the quality of human life as we have it, as well as its environmental burden.
This way, the collectivist-constructivist position, due to its claim from the arbi-
trariness of function, does not allow us to grasp the depth of the problem with
environmental problems.
In the Programme, for instance, the performativity and self-referentiality of
social institutions has tended to have been conceived ideologically as performances
of something like a collective will or belief. For example, Barry Barnes summarises
the import of self-referentiality of social institutions in the phrase “what we take
to be money is money”65. The example is favoured by the Programmers and so
David Bloor wrote that “[i]f everyone were to cease to think of coins, then bits of
metal would continue to exist, but coins would vanish into thin air”66 and Martin
Kusch that “[m]oney, we might say, is what we collectively take to be money”67.
The core idea of the Programme is true enough: money does not owe its
existence to some naturalistic fact but is in some sense fundamentally a human
construct. Yet, in the present view it is essential to see that bits of metal as
coins are not brought in and out of social existence by acts of collective thinking,
conceptualising, remembering or lack thereof. The institution of money is a
particularly complex matter only one aspect of which is anything like an explicit
belief, public trust, in the stability of currency —a bank run being a favourite
example of how collective beliefs give rise to and maintain social kinds. Money, in
its various forms, is also a central vehicle of exchanges in the trade of goods and
services in global industrial market society. Money economy, thus, is an essential
structural component of market society and associated phenomena such as wage
labour and the commodification of production. The institution of money in its
many forms is performed, not by a collective belief in money, but when market
economy is performed in a variety of countless everyday activities —and hence,
as argued above, the actors’ attitudes to money are to a significant extent non-
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consensual belief in money as money, which speaking of consensus and communal
agreement would seem to presuppose, and so, our collective performance of money
should be seen as organisatory rather than conceptual, that is ideological, in
nature.
That the idea of performativity is so easily expressed as a linguistic thing, as a
property of certain type of utterances and the beliefs that utterances are thought
to reflect, may be explained by the fact that in one of the first and most prominent
uses of the term in the philosopher J. L. Austin’s work from the 1950s68 it is used
exactly in this sense, that is, as a property of certain type of utterances called
performatives. There is a great danger of a misrepresentation here. The social is
first and foremost about interaction.
The Programme’s view from the arbitrariness of meaning is supported by their
reading of Wittgenstein’s familiar example, completing a series of numbers. We
have discussed this above, but let us quickly run through the details again. In the
course of the discussion Wittgenstein recounts a commonsensical picture about
rule-following and the mental processes underlying it, one that he is however going
to reject, describing its core message thus: “understanding ... is a state which is
the source of the correct use”. In giving this kind of an account, Wittgenstein
writes, one is probably thinking of understanding and thus of rule-following by
the model “of the derivation of a series from its algebraic formula” where the
formula would be the mental representation of the rule according to which one is
to proceed. Yet, and here comes the key claim from Wittgenstein, also seized upon
by the Programme: “we can think of more than one application of an algebraic
formula; and every type of application can in turn be formulated algebraically”69.
What is the point he is making here?
According to the Programme, the point is that in principle at any given mo-
ment any number of possibilities of glossing a rule exist. Barnes expressed this
by saying that “ ‘[r]eality’ does not mind how we cluster it”70 and that social
processes of training and verification are needed to give focus and duration to
our classifications. The point also underlies the Programme’s so-called finitism
in that, in Bloor’s words, as “[t]he number of illustrations and examples a teacher






sciousness in this regard must be finite”72 and thus “[w]e could take our concepts
or rules anywhere, in any direction, and count anything as a new member of an
old class”73.
In the present reading, however, Wittgenstein’s point was not to highlight
the problem generated by finite examples for later application but to reject the
whole picture of understanding, rule-following and the like as essentially issues of
mental processes and their ability, or lack of it, to determine future applications.
This becomes clear only a few remarks later as Wittgenstein writes “[t]ry not
to think of understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all”74. The problem of many
interpretations of an algebraic formula is another paradox that Wittgenstein spun
to the proposal that understanding and meaning are mental processes. It is not
meant to have a solution for example by appeal to collective verification.75
A similar paradox was Wittgenstein’s observation that once we replace the
mental representation of a rule with a physical schema, for example a schema of
arrows about how to read a table76, it begins to seem that the physical schema falls
short of the mental representation of the rule because the physical schema needs
interpretation whereas the mental representation does not77. This Wittgenstein
thought of as an absurdity illustrating that what really does most work in such
lines of reasoning is just an almost mystical picture of the queer capacities of
mental processes.
Wittgenstein’s posing of the problem of many interpretations paves the way
—not to the collectivist contention that social processes of training and correc-
tion can alleviate the problem— but to the idea that we should think of the
issue in wholly different terms. This would be to defocus from the ontology of
rule-following to the significance of understanding and intending to the develop-
mental course of human life. The point I am making is of course the same as I




74Wittgenstein 1958: §154. This remark gains additional weight in that it comes as the
conclusion of a sustained discussion stretching from §143. until §155. of the completing series
according to a formation rule example.
75For a similar reading, see Nigel Pleasants on Wittgenstein’s “immmanent critique” and the
private language argument as of the reductio ad absurdum form (Pleasants 1999: 25 ff).
76Wittgenstein 1958: §86.
77A lengthier and more explicit discussion than in the Investigations of the point can be
found in Wittgenstein 1969: 34 ff.
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What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the
correct idea of the use of the word ‘to remember’. We say that this
picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use
of the word as it is.78
The point is closely analogous to the one in Wittgenstein’s so-called ‘beetle
in the box’ scenario in which Wittgenstein critically discussed the view of pain
as essentially an internal, neural or phenomenal thing. For Wittgenstein, in such
a picture peoples’ having pains is as if “everyone had a box with something in
it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone
says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle”, Wittgenstein
describes. Now, under these conditions, Wittgenstein continues, it is imaginable
that each person’s beetle could be something different, it could be always changing
or even not exist at all, without talk and activities around it being affected at all.
Thus, Wittgenstein concludes: “if we construe the grammar of the expression
of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of
consideration as irrelevant”79. The point, as I understand it, is not that feeling
pain is irrelevant but that what is in question in human interactions around
pains is essentially the role of pains, pain-language, understanding and claims of
understanding in the course and development of human interaction.
Going back to the idea of arbitrariness of meaning, the reason why the Pro-
gramme’s claim that a rule can be developed in any way whatsoever seems (and
is) so outlandish is because it effectively divorces the meaning of doing or saying
of something from its point, role and surroundings. We saw this in a number
of contexts above: money is money because we decide so, a whale is not a fish
because we decide so, and so on. Yet, certainly an organisatory analysis of money
will look different from one of classifications, but an important general point is
to look at both of them as playing a role in (some area of) the wider organisation
of human activity with a point.
Conclusion
This chapter elucidated the nature of the organisatory point of view to a num-
ber of debates had about normativity and the social nature of meaning in the




extensive uses made in the literature of certain Wittgensteinian ideas about the
social nature of meaning and normativity, namely, that by the Strong Programme.
I illustrated the contrasts in which a non-ontological, organisatory reading of
Wittgenstein stands to the Programme’s reading as well as to some other Wittgen-
stein readings. I expanded the discussion to a general critique of constructivism as
unable to account for the functional dimension of social organisation. Construc-
tivism, I argued, being blind to the functions of social organisations, is thereby
blind also to the coupling of human well-being with the organisation of human
life and therefore, as argued in Part 1, also to the essentially structural quality
of human environmental burden.

Chapter 9
As Humble as Table, Lamp and
Door
There’s an evenin’ haze settlin’ over the town
Starlight by the edge of the creek
The buyin’ power of the proletariat’s gone down
Money’s gettin’ shallow and weak
The place I love best is a sweet memory
It’s a new path that we trod
They say low wages are a reality
If we want to compete abroad
— Bob Dylan, Workingman’s Blues #2
To me Dylan’s lyric perceptively captures something essential about human ex-
istence. In the quoted verse, Dylan interlaces the very mundane experiences,
hopes and dreams of an individual with the often harsh societal realities she is
confronted with capturing thereby two distinct but important dimensions of hu-
man life: the ‘subjectivity’ of the individual perspective and the ‘objectivity’ of
the societal frame of her existence. Whether or not it has come through in the
preceding pages, a similar view of human existence informs this thesis: we must
note and respect individuality, the differences in people’s perspectives, yet we
must also note the impersonal forces shaping human societal existence. To put
the same in social theoretical jargon, I have in a way sought to take methodolog-
ical individualism seriously and acknowledge the human actor in her subjectivity
and individuality but to do this in a way that does not lose track of the human
being as a societal being. I believe the Wittgensteinian idea discussed above of
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agreement of form of life or in the organisation of human life creates the space
for this kind of conceptualisation of human life.
In this chapter I shall draw a series of parallels between the core Wittgen-
steinian ideas of the present approach and a number of works in human sciences.
These are Norbert Elias’ idea of multiple perspectives, Foucault’s characterisation
of historical ‘emergence’, Marx’s historical materialism and, finally, a compara-
tively recent entrant to the social theoretical scene, the so-called practice theory.
As a connecting theme emerges the idea of the mundane, everyday quality of our
collective performance of the social, a theme whose presence in Wittgenstein’s
philosophy I shall also illustrate.
Elias on Perspectives
The epistemological worries discussed in Chapter 6 suggest that there are indi-
vidual differences in perspective and knowledge of the social. In this section I
shall discuss the present Wittgensteinian line of thought in relation to the idea
of multiple perspectives from the German sociologist Norbert Elias.
Let us begin with a passage in Elias’ classic The Civilizing Process :
... from the interweaving of countless individual interests and in-
tentions —whether tending in the same direction or in divergent and
hostile directions— something comes into being that was planned and
intended by none of these individuals, yet has emerged nevertheless
from their intentions and actions. And really this is the whole secret
of social figurations, their compelling dynamics, their structural reg-
ularities, their process character and their development; this is the
secret of sociogenesis and of relational dynamics.1
Another work by Elias’s, titled What is Sociology? 2, is a distinctly theoreti-
cal work written late in the author’s career and helps to get to grips with many
of the technical terms appearing in the quoted passage. In the introduction to
the work Elias emerges as an advocate of a new methodology for sociology. One
of Elias’s leading themes is the idea of the long term of social change. Social
change is a longer process —“two or three generations”, Elias says3— requiring
the emergence of appropriate social conditions for the new ideas to be able to be





a process of interweaving, as Elias’s technical term goes. Thus, when Elias in the
above quoted passage speaks of ‘the interweaving of countless individual interests
and intentions’ that in their multiplicity nevertheless produce something concrete
he has in mind a longer phase of interweaving where, despite the divergent ele-
ments —individual intentions for instance—, a particular direction is discernible.
This direction emerges when we study developments over the long term, as Elias
demonstrates in The Civilizing Process studying changes in attitudes and habits
over a long span from the medieval to early modern times.
Writing in the late 1970s, Elias argued that sociology needs a new set of con-
cepts to better comprehend social life and to avoid certain pitfalls of the tradition.
In an observation interestingly parallel to Wittgenstein’s Elias argues that “[o]ur
languages tend to place at the forefront of our attention substantives, which have
the character of things in a state of rest”4. The parallel I see here to Wittgen-
stein’s views relates to his claim that great philosophical confusion results when
processes such as thinking, reading, intending, being in pain, and meaning more
generally, are thought of as ‘substantives’, things essentially residing somewhere,
for example in the person’s mind or brain or perhaps in some platonic realm.
In a number of contexts in the foregoing chapters I have attempted to illustrate
the nature of the Wittgensteinian organisatory and non-ontological alternative
based on the idea of looking at the exhibition of pains, understanding and other
allegedly essentially mental phenomena as moves in the developmental course of
human interaction.
Elias claims that what results in sociology of this ‘substantivisation’ of aspects
of social life are misleading “conceptual distinctions between the actor and his
activity, between structures and processes, or between objects and relationships”5.
And so, “[o]ne can find oneself caught up in long discussions of the nature of the
relationship between these two apparently separate objects”6. Elias’s ideas of the
‘process of interweaving’ is meant to bring relief to the situation.
One particularly interesting idea that Elias uses to articulate the meaning
of ‘interweaving’ is the idea from “multiple perspectives”7. In the functionalist
tradition (e.g. Parsons) we find the idea of subsystems as functional to the main-
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thinking focusing too much around the functioning of the given social system.
Elias argues that this conceals the fact that
those who form them [social systems], institutions never perform a
function exclusively for the so-called ‘system’, ... they also perform a
function for their members.8
A crucial virtue of the view from multiple perspectives is that “it enables
us to see people again behind all the impersonal, even seemingly extra-human,
social structures”, Elias adds9. One might say Elias calls here for sensitivity to
individuality and plurality within social systems and processes.
The meaning of ‘process’ and ‘interweaving’ can be further characterised by
considering another technical term from Elias, that of figuration, mentioned also
in the quoted passage with which this section began. While Elias has enabled
us to see the individuals again, social systems are not to be characterised by
one-sided individual perspectives only:
the perspectives of individual players intermesh to create a game
which no single player can control. ... it is more likely that the players’
moves, plans and perspectives will be influenced by the game.10
Therefore, Elias continues, “we can never think of people singly and alone;
we must always think of them as people in figurations”11. The central idea of
figurations is that, while “it is still possible to bow to tradition, and to speak of
the ‘game’ as if it had an existence of its own”12, the game is being shaped by
the players’ actions as much as these are being shaped by the framework of the
game. There obtains a certain dynamic of interweaving.
In What Is Sociology? Elias describes a number of ‘game models’ the workings
of which are supposed to illustrate the process of interweaving in figurations:
“[b]y using the image of people playing a game as a metaphor for people forming
societies together, it is easier to rethink”13 the tradition, Elias writes. As Elias
frames these models, they appear principally as figurations of power relations as








Now, one of the interesting conclusions drawn by Elias from his game models is
that “[t]he more the game comes to resemble a social process” —that is one where
all players have a role in shaping the outcome of the social process— “the less it
comes to resemble the implementation of an individual plan”14. The reasoning
here is that as individuals exercise their powers in the world and on each other this
process of interweaving does go in some particular direction but, since no player
alone is able to dictate the direction, there is no individual plan that the process
realises. Hence, one could conclude in the words of the above quoted passage
from The Civilizing Process : “something comes into being that was planned and
intended by none of these individuals, yet has emerged nevertheless from their
intentions and actions. And really this is the whole secret of social figurations”.
For the present purposes the logic of social processes proposed by Elias is
worth thinking about a little bit more. The logic is that, as social processes bring
together people to interact with each other, it should at least not be assumed
straight up that the direction in which the individuals pull is uniform. This point
Elias raises in particular against the structural-functional tradition emanating
from Talcott Parsons. That tradition saw social systems as standing or falling
according to the level of social cohesion exhibited by them. Social cohesion was
understood by Parsons first and foremost to mean the sharing of a normative
orientation. What did not conform was seen as an anomaly.
On a final note on Elias, reading his What Is Sociology? one is struck by
the complete absence of the important technical term of The Civilizing Process,
namely that of habitus, and it is in general the latter work and the concept of
habitus that Elias is associated with15. While the view of What Is Sociology?
would seem to emphasise the plurality and differences among the interweaving
actors, in The Civilizing Process Elias writes that “the change in habitus charac-
teristic of a civilizing process is subject to a quite specific order and direction”.
Elias continues saying that “[a]s more and more people must attune their conduct
to that of others, the web of actions must be organized more and more strictly
and accurately”. In these circumstances individuals develop a “psychic habitus”,
a mechanism of self-regulation, “an automatism, a self-compulsion that he or she
cannot resist even if he or she consciously wishes to”, Elias explains.16 This is
the historical civilizing process in which in place of external, often physical and
14Elias 1978: 82.
15Linklater & Mennell 2010
16Elias 2000: 367.
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violent constraints exercised by the strong, develop psychic constraints that in
a novel way regulate social existence. The picture here is rather Parsonian, one
that Elias attacks vigorously in What Is Sociology?.
Foucault on Emergence
Before inspecting more closely in the following section the parallel between Elias
and Wittgenstein, I note that Elias’s idea from multiple perspectives seems to
me to be in many ways similar to what Michel Foucault writes on historical
genealogy and processes of historical emergence. In his Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History17, Foucault provides reflections characterisable as philosophy of history
employing the Nietzschean notion genealogy as well as power, the latter most
famous from Foucault himself.
We may begin with Foucault’s use of the notion of power discussed in a paper
titled The Subject and Power 18. In the paper Foucault contrasts two concepts
of power. One is the binary conception that sets power up against that which it
actively and explicitly limits and suppresses19. This conception of power, how-
ever, does not allow us to expose that character of power which “makes for its
productiveness, its strategic resourcefulness”, Foucault argues20. To expose this
facet of power, one must see that power “masks a substantial part of itself”21.
Foucault gives the following historical example. Historically, emerging powers
such as monarchic institutions “presented themselves as agencies of regulation,
arbitration, ... as a way of introducing order”, he writes22. This way power is as it
were concealed by making it synonymous with order and the submission to power
concealed as restoration of order. This is a form of power “whose operation is ...
ensured ... by technique ... by normalization ... by control”, Foucault describes23.
Now, with this concept of power in mind, let us review Foucault’s philosophy
of history by considering his notions of genealogy and emergence. According to
Foucault, history, as well as society, can be seen as a process in which forces
“play”, struggle or clash24. One way to understand this could be this: differently
17Foucault 1977.
18Foucault 1982.







positioned individuals and groups act in society from the points of view of their
respective positions. They try to assert their concepts and notions of normalcy
in terms of which social reality is to be articulated and organised. In the course
of these processes ideas, institutions, and so on are acted out, emerge and renew
—the process is their emergence, their genealogy.
Foucault argues, however, that given the nature of power as an attempt to
introduce mechanisms of control and normalisation, it can be said that “no one
is responsible for an emergence”25. What this means is that since for example
ideas in the Foucaultian view are products of (ongoing) clashes of forces, no one
really is in control of what the final product will be, hence ‘no one is responsible’
for it. To get a grasp of the meaning of this metaphoric language I find it helpful
to think of the historical emergence, say, of an idea as a compromise that reflects
various factors that played a part in its genealogy.
What this suggests to the study of history and society is that we see historical
events in a larger context of their emergence and their continual development in
human interaction. One is reminded of the words of the British philosopher and
archaeologist R. G. Collingwood (1889–1943):
Better historical thinking, deeper historical knowledge, would show
us ... not a single unchanged idea, but a dynamic interplay of ideas,
containing elements which, even quite early, prepare its conversion
into [something else].26
A similar methodological view is expressed in Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowl-
edge27. There Foucault characterises the writing of history as an encounter with
“a mass of elements that have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation
to one another to form totalities”28. In other words, historical analysis is about
organising aspects of history in some sort of wholes, constructing ‘constraints’
on the given materials by organising it. Now, Foucault’s project contrasts with
this. His is “an enterprise that wishes”, Foucault says, “to reveal how these con-
straints could come about”29. This way he intends “to question teleologies and
totalisations”30 constructed in historical writing.
25Foucault 1977: 150.
26Reprinted in Budd 2009: 249. A similar argument is advanced persuasively in Skinner 1969
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At the same time, Foucault adds, the approach “is not critical, most of the
time”, and “it is not a way of saying that everyone else is wrong”31. It is perhaps
fair to characterise Foucault’s project as one of trying to show that there are
alternatives : “These pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are
accepted without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected
definitively of course, but the tranquillity with which they are accepted must be
disturbed”32. He continues saying that
we must show that they [the syntheses, continuities, discontinuities]
do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a con-
struction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of
which must be scrutinised: we must define in what conditions and in
view of which analyses certain of them are legitimate; and we must
indicate which of them can never be accepted in any circumstances.33
The project described here, one could say, aims at revealing the complex
processes of emergence that characterises events as well as later articulations of
our knowledge about them. This is an attempt of a “genealogical critique ... to
reveal the contingent, practical, and historical condition of our existence”, as one
commentator put it34. Moreover, the project can be seen to draw from a picture
of social life as a continual process of emergence or interweaving engaged in by
differently placed actors.
In this connection, I want to briefly attempt to situate this thesis with respect
to the larger although perhaps vague, and therefore dangerous, theme of post-
modernity. One commentator described postmodernism as the view that “the
language system we use to think and communicate [is] forever separate from the
supposed reality about which we speak”35. If it is fair to characterise Foucault’s
thought as postmodern then this is not the message I take home from him. To
me a central character of postmodern thinking, exemplified for instance in Fou-
cault, is the conviction that there will always be various forces at play both in the
development of social-historical situations themselves as well as in the creation of
later accounts of them. There is this sense to the Foucaultian continual process
of emergence. Postmodernity, then, is first and foremost humility in the face of







the social-historical is not easy, but our efforts to know are continually hampered
by the complexity of the phenomena we are trying to get to grips with as well as
that we look at it from our own perspective. If, as it did for one historian, the
Enlightenment represented a ‘recovery of the nerve’ to boldly declare the discov-
ery of wisdom and knowledge36, then postmodernity represents a certain shirking
back from this surety, a certain losing of nerve if you like, but in the present view
it is a more balanced and realistic view of human knowledge. This to me is one
of the chief lessons from Foucault as well as ‘postmodernity’ in general, and I
see the present thesis as a part of that same intellectual current. By contrast,
as discussed with examples in Part 1 (in particular Chapter 3), many ideological
arguments, as found in environmentalism and environmental history, effectively
reduce the complexity of ‘historical emergence’ to its alleged essence in shared or
elite ideology.
As Humble as Table, Lamp and Door
The picture of the social process, of social and historical emergence, that we find
in Foucault and Elias (of What Is Sociology? ) is characterised by the interplay
of various forces and differently situated actors in a sinuous, multifaceted set of
ongoing processes. In Chapter 7 I discussed my reading of Wittgenstein’s blind
agreement in form of life as yielding a similar picture of social life: differently
placed actors agree in the organisation of human life, not fundamentally by shared
knowledge of it, but by our engagement in it in complementary and reciprocal
roles, or in division of labour. What I have called Wittgenstein’s non-ontological
approach to the surroundings, not the source, of human and social action are just
other facets of the same perspective to social reality.
One particular aspect of this is the idea of the mundane, everyday quality of
the activities in terms of which we participate in the collective performance of
the social. A number of passages can be found in the later Wittgenstein where
he would seem to be making a similar point. He argued, for instance, that
[t]he aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden be-
cause of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice
something —because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real founda-
tions of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has
at some time struck him.37
36Gay 1969.
37Wittgenstein 1958: §129.
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In another place he wrote that
What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean
the importance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts of
nature: such facts as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great
generality”38.
Again, in Wittgenstein’s perspective, the essential aspects about language and
social life are “already in plain view”39. The meaning-as-use of language, actions
and so on, is “as humble a one as that of the words ‘table’, ‘lamp’, ‘door’ ”, he
wrote40. In my reading, Wittgenstein conceptualised the mundane everyday uses
of language, and thereby the wider everyday human activities with which they
are interwoven, as a sort of a base level, a kind of an “original home” as he called
it41, of meaning. This is to say, we see the meaning of expressions by looking at
their uses or function in the course of everyday activities.
This takes us to the often quoted passage about the kind of method that
Wittgenstein recommends for philosophy:
we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be any-
thing hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all
explanation, and description alone must take its place.42
In the reading I advocate, words such as ‘theory’, ‘hypothetical’ and ‘explana-
tion’ refer here to attempts at getting to the underlying, hidden mental source of
human activity. ‘Theory’ is used here in the sense of making a hypothesis about
the mechanism that underlies the activity of reading: “what reading consists in,
we shall be inclined to say: it is a special conscious activity of mind”, Wittgenstein
had his interlocutor say. To this Wittgenstein replied: “But these mechanisms
are only hypotheses, models designed to explain, to sum up, what you observe”43.
As indicated in a number of connections above Wittgenstein rejected all theories,
hypothesis, explanations of the hidden source of human activity.
What, then, is Wittgenstein’s alternative descriptive approach? It would ap-
pear to consist of the essentially philosophically unastonishing activity of “ar-








Bekannten]44. Yet, to requote Wittgenstein, he did not think this would nec-
essarily be an easy task: “[t]he use of [a word] in the ordinary circumstances
of our life is of course extremely familiar to us. But the part the word plays
in our life, and therewith the language-game in which we employ it, would be
difficult to describe even in rough outline”45. However, in the organisatory read-
ing, the essential point in a description in Wittgenstein’s sense is that describes
an organised system of action, hence the terms Wittgenstein used to refer to it,
(language-)game, technique46, form (of life), which can all be read as highlighting
the system-like, organised character of the activities in question. It is also in this
fundamental aspect of the later Wittgenstein’s thought that we shall next look
for the similarity to Karl Marx’s thought.
Marx and Wittgenstein
In his One Dimensional Man47, citing passages from the Investigations such as
that the meaning is as humble as table, lamp and door, Herbert Marcuse took on
Wittgenstein for his alleged conservatism seeing no value whatsoever in Wittgen-
stein for a thinker with a critical purpose. I think I understand where this critique
comes from, although in my reading of Wittgenstein it is misguided. In fact, the
present thesis can be read as providing, if you like, a critical materialist —as
opposed to a collectivist-constructivist— reading of the later Wittgenstein.
That there are similarities between Marx’s and the later Wittgenstein’s ideas
is by now a reasonably well recognised and discussed theme in the literature48.
The most important channel of influence of Marx’s ideas upon Wittgenstein ap-
pears to have been the Italian economist Piero Sraffa. In the 1930s in Cambridge,
Wittgenstein had discussions with Sraffa about his earlier philosophy expressed
44Wittgenstein 1958: §109.
45Wittgenstein 1958: §156.
46See e.g. Wittgenstein 1958: §199., §337., §557.
47Marcuse 1964.
48Early attempts include the book length works by David Rubinstein (1981) and Susan Eas-
ton (1983) and the papers in Kitching & Pleasants 2002: Part V. More recent works include
the collection of papers by Kitching and Pleasants (2002). A paper by Marion (2005) is one of
the few, if not the only one around, to discuss mentions of Sraffa in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass
(Wittgenstein 2000, 1996) but the use made of these is minimal. Biographically and other-
wise interesting paper by the economist and a friend of Sraffa’s Amartya Sen (2003) is worth
mentioning. Sinha 2009 contains some interesting passages from letters between Sraffa and
Wittgenstein. Rothhaupt (2011) cites and notes the importance of, but only briefly explores,
the Sraffa passages in the Nachlass. Other works I know of include Read 2000 and Gebauer
2009: 139 ff.
210 Chapter 9. As Humble as Table, Lamp and Door
in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. In this period Wittgenstein began more and
more intensely to doubt his views in the Tractatus and to develop his so-called
‘later philosophy’. Wittgenstein himself acknowledges Sraffa’s influence in the
Preface to the Investigations saying that for many years Sraffa practiced unceas-
ing criticism on Wittgenstein’s thoughts and gave him the “stimulus for the most
consequential ideas of” the Investigations.
There is thus no doubt about the influence of conversations with Sraffa upon
Wittgenstein, but due to the lack of details as to what the two thinkers actually
talked about the exact nature of the influence remains unclear. In principle,
it would seem that the influence could consist of almost anything : did Sraffa,
for instance, convey Marx’s or Marxian ideas to Wittgenstein?; and what was
Sraffa’s reading of them?; and in how much detail were they conveyed?; or did
Sraffa convey merely something that was in his own interests at that time?; and
what did Wittgenstein take home of all this?; or was Wittgenstein perhaps the
one who largely dictated the subject matter of these conversations? There are
bits and pieces of information available that could be alluded to in favour of one
or the other point of view, but in principle the possibilities for speculation seem
endless.
And indeed, a host of different types of approaches to the Marxian influ-
ence upon Wittgenstein exist ranging from close readings of works by Sraffa and
Wittgenstein with an eye on a common similarity to tracing of some broader
methodological similarity in Marx and Wittgenstein, and a lot else in between.
The present approach is, first of all, heavily tinged with the main issue of this the-
sis, namely, that of providing a critical discussion of the contrast between what I
have called the ideological and the (Wittgensteinian) organisatory approaches to
human and social action. Secondly, perhaps typically for a philosophical reading
of the similarity (as opposed to, say, an economist’s reading), I shall be looking
for a fairly abstract methodological similarity between Marx and Wittgenstein.
Perhaps the most striking and often noted general similarity in Marx’s and
Wittgenstein’s views is their rejection of metaphysics. In my reading, in both
thinkers this amounts to the rejection of ideological analyses of social action that
focus on the (shared) ideas allegedly underlying social action. Instead, both
thinkers put an emphasis on the everyday organisation of human interaction and
the significance of this to human life. This will allow us to pit the two against the
ideological approach. By contrast, in Wittgenstein the rejection of metaphysics
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has been taken to mean emphasis on public criteria and standards for internal
states, a reading that I have criticised on a number of occasions above. Similarly,
the common rejection of metaphysics by Wittgenstein and Marx has been taken
to reside both taking a middle position in the so-called culture vs. nature issue49.
Marx and Structures
Some key aspects of Marx’s views can be construed as follows. In The German
Ideology, Marx and Engels argued that as a biological being the human being
must somehow acquire her sustenance which inevitably requires productive acts
of one kind or another. The term ‘materialism’ and its cognates are used by Marx
to refer to the methods and processes of the human wrestling of living out of our
environment.
Marx and Engels argue that the human being is essentially a social being in
that as a matter of fact her productive activities have historically always taken
place within some kind of a social setting, a tribe, family, village, town and now
increasingly the global economic system. In Marx’s terminology, as a social and
productive being the human being enters into various relations of production and
these relations form the economic structure of society. Relations of production
obtain between people, for example such that the master owns the slave, but also
between people and more abstract entities, for example such that the proletarian
owns her labour power, that is her ability and skill to work, and the capitalist
owns the means of production, for example the instruments of production and
raw materials. The form of organisation, of course, varies historically, dynamics
of which Marx and Engels provide ample illustrations and examples50 as well as
a theory of their historical development, a philosophy of history.
Marx saw this kind of a material basis of human existence as the scene where
the real, significant processes of human existence are played out. This view is
expressed with force in the much quoted claims such as that “[t]he mode of
production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and
intellectual life” and that “[i]t is not the consciousness of men that determines
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness”.51
In Marx’s view, in human sciences a crucial priority should be given to the base
49See Rubinstein 2002.
50See e.g. Marx & Engels 2007: 57 ff. and 68 ff.
51Marx 2009.
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(die Basis), that is, the organisation of the human effort to acquire the material
basis of her existence, over the superstructure (der Überbau) of ideas or ideology.
Many commentators have tended to see Marx’s assertion from the base over
superstructure as too radical —economically deterministic— and, furthermore,
that he did not really hold it in such a radical form52. However, what we cannot
deny is the role of the base as the setting in which everyday human life takes
place. One powerful reason for thinking that the base is of foremost importance
is that the intensified division of labour and economic relations increasingly per-
meate our existence on the base level. Through the historical intensification of
division of labour, the web of interactions upon which human existence relies,
has become ever more complicated. That is to say, the web of human inter-
actions that provides the material basis of our existence has become ever more
complicated. At the same time, division of labour has taken a global extent tying
various geographically and ideologically distinct areas together in one world eco-
nomic system. We may say the human being acts in society characterised by its
advanced commodification and the commodified society structurally permeates
our lives by setting up a complicated web of interconnections with geographically
and ideologically distinct others on a recursive and daily basis. The pervasive
significance of this form of organisation of human activity to everyday interac-
tion must surely be given a crucial role in accounts of social action. This was the
foundation of my argument in Chapter 4 above.
Another interrelated reason for giving great explanatory significance to the
base is that, by the material organisation of human life constituting the setting
in which everyday life is lived, this form of organisation draws in the masses of
people to the performance of the system on an enduring, day to day basis. As
is commonly accepted, historically the beginning of the era of capitalism was
marked, not by the qualitative emergence of the capitalist form of ownership
(which is age old), but by the quantitative broadening of the population base
whose form of organisation of human life is industrial capitalism53.
Now, these may be compelling observations, but what evidence is there that
Marx entertained them? In a nutshell, my argument here is that in Marx, as
indeed in Wittgenstein, the idea from the organisation of everyday human life
in particular ways, and the effects of this on human life, play a constitutive role
52Singer 1980; Wood 2004.
53This is noted, for example, by Weber 1930: Introduction, and Wallerstein 1983.
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in their approaches to human sociality. This, I argue, is the major commonality
between the two thinkers. Let us begin with the question what role does the idea
from the organisation of human life play in Marx?
One fundamental aspect has already been mentioned: Marx argues that the
human being produces the material basis of her existence and, most importantly,
historically she has engaged in this in the frame afforded by the social organisation
of this activity. Moreover, the form of socio-economic organisation of human life
is something essentially beyond the control of any individual being: “[i]n the
social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations,
which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate
to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production”, Marx
argued54. The indispensability of organisation to human life brings about ‘the
necessary need of intercourse with other men’. For Marx, the necessity springs
ultimately from the need of the human being to produce the material basis of her
existence.
Second, consider this passage in The German Ideology :
Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical conscious-
ness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really
exists for me personally as well; language, like consciousness, only
arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men.
Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product,
and remains so as long as men exist at all.55
One way to rephrase an underlying point of this passage is to say that the social
organisation of human life is where language is acquired and used. Language
arises and is used in the course of human interaction. And again, the need to
interact itself arises ultimately from the human need to produce the material
basis of her existence which is a collective affair taking place in the frame of the
organisation of human life in particular ways.
Third, in contrast to their hoarding mercantilist colleagues, many classical
economists such as Adam Smith celebrated the capacity of division of labour to
increase productivity seeing it as a precondition to a modern, efficient economy56.
Marx and Engels agreed, but argued in addition that the division of labour is also
a significant source of antagonism and contradictions in society. Basically, their
54Marx 2009.
55Marx & Engels 2007: 51.
56Smith 1904: Chapter 1.
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argument is that, due to the division of labour, people work and live in different
spheres of life and thus their interests naturally begin to diverge according to
what advances them in the particular role that they play in the economic struc-
ture57. Importantly, in Marx and Engels’ view, the source of antagonisms and
contradictions is systemic or organisational in nature, it resides in the organisa-
tion of human life in particular ways: social life is “antagonistic not in the sense of
individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals’
social conditions of existence”, as Marx put the point58. There is a similarity here
to Michel Foucault’s idea of power discussed earlier in this chapter: antagonism,
like power, is not merely binary in character where one represses the other, but
rather antagonism is built into the very organisation of human life in capitalist
society.
Fourth, in Marx’s view, the alienation that industrial market society produces
in its performers too has a systemic or organisational source: “we have to grasp
the intrinsic connection between private property, greed, the separation of labor,
capital and landed property; the connection of exchange and competition, of value
and the devaluation of man, of monopoly and competition, etc. —the connection
between this whole estrangement and the money system”, Marx wrote59. The
Marx commentator Peter Singer summarised the point well:
... Marx’s theory of history is a vision of human beings in a state
of alienation. Human beings cannot be free if they are subject to
forces that determine their thoughts, their ideas, their very nature
as human beings. The materialist conception of history tells us that
human beings are totally subject to forces they do not understand and
cannot control. Moreover the materialist conception of history tells
us that these forces are not supernatural tyrants, for ever above and
beyond human control, but the productive powers of human beings
themselves.60
In general, the argument from alienation employs the idea that the market
societal form of organisation puts the individual in a kind of a treadmill of work
and consumption that is not conducive to a good life. It can easily be seen that
alienation too is a systemic property pertaining to the social organisation of the
human productive activity in a certain manner. The general thrust of Marx’s
57Marx & Engels 2007: 44.
58Marx 2009.
59Marx 1844: First Manuscript.
60Singer 1980: 46.
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vision could indeed be described as the attempt to work out the implications of
the capitalist form of organisation of human life on the quality of human life61.
Marx’s approach is thus fundamentally systemic and orientated to the analysis
of the impacts of material organisation of human life on its quality.
From Metaphysical to Everyday Use
How, then, do these ideas make an appearance in Wittgenstein’s writings? I
argue that in Wittgenstein too, there is an emphasis on the importance of a base
of sorts, though it is not of economic nature. This does not, however, refute the
present comparison of Marx and Wittgenstein’s as analysts of the organisation
of human life. The guiding idea is not that the organisation has an economic
character, but that it is comprises actions of everyday quality.
Thus, as I have argued on a couple of occasions above, Wittgenstein often
draws attention to the circumstances surrounding language use, details of which
he often leaves unspecified, but of which he talks as if they were very ordinary
and well known62. Wittgenstein characterised his approach as one where “[w]hat
we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” by
reminding ourselves of how these words are actually used63. Further examples of
the importance of ‘everydayness’ in Wittgenstein’s approach are his discussion
of pain and exhibition of pain in ordinary circumstances as opposed to pain
being fundamentally a phenomenon of the privacy of one’s consciousness64 or
transcendentality of scepticism as compared to the everyday knowledge claims
we make easily and without doubts65, both of which we have discussed in detail
in the foregoing chapters.
We see then that Wittgenstein’s concern with everydayness is no concern with
the economic base as it is in Marx. However, based on the above considerations
from the commodification of society, one may argue that the base, as it is ex-
perienced by ‘the man on the street’, is not explicitly economic in character,
but rather mundane having to do in general with performing the various facets
of one’s occupational role as well as engaging in various acts of production and
consumption of goods and services. This is one important implication of every
61Elbe 2010: 598.
62See e.g. Wittgenstein 1958: §29., §33., §87., §117., §154.
63Wittgenstein 1958: §116.
64See e.g. Wittgenstein 1958: §244. ff.
65Wittgenstein 1975.
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artefact, service, commodity and infrastructure linking inextricably with the so-
cial processes of their production, maintenance and replacement. Thus, in my
view, what characterises the base is the mundane, everyday character of the ac-
tivities included in it that can at the same time be seen to have a significant
economic dimension. I argue thus that both Wittgenstein and Marx seek expla-
nations of social action, societal change and so on, in the organisation of human
everyday activity. To be sure, an important precondition of stable everydayness
is the stability of the economic form of its organisation but in everydayness this
often fades into the massively complex background that constitutes the setting
in which everyday life is lived.
I shall briefly try to peg my argument to some pieces of historical information
that we have of the kind of influence Sraffa exerted upon Wittgenstein. The
discussion will also give us a chance to look at some passages from Wittgenstein’s
Nachlass —his unpublished notebooks and other writings—, a source that is
practically unexploited in the Marx-Wittgenstein literature. This, however, is
not the place to analyse these passages here in great exegetical detail.
First, then, the biographical clue: Wittgenstein is reported to have said that
“the most important thing he gained from talking to Sraffa was an ‘anthropolog-
ical’ way of looking at philosophical problems”66. The following passage found
in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass would seem to relate to just this statement, for it
talks about looking at something anthropologically and attributes the theme to
a discussion with Sraffa:
Are the propositions of mathematics anthropological propositions say-
ing how we men infer and calculate? —Is a statute book a work of
anthropology telling how the people of this nation deal with a thief
etc.? —Could it be said: “The judge looks up a book about anthro-
pology and thereupon sentences the thief to a term of imprisonment”?
Well, the judge does not USE the statute book as a manual of an-
thropology. (Discussion with Sraffa)67
The issue of an anthropological way of looking at something is discussed at some
length in the surrounding pages of the notebook in which this passage appears,
but I want to highlight the following interesting characterisation of the difference
66Monk 1990: 261.
67MS 117, p. 172. The Nachlass is available in Wittgenstein 2000, 1996 and to some extent
online at www.wittgensteinsource.org. The original passage is in German. I have used the
translation from Wittgenstein 1978: §65. (p. 192), which however omits the phrase in brackets
(Discussion with Sraffa) that is there in the original notebook of Wittgenstein’s.
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between looking at a mathematical proposition anthropologically and looking at
it mathematically appearing in the same notebook some pages later:
We shall see contradiction in a quite different light if we look at its
occurrence and its consequences as it were anthropologically —and
when we look at it with a mathematician’s exasperation. That is to
say, we shall look at it differently, if we try merely to describe how
the contradiction influences language-games, and if we look at it from
the point of view of the mathematical law-giver.68
The passage is interesting for it connects ‘looking at something anthropologically’
with giving a description of it. Most interestingly for the present purposes, it
characterises the giving of descriptions as describing ‘how the contradiction influ-
ences language-games’. What is this influence like? A little earlier Wittgenstein
had written this: “When I say: ‘I don’t know my way about in the calculus’ —I
do not mean a mental state, but an inability to do something”69. In the present
organisatory reading, looking at how a contradiction influences language-games is
to look at language-games as systems in which the appearance of a contradiction
would mean changes in what one does in them. In the present reading, then, an
anthropological way of looking at something would involve looking at it as an
organised system of doing something.
This reading is supported by remarks such as the following that again at-
tributes the theme to a discussion with Sraffa:
(Sraffa) An engineer is working on a bridge; thereby he consults
different manuals; technical manuals and legal manuals. In one of
them he learns that the bridge will collapse if he constructs this part
weaker than etc. etc.; in the other that he would be locked up if he
would/wanted to build the bridge so and so ... —Now, do these man-
uals both stand on the same level?— It depends on what kind of a
role they play in his life ... The legal manual can be for him simply a
book about the natural history of the people around him.70
The case discussed here is different but essentially analogous to the one in the
above quoted passage, namely, one involving a contrast between descriptions
such as are given in technical manuals as opposed to prescriptions given in a
legal manual. A legal manual too, however, can be read as a mere description,
that is as an anthropological or natural historical observation. (The way the
68Translation from Wittgenstein 1978: §87. (p. 220), original in MS 117, p. 256.
69Translation from Wittgenstein 1978: §80. (p. 210), original in MS 117, p. 232.
70MS 212: 709. My translation.
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terms ‘anthropological’, ‘descriptive’ and ‘natural historical’ (and cognates) work
and intermingle in the Nachlass passages gives us a strong reason to think that
they are names for one and the same thing.) That is to say, a legal manual can
play such a role in someone’s life, as Wittgenstein put it. But to reiterate the
point for bringing up these passages here: to describe something (or to look at it
anthropologically or natural historically) is to describe it as an organised system
of living human life, part of which is to look at the effect of the appearance of a
contradiction upon this system, or again, to look at the role of something within
such a system.
A contrasting account of the ‘anthropological way’ is given by Peter Hacker.
The main lines of Hacker’s view are familiar from our discussion of mastery and
criteria in Chapter 6 above. Hacker argues that “[w]hat warrants using the epi-
thets ‘ethnological approach’ or ‘anthropological approach’ in describing Wittgen-
stein’s later philosophy” resides in that it views concepts
as techniques of using words. To have mastered a certain concept is
to have mastered the technique of the use of a certain word in some
language or other. To possess a concept is to be able to use a word or
phrase correctly, to explain what one means by it in a given context,
and to respond with understanding to its use.71
In discussion of Hacker’s views in Chapter 6 above I argued, one, that this view of
concepts does not pay adequate attention at individual differences in knowledge of
criteria, but as in the above passage links quite straightforwardly the possession of
a concept with its manifestation in use, the criteria for which we are in collective
possession. And, two, I argued that in this view of concepts essential is actually
not that they are used but that there are collective criteria for them. In other
words, in a characterisation such as Hacker’s, human sociality appears as defined
by the concept that social actors posses and share, whereas in the organisatory
reading the defining aspect is the social process with an organisation characterised
by reciprocity and complementarity of actions by differently placed actors with
no assumption of concepts being shared. And thus, despite the reference to the
accepted use of concepts as the criteria of their possession, Hacker’s view too is
ontological based on the idea of concepts as shared mental presentations.
I believe the above considerations allow the development of a fresh angle to
the question of Marx’s influence on the later Wittgenstein. Possibly due to the
71Hacker 2010: 18.
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constructivist-collectivist ontology often attributed to the later Wittgenstein, a
central aspect of Marx’s approach, namely the tracing of structural effects of the
organisation of human life on the character and quality of human life has not been
conceived as having possibly found its way in Wittgenstein’s views. Yet, in the
present reading of Wittgenstein, he shares with Marx the non-ontological focus
on the organisation of human life where the organisation is characterised, not
essentially by some shared ideology, mentality or the like, but the organisation of
human activity marked by reciprocity and complementarity, that is, by division of
labour, which may also embody disharmony or antagonisms as Marx was keen to
illustrate. To requote Marx and Engels, “language, like consciousness, only arises
from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men” which in my reading
is echoed in Wittgenstein’s “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of
a form of life”72. That is, in these perspectives language is looked at functionally
as part of organised, purposeful human interaction. Admittedly Marx employed
the idea to give a theory of class antagonism embodied in the organisation of
human life, which does not characterise Wittgenstein’s views, but the underlying
functional view of language they shared.
Practice Theory
I shall close this chapter with a final comparison, this time with the so-called prac-
tice theory. The concept of practice has its roots in the works of Anthony Giddens
as well as Pierre Bourdieu and Charles Taylor. However, the example of a practice
theory that I shall review here is that of Theodore Schatzki’s laid out in his Social
Practices73. The focus on Schatzki is justified in that his social theory is heav-
ily inspired by Wittgenstein allowing us to discuss the present Wittgensteinian
approach in contrast to another representative of Wittgensteinian approaches in
social theory.
In Schatzki’s view, expressed in an introductory piece to a collection of pa-
pers on practice theory, altogether four points can be seen to characterise the
practice theory74. First, there is the belief that “such phenomena as knowledge,
meaning, human activity, science, power, language, social institutions, and his-
torical transformation occur with and are aspects or components of the field of
72Wittgenstein 1958: §23.
73Schatzki 1996.
74Schatzki 2001: 2 ff.
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practices”, Schatzki writes. Second, the field of practices is characterised by the
interweaving within them of human activity with material entities and artefacts.
Third, the human performance of the field crucially involves “shared skills or un-
derstandings”. Fourth, “bodies and activities are ‘constituted’ within practices”
for instance in the sense that the practice highlights and perhaps even in some
sense defines certain properties of the human body. The last two points echo
Charles Taylor’s idea of embodied knowledge meaning such things as, in Taylor’s
example, that “the sense I have of my own importance is carried in the way I
swagger”75.
Schatzki presents his Wittgensteinian approach by way of a bewildering array
of distinctions and technical terms that can overwhelm the reader. The main
ideas, however, are clear enough. Central to Schatzki’s view of social life is that
it is a field of practices. A practice is “a temporally unfolding and spatially
dispersed nexus of doings and sayings”76 and social life in its totality a ‘nexus
of practices’ (‘the weave of life’). Practices involve recursive doings and sayings
by the participants in a continuous flow of interaction in particular locations
with associated material equipment. Schatzki also gives considerable space to
a discussion of the social nature of the human mind and body as expressing
‘conditions of life’ and ‘how things stand are going for someone’77.
Next, Schatzki (together with many Wittgenstein commentators, as we have
seen) goes on to characterise his view of what effectively seems to be the source of
action, or doings and sayings, in practices. In Schatzki’s view, doings and sayings
link together in practices by way of, first, “understandings, for example, of what
to say and do”, and sometimes also, second, “explicit rules, principles, precepts,
and instructions”. There is a third component that Schatzki calls “teleoaffective
structures”, that is, “ends, projects, tasks, purposes” with appropriate “beliefs,
emotions, and moods78. The three together Schatzki refers to as “the organiza-
tion” of practice79.
As in Giddens, what in some ways looks first like a rather classic conception
of knowledge of the social as mental content of some kind, goes also in Schatzki
through some significant modifications. First, similarly to Giddens, Schatzki
75Taylor 1995: 170-1.
76Schatzki 1996: 89.




argues that actors’ knowledge is in many cases practical know-how and often
“unformulable” in language80. The point is obviously important to Schatzki as it
is discussed at some length and vigour, more so than for example in Giddens. I
shall have more to say on this shortly.
The second aspect in terms of which Schatzki modifies the classic conception
of knowledge of the social is, as Schatzki writes, that
the teleological organization is attributed to the firm, not its employ-
ees. Parallel remarks apply to the rules and understandings ... since
participants observe different subsets of a practice’s rules and act out
different subarrays of its understandings.81
Now, this passage could perhaps be read as making a point analogous to
the one argued in Chapter 6 above that there are great individual differences
in knowledge, sensitivity, interests and perspectives to social reality. It appears
that in Schatzki’s view, the core of a practice does not reside solely in ‘the orga-
nization’ as shared (tacit, unconscious or ‘unformulable’) mental content of the
practitioners, but rather at least as much in the interconnections of doings and
sayings performed by differently situated individuals in possession of differing sit-
uated knowledge (‘subsets and subarrays’). But then, Schatzki never explicitly
makes this kind of statements and does not develop these ideas about subarrays
and subsets in any length. As shown above, in Giddens too there are significant
seeds for acknowledging individual differences in knowledge of the social but both
Schatzki and Giddens fail to pursue the implications.
Consider the point a bit closer. In a move with which we can agree Schatzki
denies that actors’ understandings cause their doings and sayings82 and writes
that ‘the organization’ does not exist “in the minds of the actors” but “out
there in the practices themselves”83. This means that most of the phenomena
Schatzki discusses —such as understandings, the expressive body and human
mental episodes— have identity only in the context of the flow of practices: they
gain “status from their place in the play of phenomena, occasions, and existing
life conditions, all this contextualized within practices of reaction, attribution,
and education”84. This would suggest that the social nature of meaning does not
reside in shared mentalities, but in shared frame of action.
80Schatzki 1996: 129 and 126 ff.
81Schatzki 1996: 105.
82Schatzki 1996: 109.
83Schatzki 1996: 105. Schatzki quotes these phrases from Charles Taylor.
84Schatzki 1996: 33.
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Then, by contrast, for example in Schatzki’s discussions of terms such as
‘understandings’, but also ‘signifying’85, ‘mattering’86, ‘intelligibility’ and others
—all these describing various ways in which meanings exist and function in social
settings— differences in peoples’ knowledge of various aspects of the social do
not play any noticeable role. Moreover, Schatzki appears to dismiss such dif-
ferences as pertaining only to, in Schatzki’s words, larger scale “ “cultural or
societal” divisions in understanding and intelligibility” arising from the mixing of
practices87. In a similar vein, occasionally we even find phrases in Schatzki that
echo the shared ideology picture: “actors and their we’s ... posses most of the
understandings against which their behavior expresses particular conditions”88.
I note, however, that as compared to some other approaches, a so-called prac-
tice theory, such as Schatzki’s is still rather sensitive to differences in knowledge
because conceiving the social as a ‘nexus of practices’ would seem to allow a
rather fine-grained look at the social. Practices would in particular highlight the
everyday character of human and social action within practices. Consider here
Schatzki’s development of Wittgenstein’s phrase ‘the weave [Teppich] of life’89.
Schatzki asks us to view social life as a weave of practices occurring “at particu-
lar places for particular lengths of time”90. Such an “intermeshing of practices”
would seem to allow for a rather flexible analysis of social life as an on-going
‘emergence’ (in the Foucaultian sense discussed above) of mutually interacting,
conflicting as well as supporting, ‘perspectives’.
A large body of theoretical work pursued for instance by a number of so-
ciologists of scientific knowledge (e.g. Harry Collins and Andrew Pickering) ex-
ists around the ideas from which Schatzki also draws. Themes here include the
idea of the agency of material things appreciating the role that instruments and
other artefacts play in shaping the practices involving them91. Authors speak of
posthumanist theorising to contrast themselves with the classic (over-)emphasis
on human cognition and agency as the sole root of all action in social life. They
champion the view, in the words of Andrew Pickering, that “the doings of ma-









in what transpires in social life, that is, “the non-human world is constitutively
implicated in the extension of culture and what precipitates out of it”92. Another
theme is the study of social actors in the very midst of their practical engage-
ment in their art in connection of which for instance Harry Collins has mounted
a spirited defence of the idea of tacit knowledge against critics such as Stephen
Turner (see Chapter 6 above)93.
I close on a critical note on the family of practice theories. While Schatzki’s
views can be formulated in a way that agrees with the present approach, the po-
sition of some features of the practice theory to the questions from the individual
differences in knowledge of the social and the related one of a shared ideology
as the core of human sociality still remains, in my view, to an extent ambigu-
ous. To illustrate the ambiguous position of the practice theory to the individual
differences in knowledge, consider here the American sociologist Ann Swidler’s
take on how the practice theory deals with ‘the problem of the subjectiveness
of meaning’. This problem relates closely to the idea of individual differences
in knowledge of the social in drawing from the observation that the central con-
stituent elements of culture we encounter in classic sociology (Weber, Parsons),
such as ideas and values, are difficult to find “in any coherent or consensual form
in the heads of particular actors” whose conduct allegedly is powered by such
ideologies, as Swidler puts it.94
Swidler argues that practice theories have dealt with the problem by two
means. First, having “de-emphasized what was going on in the heads of actors,
either individuals or collectives”, they cast human and social action as taking
place in the frame of practices and in these predominantly “as routine activities
(rather than consciously chosen actions)”95. The second move has been to iden-
tifying “the impersonal area of discourse”96 that, together with practices, forms
an “observable object for the study of culture”97.
However, it is hard to see how these strategies avoid ‘the problem of the
subjectiveness of meaning’. First, to cast human action as routine-like does not
really de-emphasise what is going on in the heads of the routinely acting actors.
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social action into some realm of dispositional unconsciousness, a realm that is
mental nonetheless and that therefore faces the question of how this knowledge
is shared and transmitted. Second, it is not clear without further ado as to
how discourses manage to be ‘impersonal areas’ somehow ordaining social action
without a recourse to the old ghost of actors’ grasp (ideas) of practices and
discourse.
The idea of impersonal areas of discourse Swidler’s paper illustrates by ref-
erence to the political scientist and social theorist William Sewell’s notion of
‘cultural schemas’, a notion apparently deriving originally from anthropology98.
Consider Sewell’s characterisation of schemas: they include “binary oppositions
that make up a given society’s fundamental tools of thought, but also the various
conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles of action, and habits of speech and ges-
ture built up with these fundamental tools”. Further such elements include “not
formally stated prescriptions but the informal and not always conscious schemas,
metaphors, or assumptions presupposed by such formal statements”.99 Needless
to say, all these notions hardly are immune to the charge from masking individual
differences in knowledge of them. Thus, I conclude that unfortunately Swindler’s
attempt to address individual differences in knowledge of the social appears to
come to no more than a re-branding and introduction back into circulation of the
old themes.
Conclusion
The connecting theme of the present chapter, the everyday character of our collec-
tive performance of the social, highlighted the importance of taking full account
in social theory of the organisation of human life as a recursive, mundane process
of human interaction characterised by division of labour or roles. Bringing out
the mundane nature of human and social action, characterised by interaction of
ideologically and geographically dispersed actors, helps to see social action as an





Nie wird es aber plausibel, daß die Menschen aus purer
Dummheit all das tun.
— Ludwig Wittgenstein1
This thesis has sought to give a multidisciplinarily grounded account of the cul-
tural causes of environmental problems discussed as a question in philosophical
and sociological theory of social action. The work can be seen to revolve around
one core idea employed in different but analogous contexts: to dispute the so-
called ideological approach in environmentalism and environmental history as well
as in philosophical and sociological theory by contrasting it with the so-called or-
ganisatory approach in both areas.
More precisely, I argued that in environmental historical and environmental-
ist accounts of the human relationship to nature, ideologies (world-views, values)
about nature are often cast as the mental drivers of human ecologically conse-
quential action. I claimed that analogously in many popular philosophical and
social theoretical works, shared conceptual schemes, shared criteria and stan-
dards or the like function as the mental source of social action. I argued then
that such so-called ideological approaches cannot explain certain core aspects of
our collective causing —or performance, to use the sociological jargon— of en-
vironmental problems in global industrial market society. The performance is
characterised, not by shared ideology, but by division of labour of culturally and
geographically dispersed actors who view global industrial market society from
differing perspectives and act in different positions with differing knowledge, be-
1Wittgenstein 1967: 235.
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liefs and interests. Humans are thereby, nevertheless, engaged in the performance
of a shared organisation of activity in reciprocal and complementary positions.
To account for these characteristics of our collective performance of global in-
dustrial market society and its environmental problems, I claimed that we need
an organisatory approach that sees our collective performance mediated by the
organisation of human activity in global industrial market society. All of these
ideas I also articulated theoretically by giving an original organisatory reading
of Wittgenstein. This reading I contrasted with, as well as positively related to,
a range of classic and contemporary approaches in (Wittgensteinian) philosophy
and social theory.
Pursuing one argument both in environmental as well as philosophical con-
texts, the thesis has a marked dual character. This dual character is reflected in
the title of the thesis as well as in the division of the thesis in two quite different
parts in which very different sets of literature and different, although essentially
parallel, arguments were pursued. This parallel resides in the suggestion made
in this thesis that the ideological approach to the human relationship to nature
can be viewed as a concrete example of the popular philosophical and social the-
oretical approach of explaining social action by reference to its alleged source in
a shared ideology. The bipartite division of the thesis also essentially contributes
to an ambitious and hopefully stimulating discussion of a pressing contemporary
problems with breadth and depth. There is breadth to the account in that di-
verse, multidisciplinary literature and issues were covered that yet converge under
the common header of the cultural causes of environmental problems. And there
is depth to the account in terms of the philosophical dimensions of social action
that the thesis explores in some detail. The detailed theoretical discussion of Part
2 allowed in particular the exposition of the deep embeddedness of the ideological
approach in our intellectual culture which, however, meant the relative absence of
the environmental theme in that part. Posing the issue of our collective causing
of environmental problems as a question in philosophical and sociological theory
of social or collective action represents a novel as well as ambitious manner of
looking at the human relationship to nature in human sciences. The reader may
well disagree with some particular observations and points made in the thesis,
but I believe that the overall dual manner in which the thesis analyses the human
relationship to nature is nonetheless a stimulating and challenging read.
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Part 1
In Part 1 my focus was on environmental sociological, environmentalist and envi-
ronmental historical literature and my intention to examine both the ideological
and the socio-economic backgrounds to our environmental crisis. In Chapter 2 I
began with a review of two broad orientations in environmental sociology to en-
vironmental problems. The so-called Ecological Modernisation Theory is hopeful
about the prospect, aided by technological discoveries, of an ecological transfor-
mation of political and business institutions and practices towards factoring in
environmental considerations in their operations. This view notes the deep depen-
dence of human well-being on global industrial market society as the provider of
work and livelihoods to the global masses —global inequalities notwithstanding—
and is therefore not keen to disturb the system more than is absolutely neces-
sary. The so-called Treadmill of Production approach, by contrast, is sceptical
of the transformation potential indicating the need for more drastic changes in
the organisation of human productive and consumptive activities to effectively
address overt human environmental burden. I did not seek to pick a side between
these two views but to highlight the role of global industrial market society as the
essential context in which environmental problems are caused, conceptualised as
problems and addressed. Global industrial market society as the context of our
environmental predicament indicates that somehow we must reconcile the unrec-
oncilable to overcome our “crushing dilemmas” as George Monbiot called them2;
that is, we must find ways to combine environmentally low-intensity organisation
of human life with providing the immensely large masses with some sort of bare
essentials of human life.
Interestingly, then, as I illustrated in Chapter 3, environmentalist and envi-
ronmental historical literature is often most readily geared towards an ideological
analysis of the human relationship to nature. In such works, as I showed with
extensive examples from a wide range of literature, the focus is often on the ex-
plication of the role of religious, scientific, philosophical and other ideas as the
fundamental drivers of human environmentally consequential activities. Such an
ideological approach is not conducive to comprehending the deep organisatory
or structural character of the human environmental burden. By close readings
of a number of environmental historical case studies, I attempted to show the
2Monbiot 2011d.
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often quick, and in my view implausible, attributions of ideological motivational
contents and beliefs to the various actors we encounter in the studies. Here also,
by way of an original historical case study of John Evelyn’s Sylva, the 17th cen-
tury classic of forestry, I attempted to reveal the multiplicity of differently placed
actors, perspectives and considerations that go into the making of the human
relationship to nature. The ideological approach, I argued later in Part 2, is
mirrored in the paradigmatic philosophical and social theoretical view that social
action is driven by shared knowledge, beliefs, conceptual schemes or some other
such ideology.
In Chapter 4 I presented a more realistic, organisatory, way of thinking about
the cultural causes and discussed global industrial market society and its intense
structural environmental burden as resulting from the daily activities of the glob-
ally dispersed masses. I concluded this discussion with drawing up four points in
terms of which of the ideological approach to the cultural causes of environmental
problems fails to account for our collective causing of environmental problems.
First, global industrial market society brings into interaction a strikingly hetero-
geneous mass of globally dispersed masses. This interaction is best looked at via
its form of organisation, not what the diverse actors might collectively know and
believe or what attitudes they might collectively hold.
The second point was that the intensity of the environmental burden generated
in global industrial market society is due to it extensively permeating the everyday
productive and consumptive activities of the global masses. I used the example
of the historical shift from trade in luxury to bulk goods and the implied shift
towards mass production and consumption to illustrate this. It is this thus not
the extraordinary level of ideologies, but the very ordinary, everyday activities of
the masses that we must look at in order to understand the human relationship
to nature.
My third point was that, given the very ordinary, everyday character of the ac-
tivities in terms of which we collectively perform global industrial market society,
our collective performance cannot be seen to have an effective general ideological
source. This point anticipates the theoretical argument of Part 2 in that, given
the dominance of methodological individualism and naturalism in philosophy, the
default tendency there often is to view human action as action at will under the
guidance of beliefs. In my view, however, this is a peculiarly unsuitable starting
point for understanding collective, everyday action, for there does not appear to
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be any general shared ideology that one could plausibly suppose to find in the
heads of the actors engaged in their diverse daily activities. There is nothing
“philosophically astonishing”, to use Wittgenstein’s phrase, about our everyday
activities. Yet, as illustrated for instance in the discussion of a number of environ-
mental historical case studies in Chapter 3, authors there often evoke dramatic
but on closer scrutiny largely empty phrases such as “metaphysical hatred” of
wildlife to explain the actions of the historical actors.
My fourth and final point was that when the human relationship to nature
is conceived ideologically as driven fundamentally by a set of beliefs, evaluative
orientations or a conceptual scheme, the essence of the relationship appears as
effectively arbitrary. This point too anticipates the argument of Part 2 in that it
works also a critique of the popular philosophical and social theoretical view of
social action as building upon collectively held, self-justifying and self-referential
beliefs (consensus). A parallel view can be found in the environmentalist litera-
ture according to which a change in ideology could bring about an effective change
in the human relationship to nature. In my view, this ideological argument ef-
fectively serves to obscure the deeply problematic structural character of human
environmental burden as a function of, not our ideologies, but the organisation
of human productive and consumptive activity.
Part 2
The concern in Part 2 was to show, with reference to a range of social theoretical
and philosophical literature as well as Wittgenstein’s philosophy, how we should
think about human action and social action in particular, to be disposed to
give, not an ideological, but an organisatory account of the cultural causes of
environmental problems. At the same time, Part 2 aimed to illustrate that in
our intellectual culture strong forces are operational that steer thought to an
ideological approach about human action, both individual and collective or social
action. Part 2 is a necessary complement to Part 1 in that the former subjects
to a philosophical critique the ideological approach to social action as found in a
range of philosophical and social theoretical literature that essentially parallels the
ideological approach to our collective causing of environmental problems discussed
in Part 1.
These aims were pursued as follows. In Chapter 5, I began with a brief
historical overview of what might be termed the methodological individualistic
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beginnings of modern philosophy in thinkers like Descartes, Locke and Kant who
in their distinctive ways set the paradigmatic emphasis on the essentiality of
the mind to explanations of human action and thought. I argued here that in
later classics of sociology, such as Weber and Parsons, individualism was to some
extent replaced by collectivism, but in one important sense the replacement was
not at all that radical. In these and many subsequent thinkers, the idea of the
essentiality of the mind to human action and thought was not disputed but in fact
extended to cover social or collective action: social action as collective action at
will under the guidance of shared beliefs became the guiding idea of the emerging,
and enduring, paradigm from sharing in philosophical and sociological theory of
social action. The critical reading of Weber’s ideological argument in his classic
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism given in Part 1 (Chapter 3, p.
32) could also have been given here as an explication of this paradigm.
In later chapters of Part 2, one of my main aims was to make explicit the role of
the collectivist paradigm from sharing, and the view of the essentiality of the mind
that goes with it, in a range of later philosophical and sociological theory. To-
wards this end, in Chapter 6 I reviewed Stephen Turner’s important critical work
against a tendency very similar to what I call the paradigm from sharing. I also
drew attention to some critical observations by Max Weber and Richard Sennett
on the difficulty of motivational analyses as well as on the known problem en-
countered routinely in survey research of reducing respondents’ diverse responses
to general conclusions. Similarly, analogous quick attributions of mastery and
knowledge of rules can be found in many representatives of Wittgensteinian phi-
losophy of which I gave examples. The chapter also contains a lengthy overview
of Anthony Giddens’ social theory which I found, despite many indications to
the contrary, also to preserve the paradigm from sharing in Giddens’ notion of
‘mutual knowledge’ as the foundation of social action. The issues raised can be
read as essentially parallel to the quick and overarching, and in my view implau-
sible, attributions of ideology made in environmental history which I illustrated
by several concrete examples in Part 1 (Chapter 3, p. 28).
I realise that the paradigm from sharing cannot be countered only by showing
weaknesses in the particular views and arguments it gives rise to. It is also
important to suggest an alternative which in this thesis I sought to do in terms
of developing an alternative reading of the later Wittgenstein. I began this in
Chapter 5 with an overview of the later Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical
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analysis, which I continued in much more detail in Chapter 7. In that chapter
I engaged in close reading of the later Wittgenstein to illustrate what I call his
non-ontological, organisatory and developmental approach to social action and
human sociality more generally. The point of contrast in this chapter was the
philosophy of John Searle that is explicit in its naturalistic ontological orientation
to certain modes of human cognition that in Searle’s view drive social action.
In my view, one of the most striking differences between my Wittgensteinian
perspective and some ontological approaches such as Searle’s is brought out in
Searle’s claim, quoted in my discussion above, that “[w]hen I say, for example,
that I am able to speak English, I am talking about a causal capacity of my
brain”3. In my view, this completely disregards the reasons for which someone
might convey to the other person that she is able to speak English and what
consequences this has to the development of their interaction. In this way, in
the Wittgensteinian perspective I propose, utterances about abilities for example
should be seen as moves (to use Wittgenstein’s term) made for some purpose or
another within the developing course of human interaction. Hence, for example,
a teaching situation Wittgenstein would not characterise in terms of the mental
processes in the teacher’s and the pupil’s brains or minds. Instead, he would
describe it as the very familiar developing process of the teacher giving examples
and the pupil responding.
More generally, in Wittgenstein’s perspective the focus is upon human interac-
tion as (recurring) processes that develop by participants’ reciprocal and comple-
mentary moves. Crucially, essential here is not that the participants share collec-
tive knowledge about these processes, but rather that their interaction takes place
within a common form of organised interaction. This Wittgenstein designated as
“not agreement in opinions but in form of life”. Analogously to Wittgenstein’s
idea, in the case of our collective performance of global industrial market society
and its environmental problems, the performance is fundamentally characterised
by a heterogeneous mass of geographically and culturally dispersed masses acting
out a shared form of organisation of their diverse activities. This illustrates the
way in which I bring the two parts of my argument, the environmental and the
theoretical, to a common conclusion. In my view, for us to to come to an organ-
isatory view about the human relationship to nature, it is essential to abandon
the paradigm from sharing and the associated idea of the essentiality of the mind
3Searle 1996: 129.
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to human action so widespread in philosophy and social theory.
Next, in Chapter 8, I developed my Wittgenstein reading in contrast with that
of the so-called Strong Programme associated with the work of David Bloor, Barry
Barnes and others. My perhaps most surprising claim here was that even these
Wittgensteinian critics of overt individualism can in the end be seen to represent
only a slight modification of the traditional emphasis on the essentiality of the
mind to explanations of human action. The Programme’s Wittgenstein reading
is thus a further case in the series of Wittgensteinian and other accounts of social
action discussed in this thesis that in my view have failed to appreciate the full
scale of Wittgenstein’s radically non-ontological, organisatory approach.
In Chapter 9 I sought to draw some positive parallels from my organisatory
reading of Wittgenstein with existing literature. I discussed Norbert Elias’s views
on social processes of interweaving of differently positioned individuals in a later
work contrasting this with the in my view ideological character of his approach in
the classic The Civilizing Process. I positively related my views to the work of the
seminal figure of Michel Foucault and the notion of postmodernism. I discussed
Foucault’s use of the ideas of structural power (as opposed to binary power) and
that of historical emergence.
In the same chapter I also contrasted my views with the so-called practice
theory, a significant recent development in modern social theory emphasising the
situatedness of social action in particular kinds of material settings as well as the
embodied quality of human understanding and engagement with artefacts as well
as fellow human beings. With regard to this view too, however, I found that while
they reject the traditional ontological focus on certain modes of human cognition
as the foundation of social action, the focus nevertheless remains in other, for
instance, embodied modes of cognition. Therefore, the practice theory, too, in
some ways struggles to shed the traditional focus on human cognitive capacities
as fundamental to explaning human action.
Finally, also in Chapter 9, I sought to draw a significant parallel between the
philosophies of Karl Marx and Wittgenstein. In general, this thesis has sought to
highlight Wittgenstein and Marx as thinkers whose ideas offer a clear organisatory
alternative to the ideological approach, but certain core ideas of both remain
widely rejected or ignored. Wittgenstein for example, wrote the philosopher Paul
Johnston, “is widely regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of this century
[the 20th] and yet the central thrust of his work is emphatically rejected by the
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current philosophical community”. In Johnston’s view, there has been a failure to
appreciate that Wittgenstein proposed “a radical new approach to the whole topic
of the Inner”4, a theme that also underlies my reading of Wittgenstein. Similarly,
Marx’s structuralist emphasis on the importance of the organisation of human
productive activity (the base, die Basis) over ideologies (the superstructure, der
Überbau) is frequently dismissed as too deterministic.
Yet, this thesis argued that a structuralist, non-ontological, organisatory view
of human action is needed to comprehend, among others, the deeply problematic
character of the human environmental impact. To be able to explain the intensity
of the human environmental impact, it is absolutely essential to take into account
the different everyday activities of the geographically and culturally dispersed
masses in division of labour, which we can best capture by obtaining a view of
the organisation of this collective activity.5
In Closing
The thesis has not attempted to work out a solution towards addressing environ-
mental problems. Perceptive potential solutions to our environmental dilemma
have been sketched by others, notably Herman Daly6. However, the thesis has
shown, to me at least, the deeply problematic character of the human environ-
mental burden in its deep embeddedness into the very fabric of the organisation
of human everyday life on global scale. This is very disconcerting. At the same
time, our ideologically orientated philosophical tradition is effectively not in the
position to analyse the structural character of our environmental dilemma, more
often than not focusing on the mental source of social action instead. More gen-
erally, while philosophical theory of social action would seem to be in an excellent
position to make a topical contribution to the discussion about the cultural causes
4Johnston 1993: ix, x.
5In my view, a similar argument could be made about the causes of the current economic
crisis that since 2008 continues to plague world economy. There too the widely accepted ex-
planation of the crisis is in many essential respects ideological in that the crisis is attributed to
the creed-driven invention of certain financial instruments of speculation and risk taking. An
alternative, and in my view deeper explanation, is fundamentally organisatory and found for
instance in the work of the Australian economist Steve Keen (2009). George Monbiot (2011b)
offers a good summary of Keen’s views. More generally, I find Monbiot’s views on our environ-
mental predicament in many essential ways similar to mine. Monbiot’s perceptive writings on
the environmental crisis, many of which appeared in 2011 in The Guardian and that I often
quote in the preceding chapters, have greatly encouraged me during the writing up process of
this thesis.
6Daly 1996; Jackson 2009; NEF 2010b.
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of environmental problems, this is not a case study in terms of which philosophers
have typically framed their views7.
The thesis indicates further that, as environmental problems are caused collec-
tively by social action in division of labour, also the solution must be a collective
endeavour in this sense. It is clear that global political will is needed to make
anything happen. Yet, also essential for meaningfully addressing environmental
problems is to afford everyone a tenable position in the new, ecologically more
sustainable organisation of human activity —a new division of labour, if you
like— otherwise there is no reason to expect effective reductions in the intensity
of human environmental impact. Unfortunately, all indications are that this may
well be too much to ask.
In an interesting way, then, sensitivity is needed for diversity of positions
within a shared broader organisation of human life. Such a sensitivity is apparent,
I think, in Wittgenstein’s respect of the diversity of human forms of life. In the
epigraph to the present chapter, Wittgenstein was commenting on the positivist
anthropology that he detected in the classic Scottish anthropologist Sir James
George Frazer’s (1854—1941) seminal work The Golden Bough. Wittgenstein
seems to have felt that Frazer’s approach to the primitives whose religious and
other practices he had studied was not, as we could put it, one of a human being to
another, but a much more distant, observational and analytical approach mixed
also with (implicit) ridicule of the peculiar ways in which these people with all
apparent seriousness engaged in their activities.8 And here Wittgenstein wrote
the phrase of the epigraph: “it will never be plausible to say that mankind does
all that [i.e. engages in ceremonial practices] out of sheer stupidity”9.
Now, the parallel I see here with our present topic of our collective causing of
environmental problems is that, in a peculiar way, we seem to be in the need of
making our own culture and age seem plausible to ourselves. We must not dismiss
7Shove 2010.
8Also Talcott Parsons criticised Frazer speaking of “positivist thinking” characterised by
“the strong tendency ... to minimize the [social] importance of religion, to treat it as a matter
of ‘superstition’ ” (Parsons 1954d: 198). In Peter Hacker’s view, Wittgenstein felt aversion
to the culture represented by Frazer for its incapacity or lack of awareness of “the [universal
human] ceremonial impulse to give expression to what is awesome, wondrous, terrible, tragic in
human experience” (Hacker 2001: 93).
9Wittgenstein 2010: 119. This passage stems from Bemerkungen über Frazers The Golden
Bough or Remarks on Frazer’s The Golden Bough, a series of remarks written in German by
Wittgenstein in his notebooks over the course of ten years from the early 1930s onwards. They
were published posthumously and are rather unpolished. They were first published in 1967 in
German (Wittgenstein 1967).
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our relationship to nature as dictated by the sheer stupidity of technocratic,
consumption-orientated materialism or some other such ideology, aspects that
we often ridicule and demonise in our own culture. For never will it become
plausible that the modern human being engages in all these activities out of
sheer stupidity. A deeper and more complex account is needed to comprehend
the deeply problematic character of our present environmental dilemma.
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